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	Encyclopedia: Intentionality (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		The philosophical analysis of intentionality yields a clear logical characterization of this fundamental theoretical division in the social sciences and biology: "mentalistic" theories are all and only those making ineliminable use of intentional idioms, and hence inheriting the logical problems of construing those idioms coherently.
		Dispensing with intentional theories is not an attractive option, however, for the abstemious behaviorisms and physiological theories so far proposed have signally failed to exhibit the predictive and explanatory power needed to account for the intelligent activities of human beings and other animals.
		The basic idea is to explain the intentionality of mental states in terms of their biological functions, which might in turn be given a reductive account in terms of evolutionary history.
	www.nationmaster.com /encyclopedia/Intentionality (1143 words)

	Intentionality (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		Brentano's use of 'intentional inexistence' is liable to confuse.
		Intentions, for instance the intention to buy a cat, are just one of many types of intentional mental states.
		But aboutness surely won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep...If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with (or maybe of their supervenience on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic.
	mit.edu /abyrne/www/intentionality.html (3064 words)

	Naturalizing
		Intentionality, as Brentano originally introduced the term in modern philosophy, was meant to provide a distinctive characteristic definitively separating the mental from the physical.
		Intentionality is the power to reach out to objects, whether logical and mathematical verities or perceptual things, but this power is achieved only by the constitution (or giving) of meaning.
		Intentionality is not like a searchlight that can shine indisriminately on any of its objects; the act itself has an internal structure that matches it to that which it is about.
	www.ucs.mun.ca /~davidt/Naturalizing.html (5857 words)

	tabled1
		Many have contemplated that this intentionality may be the mark of the mental, and taken consciousness as at least a main part of the mental, the remainder being our various capabilities and dispositions.
		The general question in front of us, then, is whether the various philosophical doctrines of intentionality satisfy a requirement on accounts of consciousness that is given in the various remarks, and also whether the account of perceptual consciousness as existence satisfies the requirement.
		Summary of objections to doctrines of intentionality: (a) Hamlet without the prince, (b) nonsensical relation to non-existent object, (c) vagueness of "mind," (d) vagueness of mind-to-content relation, (e) obscurity of content-to-thing "relation" of representation, (f) incompleteness, (g) missing the subject entirely, (h) general interpretation problem with Searle.
	www.ucl.ac.uk /~uctytho/consciousness_as_existence3.htm (11419 words)

	HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER AND THE INTENTIONALITY QUESTION
		The meaning of an intentional entity is related to the meaning of that general entity, that being, in Heidegger's terminology, Dasein, which has that intentional state and also some other states.
		Instead of making intentional states central from which overt acts are derived, Heidegger takes the intentionality of overt acts as primary and of inner states as secondary.
		So the necessary condition of a goal-directed intentional overt act is its practice, appropriately chosen, learning proper manner of tool use, and since engaging in a practical activity is a necessary condition for having intentionality, a person engages in a practical activity if he intends tools as tools by using them.
	www.ul.ie /~philos/vol7/husserl.html (3982 words)

	Collective Intentionality
		However, the term “collective intentionality and sociality” in its widest sense includes social ontology, philosophy of sociality, part of moral and political philosophy and at least parts of social epistemology, and the counterparts to these fields in neighbor sciences (such as psychology, sociology, economics, and political science).
		To wit, collective intentionality has so far played hardly any role in social science theorizing, although it deserves to be a central object of study and also serves to create explanations for collective action and phenomena generated by it.
		Collective Intentionality III was held at EIPE (of Erasmus University) in Rotterdam in December 2003; the main organizational burden was carried by Uskali Mäki and Frank Hindriks.
	www.helsinki.fi /~pylikosk/collint/group.html (810 words)

	Bloomsbury.com - Research centre
		Intentionality (Latin, 'tend onto'), in philosophy, is aboutness, or object directedness.
		And the picture is intentional because it is a picture of Windsor castle, because it is 'directed at' the object Windsor castle.
		But not all intentional mental states are intentions; beliefs are intentional but are not intentions.
	www.bloomsburymagazine.com /ARC/detail.asp?entryid=102286&bid=2 (149 words)

	Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content
		But the presupposition thesis is satisfied because, on the face of it, the intentionality of singular concepts depends on what those general concepts refer to: 'dolphin' and 'animal' refer to kinds or properties, and according to the externalist this constitutes, at least in part, the singular concept's intentionality.
		The subjective intentional properties of non-perceptual concepts are always of matter of, as it were, looking sideways via their connections with perceptual concepts.
		Intentional directedness is an object-independent property, and it does not involve relations to objects.
	www.nyu.edu /gsas/dept/philo/courses/concepts/loar.html (12726 words)

	Intentionality
		They depend for their intentionality on their being the creations and tools of creatures with minds, and particular representations derive their specific aboutness from the specific aboutness of the ideas, beliefs, and intentions of their creators.
		The logical oddity of intentional idioms, and their resistance to regimentation, has led Quine and several other theorists to declare the bankruptcy of all intentional theories, on grounds of logical incoherence.
		A close examination of the most powerful of these theories reveals intentional idioms inexorably creeping in--for instance in the definition of the stimulus as the "perceived" stimulus and the response as the "intended" effect, or in the reliance on the imputation of "information-bearing" properties to physiological constructs.
	ase.tufts.edu /cogstud/papers/intentio.htm (3980 words)

	Collective Intentionality [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
		Shared intentions, according to Bratman, are to be identified with the state of affairs consisting of a set of interrelated individual intentional states.
		And in normal cases of shared intention (cases where there is no coercion or where I am not in control of your actions), the other agent is seen as being in control of his or her own actions.
		The operative members must intentionally and jointly accept P as the view of the group, where joint acceptance simply means that each operative member accepts p as the view of the group and this is common knowledge.
	www.iep.utm.edu /c/coll-int.htm (10298 words)

	Evolution, Error and Intentionality
		An individual's intentional states and events (types and tokens) could not be different from what they are, given the individual's physical, chemical, neural, or functional histories, where these histories are specified non- intentionally and in a way that is independent of physical or social conditions outside the individual's body.
		Intentionality, according to Brentano, is supposed to be the "mark of the mental" and yet the chief beauty of the Darwinian theory is its elimination of Mind from the account of biological origins.
		We may call our own intentionality real, but we must recognize that it is derived from the intentionality of natural selection, which is just as real--but just less easily discerned because of the vast difference in time scale and size.
	ase.tufts.edu /cogstud/papers/evolerr.htm (12345 words)

	Minds, Brains, and Programs (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		Such intentionality as computers appear to have is solely in the minds of those who program them and those who use them, those who send in the input and those who interpret the output.
		Whatever else intentionality is, it is a biological phenomenon, and it is as likely to be as causally dependent on the specific biochemistry of its origins as lactation, photosynthesis, or any other biological phenomena.
		Intentionality is by definition that feature of certain mental states by which they are directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world.
	bbsonline.org /documents/a/00/00/04/84/bbs00000484-00/bbs.searle2.html (8730 words)

	Intentionality (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		Intentionality, identity, and delusions of control in schizophrenia: a Husserlian perspective (1).
		Lewis states that intentionality is best studied within an active...
		building-blocks, that is, agent(s) intentionality and status-bestowing acts.
	hallencyclopedia.com /Intentionality (515 words)

	Intentionality 1
		One account is this: that language items get their intentionality from the intentionality of mental items.
		So it is held that the intentionality of language is to be explained by the intentionality of thought or consciousness.
		I suppose the language of thought hypothesis would be an example of the other approach, that mental intentionality comes from linguistic (or quasi-linguistic) intentionality, although the language in question is not a natural language but a language of thought.
	www.lancs.ac.uk /depts/philosophy/courses/222/22215intentionality1.htm (1065 words)

	The Rosenthal-Sellars Correspondence on Intentionality
		We might then distinguish two senses of '"means"-statement' as follows: (1) 'statement which is about intentional items (no matter what their determinate factual character is)' and (2) 'statement which is about items which exhibit intentionality and a certain (linguistic) determinate factual character'.
		Thus, their concept of an explanation of behavior in terms of intentional items coincides with their concept of an explanation in terms of what we would call Rylean intentional items, i.e., in terms (roughly) of what people say or are disposed to say.
		An Ockhamite intentional item must have a determinate factual character (though we may not know what it is, save in very generic terms) by virtue of which it is able to play a certain Ockhamite role (conceived by analogy with a certain Rylean role).
	ditext.com /sellars/rsc.html (11188 words)

	Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind - Searle, John (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		Consistent with the focus on intentionality, his interest turned to philosophy of mind, where his major work can be seen as consisting in three main efforts: a critique of computationalism and strong Artificial Intelligence (AI); the development of a theory of intentionality; and the formulation of a naturalized theory of consciousness.
		Intentionality played an important role in Searle's philosophy going back as far as his early work in speech act theory.
		Searle also analyzes intentional states in terms of their directions of fit (which can be world-to-mind, mind-to-world, or null) and directions of causation (which can be mind-to-world or world-to-mind).
	www.artsci.wustl.edu /~philos/MindDict/searle.html (921 words)

	Amazon.com: Intentionality : An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge Paperback Library): Books (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		Intentionality is taken to be the crucial mental phenomenon, and its analysis involves wide-ranging discussions of perception, action, causation, meaning, and reference.
		As a preliminary formulation we might say: Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world.
		The current philosophical debates about what is the mind and how can it translate intentions into body actions including language and action are summed up into a convincing, clear-headed, yet arrogant and extremely mis-guided approach to this philosophical question.
	www.amazon.com /exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0521273021?v=glance (1355 words)

	UCR CHASS: Department of Philosophy
		“Attention and Sensorimotor Intentionality,” forthcoming in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, edited by David Smith and Amie Thomasson.
		Phenomenality, Intentionality, and Reflexivity: Replies to Ludwig and Thomasson,” Psyche 8(09) October 2002.
		Guest Lectures on Merleau-Ponty and “Motor Intentionality,” for Hubert Dreyfus’ Course in Phenomenology, University of California, Berkeley, February-March 2002.
	www.philosophy.ucr.edu /people/siewert (677 words)

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