
	Where results make sense

Topic: Internalism and externalism

Related Topics

Twin Earth thought experiment

Phenomenology

Gareth Evans (philosopher)

David Hume

The Theory of Social and Economic Organization

Clark Howard

Quantum number

Moira MacTaggert

Angst

Blast furnace

Santa Clara Valley

Apollo Theater

Slug barrel

Animal shell

New Right (Netherlands)

	The KK (Knowing that one Knows) Principle [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
		Externalist theories say that warrant may be external to our cognitive perspective, and that empirical investigation may be needed to ascertain which of our beliefs have it.
		For, if warrant may be external to our cognitive perspective, then there is no special reason to expect those who know that p to be in a position to know that their belief that p is warranted.
		To see that internalists can reject the KK principle, note that it is possible to adopt a position on which one is not always in a position to know about the internal, mental properties that are normally accessible to introspection and reflection.
	www.iep.utm.edu /k/kk_princ.htm (4744 words)

	20th WCP: Intuitions
		Global externalism has it that every term's extension is dependent on environmental factors; global internalism tells us that every term's extension is determined by a sense that's independent of such factors.
		Someone attracted to externalism and CM might be attracted to localphil internalism (i.e., local internalism that include philosophical concepts in the class of concepts that are supposed to be understood in internalist terms).
		The localphil internalist thinks these sorts of cases imply externalism for non-philosophical terms; it would seem therefore, that she's committed to the same sort of conclusion when philosophical concepts are involved — in the absence, of course, of a good reason for thinking otherwise.
	www.bu.edu /wcp/Papers/Meth/MethCapp.htm (3103 words)

	Intellectual Virtues (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Externalism says that the truth of any given belief is completely dependent upon the external world, where truth is secured simply by the way things happen to be.
		Internalism is different in that it moves justification from the external towards the internal.
		Externalism seems to imply that, since justification is external, beliefs are simply forced upon us, and we are unable to arrive at knowledge through a process of deliberation and reflection.
	www.class.uidaho.edu /ngier/_disc4/0000008d.htm (7634 words)

	Internalism/Externalism: Annotated Bibliography
		Internalism's cornerstone, which conjugates the representational theory of mind, according to which propositional attitudes are relations between organisms and their mental representations, and the computational theory of mind, according to which mental processes have access only to formal-non-semantic, syntactic, properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.
		Weak externalism, according to which a state only depends on the existence of the external objects it is about, is preferable to strong externalism, which holds that a state depends on factors lying in the subject’s external environment.
		Both internalism and externalism can divide into two versions, depending on whether the qualifying claim of these doctrines is taken to hold with respect to either mental types or their tokenings.
	host.uniroma3.it /progetti/kant/field/voltoli.html (6304 words)

	Talk:Internalism and externalism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		These need to be moved to internalism and externalism (epistemology), internalism and externalism (philosophy of language, etc. (note, isms are not capitalized in philosophical writing, generally speaking).
		From the article: "One strand of externalism is reliabilism" I have to question this.
		Aside from being not uncontroversial, the definitions of (linguistic) internalism and externalism aren't obviously mutually exclusive; one might take it that 'meaning' is determined by what language users know, and that the relevant knowledge states are individuated by environmental factors, and hence come out as both internalist and externalist!
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Talk:Internalism_and_externalism (404 words)

	Book Review
		Internalism is the position that the conditions for justification must be appropriately internal to the knower's perspective.
		Externalism is simply the denial of internalism, holding that the conditions for justification need not be within the knower's perspective.
		That there are external conditions on knowledge which an agent cannot (even in principle) reflectively determine to have obtained, whilst inconsistent with the Transparency thesis, is not incompatible with internalism because it does not prejudice the issue of whether or not the internalist conception of justification is necessary for knowledge.
	sorrel.humboldt.edu /~essays/pritchard.html (8235 words)

	Internalism Defended
		Internalism is a view about which states, properties, and events can contribute to epistemic justification - the sort of justification that, in sufficient strength, is a necessary condition for knowledge.
		Internalism in epistemology is the view that only internal states of the cognizer can be relevant in determining which of the cognizer's beliefs are justified.
		What internalism in epistemology and philosophy of mind have in common is that being in some condition which is of philosophical interest - being epistemically justified in certain attitudes, or having attitudes with certain contents - is settled by what goes on inside of cognitive beings.
	www.ling.rochester.edu /~feldman/papers/intdef.html (11829 words)

	Externalism About Mental Content
		Externalism is clearly true of knowledge of the environment, since one can know that it is raining outside only if it is indeed raining outside.
		Suppose semantic externalism is correct, that the meanings of words as used by a speaker depends in part on his relations to the physical or social environment.
		In all versions of externalism discussed earlier, the mental contents of a subject are supposed to depend on aspects of the environment which are clearly external to the subject's cognitive processes.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/content-externalism (6582 words)

	Internalism/Externalism: Entry
		Taken in their simplest versions, externalism and internalism are the conceptions according to which, pending on the broad vs. the narrow identification of an intentional state, the content of such a state can legitimately be conceived only either as relational or as non-relational respectively.
		For internalists, no external object or event which lies or occurs outside a subject’s brain (or at most its body) is relevant for the individuation of the content of an intentional state.
		McGinn (1989)), strong externalism holds that an intentional state depends on factors lying in the subject’s external environment, whereas weak externalism says that a state only depends on the existence of the external objects it is about.
	host.uniroma3.it /progetti/kant/field/voltolini.html (2139 words)

	dee dee dot com
		Descriptivism is similar to internalism in that it requires the content of a mental state to have a description to individuate one state from another, and it is these internal mental states, or the description, which determine the content of that specific state.
		Descriptivism is similar to internalism, suggesting that our beliefs, propositional attitudes, or the descriptions we give to objects in the world determine their meaning—that thing A and thing B are distinguishable from each other by our description of each, and that all those facets of the mental state are in the head.
		Despite the competing external, social view and internal, individualistic psychological view, it seems meaning cannot be wholly one or the other, and must somehow rely on a combination of internalism and externalism.
	www.dangerrrdoll.com /Content/Writing/Articles/essay8.html (1803 words)

	Studies in the History of Ethics: James Edwin Mahon (Site not responding. Last check: )
		In particular, internalism held that “judgments of obligation must be practical in the further sense that their being efficacious in influencing behavior is somehow logically internal to them”, that “motivation is somehow… “built into” judgments of moral obligation” (Frankena, 1958, p.
		Internalism of this sort has loomed large in the twentieth-century arguments for ethical noncognitivism—that is, for the view that ethical judgments have no cognitive content and so cannot literally be true or false, but rather express noncognitive (in this case motivation-laden) mental states.
		Internalism was not an impetus for arguing for emotivism originally, and the internalist argument for emotivism that he borrowed from Field was only used once.
	www.historyofethics.org /082005/082005Mahon.html (7636 words)

	[No title]
		In a third sense, internalism and externalism oppose each other on whether moral reasons are intrinsically (but not essentially) motivating, that is, on whether, when they do motivate at all, they do it in their own right or not.
		Internalism is predominant in the recent debate, for some good reasons: 1) externalism has difficulties in explaining in which sense a moral reason can be normative for a particular subject; 2) in an externalist framework, it is not clear what normativity amounts to; 3) externalism cannot explain the practicality of practical reason, i.e.
		Internalism seems to have difficulties in granting the second demand as far as it tries to respond to the first (as in Williams's version).
	sifa.unige.it /2eve/RO99/abs/mor.htm (1073 words)

	Internalism and Externalism (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Internalism and Externalism are two rival views in epistemology.
		To stress, Internalism and Externalism are not additional rivals to Foundationalism and Coherentism.
		In the end, you still may be unconvinced by externalism, but hopefully this will give you a better feel for what the view is trying to claim.
	www.unc.edu /courses/2002fall/phil/032/001/internalism.html (1554 words)

	Desert Landscapes » Blog Archive » Internalism and Externalism about the Good Life (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Internalism is roughly the view that what makes a good life is internal to the agent.
		Externalism is roughly the view that what makes a good life is (at least partly) external to the agent.
		This is a different sort of case, because, of course, I’m trying to tug at an intution that if someone is severely misled about not only her prudential well-being but her moral worth as well, her delusional beliefs alone cannot determine her life to be good (in the broadest sense of good).
	www.arizonaphilosophy.com /index.php?p=52 (3341 words)

	AW: Fw: [Fis] Is the distinction between internalism and externalism morethan aparticular philosophy of mathematics? (Site not responding. Last check: )
		The “internal” is traditionally called “subjective”, the “external” is usually called “rational”.
		Februar 2005 13:02 An: Koichiro Matsuno; fis@listas.unizar.es Betreff: Re: Fw: [Fis] Is the distinction between internalism and externalism morethan aparticular philosophy of mathematics?
		The internal relations that remain can be treated as qualities, so that everything in the world fits a subject-predicate logic.
	webmail.unizar.es /pipermail/fis/2005-February/000920.html (1113 words)

	Abstract: Judgement internalism and externalism: a deprived debate
		Judgement internalism is the metaethical view that there is an internal or conceptual connection between practical normative (usually read moral) judgement and motivation.
		This paper argues that whether the connection in question is conceptual or not is wholly underdetermined by resources internal to the debate, and that the debate therefore fails to clarify the deeper issues at hand.
		I argue that, at the limit, internalism will amount to the claim that, if A judges he ought to x then, so long as nothing prevents judgement from producing motivation, A is motivated to x.
	www.societies.stir.ac.uk /sppa/proceedings/papers/srobertson38056abstract.html (510 words)

	Lecture Notes, Lehrer's Theory of Knowledge, Chapter 7, Externalism and the Truth Connection (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Lehrer describes the difference between the externalism and internalism by considering what is required to "convert" true belief to knowledge.
		There is no fault in her; the defect is external to her and lies in the circumstances that invincibly deceive her.
		"The error of externalism is to fail to notice that the subject of knowledge must accept and be correct in accepting that the internal conditions of trustworthiness are connected with the externalist relations" (p.
	hume.ucdavis.edu /phi102/tkch8.htm (6591 words)

	Epistemology
		Central to his account are the pivotal role played by a principle of self-trust and his insistence that a sound epistemology must ultimately be ecumenical in nature, combining elements of internalism and externalism.
		This match of internal and external factors follows from Lehrer's new coherence theory of undefeated justification.
		Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues by Ernest Sosa, Laurence Bonjour (Great Debates in Philosophy: Blackwell) Epistemology is the theory of episteme, of knowledge.
	www.wordtrade.com /lists/epistemology1.htm (739 words)

	a dilemma for internalism (Site not responding. Last check: )
		If internalism is subject either to the regress problems mentioned in (III) or to the prominent objection to externalism mentioned in (IV), then we should not endorse internalism.
		According to premise (I), an essential ingredient of internalism is the requirement (for justification) that there be some sort of actual or potential awareness of something on the part of the subject.
		externalism is problematic insofar as it says that a belief can be justified even though, relative to all the subject is nonconceptually aware of, the belief isn’t likely to be true.
	web.ics.purdue.edu /~bergmann/dilemma.htm (10459 words)

	JumboBody » Philosophical Interests
		Basically I defend the conditional conclusion ‘P –> Q’, where P is externalism with respect to epistemic justification and Q is the exclusivism typically defended by reformed epistemologist philosophers such as Plantinga, Alston, and Wolterstorff.
		Given externalism with respect to warrant, I argue in defense of a Reformed epistemological view of Christian exclusivism.
		In short, taking Plantinga’s strategy, I argue for the following conclusion: if true, given externalism, Christian belief can be warranted even when one cannot show all the other religions to be false.
	www.jumbobody.com /blog/index.php/philosophy-papers (439 words)

	2002b (Site not responding. Last check: )
		The debate on internalism and externalism is often constructed in the form of an outright opposition between mental content and mental causation.
		Some may claim that because there is no proper explanation of the role of externalist mental content in the internal causation of behavior, physicalism has failed.
		We submit, however, that the debate on internalism versus externalism does not need a winner, but rather a dissolution of the opposition between the two.
	www.socsci.kun.nl /~haselag/publications/2002b.html (484 words)

	Access Externalism (Site not responding. Last check: )
		If you can have the internal fact without the external fact, and there are differences in justification only when there are differences in the internal facts, it’s tempting to suppose there’s some sense in which the internal facts are doing all the work.
		The presence or absence of an external fact, all by itself, is directly relevant to justification.
		The fact that some external facts are directly relevant to justification in this way does not suggest that they all are.
	www.unl.edu /philosop/people/faculty/gibbons/access.htm (9755 words)

	Externalism Internalism and Self Knowledge (Site not responding. Last check: )
		It was systematized by Burge and others, and became an alternative program to internalism.
		As against this, Boghossian, Bruekner, Butler and others argued that (the fact of) self-knowledge of content is incompatible with externalism.
		I show that new distinctions and concepts that are introduced by the contenders are initiated by arguments presented by the other party.
	www.tau.ac.il /humanities/philos/iasc/pisa/senderow-pisa-abs.htm (383 words)

	Seminars (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Contemporary epistemology has been much concerned with the dispute between Internalism and Externalism.
		There are disagreements within each camp about the analyses of knowledge, justification, and more generally, what matters epistemologically, as well as the somewhat second-order dispute between the camps.
		In this seminar, we will look both at the internal attempts to 'do epistemology' as well as this broader internalism/externalism issue.
	philosophy.wisc.edu /forster/PhilSci/seminars.htm (367 words)

	Internalism vs. Externalism: A debate about J-Factors (Site not responding. Last check: )
		J-factors need to be internal to the subject’s mind.
		Where "internal to subject’s mind" means, roughly, "accessible to the subject by reflection"
		Note: Reliabilism is a specific form of externalism (because "being a product of a reliable process" is something that might not be accessible to the subject by reflection).
	www.unc.edu /~theis/Exp&R/jfactors.html (174 words)

	PH29A Internalism/Externalism
		Of recent years, one such contrast that has come to the fore in various areas of philosophy is that between "internalism" and "externalism".
		The crucial claim here is that the meaning of bits of language is not purely an internal matter but depends rather on our causal interactions with the rest of the world.
		English speakers refer to trees by using tree because they have interacted with actual trees in acquiring their language; a group of people brought up in an environment with no trees but only plastic imitations would not be using that word in the same way.
	www.uwichill.edu.bb /bnccde/PH29A/ph29aintext.html (834 words)

	Re: internalism vs. externalism (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Perhaps this mental state is in principle accessible. But do to a kind of internal constipation one can't get it out to consciousness so-to-speak.
		The fact that externalism does not pick out a property necessary for one particular epistemic desiderata does not imply that it fails to pick out a property essential to some epistemic desiderata.
		Quite a few externalists are willing to concede your point about "justification." >It > holds that there is at least one aspect of > that-which-is that the cognizer is not aware > of, or has no access to, and that this unknown > aspect of that-which-is is what confers > justification.
	www.ccir.ed.ac.uk /~jad/vantil-list/archive-Oct-2002/msg00007.html (347 words)

	>-- The Garden of Forking Paths --<: Alternative Possibilities and the gap
		The analogy is with belief: on an internalist view of belief, belief has an internal relationship with truth, such that there can’t be a gap between ‘I believe that p’, and ‘I take p to be true’ (hence Moore’s paradox).
		I think there is a tendency in the literature to think that the demand for alternative possibilities is naturally associated with libertarianism.
		I think this is a mistake: the demand for alternative possibilities is the product of externalism, not of any version of incompatibilism.
	gfp.typepad.com /the_garden_of_forking_pat/2004/09/alternative_pos.html (780 words)

Try your search on: Qwika (all wikis)