| |
| | What is A Priori about Action (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-19) |
 | | In the conceptual domain of intensional psychology, there are said to be such constitutive principles associated with the assignment of content: “the content of a propositional attitude derives from its place in the pattern [of states]”; and that pattern is said to involve “a large degree of consistency,” or rationality, and correctness (1980b, 221). |
 | | But, then, primary intension is not something an individual language learner, qua competent language user, must know, have acquired, or have anything approaching full cognitive access to. |
 | | D is not an intension, for, as used in these discussions, an intension is a function that fixes the extension of a concept, depending on the world. |
| cas.memphis.edu /philosophy/dkhndrsn/ActionTalk.htm (9480 words) |
|