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Topic: Joseph Raz

	Joseph Raz - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Joseph Raz is a legal, moral and political philosopher.
		Raz is one of the most influential living legal philosophers and an advocate of legal positivism.
		In political philosophy Raz is a proponent of a Perfectionist Liberalism.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Joseph_Raz (387 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-13)
		Using Raz’s claims about government’s over-reaching as a guide, I will provide a rough formalism of the reliability condition on political authority, one that reflects the spirit of the justificatory theory that Raz proposes, and that would fail to be satisfied in the sorts of cases of state over-reaching he cites.
		Raz certainly seems to have just such a test in mind, since he claims that the sorts of cases where the government might fail the test are those involving a subject with a certain amount of expertise in a given area.
		Raz makes a global demand on such a condition when he argues that we must take into consideration the effect on subject’s performance-in-conformity-with-right-reasons that attempting to determine the right course of action in a given situation is likely to have.
	www.u.arizona.edu /~anhabib/Raz.doc (3560 words)

	Case of Guy Joseph Raz - Teacher (Pasadena , CA)
		Raz obtained the girl's e-mail address and those of other students while teaching a religion class at the temple last year, according to an investigator's affidavit.
		Raz was arrested by undercover FBI agents upon his arrival at the library and refused to give a statement, says an affidavit by the detective, Christopher A. Hicks, assigned to the FBI as a special U.S. marshal.
		Raz had made plans to meet the girl in the library's ancient studies section, not realizing he was communicating with a detective from the Sheriff's Department, whom the girl's parents contacted weeks earlier.
	www.theawarenesscenter.org /Raz_Guy.html (1690 words)

	Value-pluralism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Oxford philosopher and historian of ideas, Isaiah Berlin, is credited with being the first to write a substantial work describing the theory of value-pluralism, bringing it to the attention of academia.
		Joseph Raz and many others have done further work clarifying and defending value-pluralism.
		Joseph Raz: The Practice of Value, Oxford University Press, 2004.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Value-pluralism (460 words)

	South African Judges: In Dereliction of Their Duty
		A theorist with less faith in the rule of law such as Joseph Raz would have objections to Dyzenhaus’ argument because it relies on the assumption that the rule of law is supreme.
		In Raz’s conception of judicial independence, the non-political nature of the judiciary means that it should be straightforward in its application of the law and refrain from acting for any reason other than for what the law proscribes.
		Raz might challenge Dyzenhaus’ idea that there is equality inherent to the rule of law because he does not agree that the rule of law has a moral component.
	www.unc.edu /~ptutone/philosophy.htm (2464 words)

	On Values, Reasons, and Bucks
		Raz is careful to make clear that there is no general requirement to have any views about the value of things.
		Raz seems to assume that incommensurability – the main road to closure – can be established quickly in many cases, simply by noting that different options are different in kind.
		An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on ‘The Ethics of Joseph Raz’ in March 2002 in New York.
	www.phil.upenn.edu /~ulrike/vr1.htm (8502 words)

	R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Samuel Scheffler (ed.), Michael Smith (ed.) - Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy ...
		Raz holds that an act is intelligible only if it is done for a reason.
		Frankfurt argues that Raz is mistaken to think that choosing and actively willing require that a person have reason for her choice and for what she wills.
		So Frankfurt's putative counterexample against Raz's position must be modified by stipulating that, in the circumstances, the people in the examples are not even disposed to respond to reasons.
	ndpr.nd.edu /review.cfm?id=2341 (5146 words)

	The Tanner Lectures on Human Values at UC Berkeley
		Joseph Raz, Professor of the Philosophy of Law, Oxford University will be presenting two lectures in the series "The Practice of Value".
		Joseph Raz is a Professor of the Philosophy of Law and Fellow of Balliol College at the University of Oxford, and a Visiting Professor at Columbia University.
		Raz is a Fellow of the British Academy and a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
	www.grad.berkeley.edu /tanner/0001.shtml (1062 words)

	[No title]
		Although Raz replied to several of these papers when they were presented at a conference in his honor, these replies do not appear in the published volume.
		For example, as John Broome observes, Raz ‘was one of the first explorers’ in ‘the age of the discovery of reasons.’ Little wonder, then, that many of the writers for this Festschrift should orient themselves not toward Raz, but instead toward the vistas he opened.
		And papers on Raz’s landmark contributions to jurisprudence and political philosophy are reserved for a second volume altogether: Rights, Culture, and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz, edited by Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson and Thomas W. Pogge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.
	sophos.berkeley.edu /kolodny/ReviewRazVolume4.doc (2043 words)

	Yale Law School \| @YLS \| Joseph Raz to Deliver Storrs Lectures, "Between Authority and Morality," March 24-31 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-13)
		Joseph Raz to Deliver Storrs Lectures, "Between Authority and Morality," March 24-31
		Raz's first lecture, "Judges Are Humans Too," will outline what he calls an "ancient theme in legal thought"--the position of judges between law and morality.
		Raz will suggest that a means by which judges integrate law and morality is through interpretation.
	www.law.yale.edu /outside/html/Public_Affairs/359/yls_article.htm (152 words)

	A FLAWED DEFENCE (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-13)
		Since Sebok cites Raz in support of his challenge to the fundamental rights approach, one can be forgiven for thinking that this really is the argument that Sebok was trying to make.
		Moreover, Raz has on a number of occasions endorsed an understanding of adjudication that would be hard to reconcile with the claim that incorporationism results in law being unlimited.
		As Raz puts it, 'Even when courts have discretion, their discretion is almost invariably guided by law which requires it to be exercised in a certain manner and on the basis of a certain range of considerations and on no others.'
	www.utpjournals.com /product/utlj/501/501_fagan.html (15728 words)

	untitled
		8- In the words of the major supporter of ELP, Joseph Raz: 'A jurisprudential theory is acceptable only if its tests for identifying the content of the law and determining its existence depend exclusively on facts of human behaviour capable of being described in value-neutral terms, and applied without resort to moral argument'.
		On the internal negation formulation, the Separability Thesis is the claim that in all legal systems it is necessarily the case that the legality of a norm not depend on its morality or its substantive merits.
		Raz's relevant reflections on the scope of the exclusionary reasons ('It should be remembered that exclusionary reasons may vary in scope; they may exclude all or only some of the reasons which apply to certain practical problems' in Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 19912), pp.
	www.dirittoequestionipubbliche.org /D_Q-1/testi/moreso-note.htm (2762 words)

	R_0032_3217_818
		Raz is interested in what it is to engage with value, to give morality a place in one’s practical reasoning.
		Of course, it is not less complicated than practical reason in general; but Raz prefers to emphasize complications like incommensurability and play down the alleged problem of the relation between morality and self-interest.
		Like most legal positivists, Raz wants to keep this distinction clear; but, as always, what he gives us is a clear view of complication rather than a simple denial that social practice ever makes a difference to what is right.
	www.politicalreviewnet.com /polrev/reviews/post/R_0032_3217_818.asp (343 words)

	Raz, Anscombe, Finnis
		Raz, "Authority and Justification" - an argument against Ladenson's claim that there are authorities having a right to rule but the right to rule does not imply that they must be obeyed.
		Raz defends the claim that practical authority is authority with the power to REQUIRE action.
		Raz claims that it is clear that justified use of coercive power is different from authority.
	pegasus.cc.ucf.edu /~stanlick/authority2.html (3612 words)

	Contemporary conceptions of liberalism (Joseph Raz, John Rawls, David Gauthier)
		I use this point, first, to explain and evaluate the distinct approach taken by each theory, and, second, to respond to recent depiction of contemporary liberalism as the attempt to eliminate conceptions of the good from political justification.
		Raz presents a communitarian conception of liberal society that is grounded in a perfectionist theory of the value of individual autonomy.
		By contrast, Gauthier presents a market conception of liberal society that is grounded in the individualistic preference-based assumptions of rational choice theory; given these assumptions, the conceptual basis of a liberal political framework is presented as a rational compromise motivated only by mutually disinterested preferences-hence a want-regarding modus vivendi.
	repository.upenn.edu /dissertations/AAI9913501 (348 words)

	Alibris: Joseph Raz
		Joseph Raz presents a penetrating exploration of the interdependence of value, reason, and the will.
		At the core of the book are the Tanner Lectures delivered at Berkeley in 2001 by Joseph Raz, who has been one of the leading figures in moral and legal philosophy since the 1970's.
		Joseph Raz answers these three questions by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus...
	www.alibris.com /search/books/author/Joseph_Raz (572 words)

	Moral Soriano: Is Law so Normative? Joseph Raz’ Notion of ‘Authority’ in Practical Legal Reasoning (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-13)
		From this point of view, Raz differentiates first order reasons from second order reasons, and further, the deliberative level of legal reasoning from the executive level of legal reasoning.
		It is argued that the law – a form of authority – does not have the normative function Raz attributes.
		If first order reasons have to be provided to justify the abandoning of a precedent, then these type of reasons have a place in legal reasoning, and they prove that legal reasoning is not executive, but also deliberative.
	www.mpp-rdg.mpg.de /moral5.html (220 words)

	OUP: Joseph Raz in Conversation ...
		Professor Joseph Raz, author of Engaging Reason, talks with Peter Momtchiloff, Commissioning Editor for Philosophy at OUP, about the background to his work in the fields of moral and legal philosophy.
		It is probably yet another manifestation of the lack of clear horizons in contemporary philosophical thought.
		Joseph Raz’s Engaging Reason is available from your local bookshop now: 0-19-823829-0, priced at £30.00.
	www.oup.co.uk /academic/humanities/philosophy/viewpoint/raz (823 words)

	OUP: Rights, Culture and the Law: Meyer
		Joseph Raz is one of the world's leading legal, political and moral philosophers of law
		The volume brings together a collection of original papers on some of the main tenets of Joseph Raz's legal and political philosophy: Legal positivism and the nature of law, practical reason, authority, the value of equality, incommensurability, harm, group rights, and multiculturalism.
		This volume concludes with a chapter by Joseph Raz in which he responds to arguments in the foregoing essays.
	www.oup.co.uk /isbn/0-19-924825-7 (555 words)

	The Leiter Reports: Editorials, News, Updates: Immortality in Legal Philosophy (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-13)
		It is uncontroversial among legal philosophers that Raz is the most significant living figure in the field, and that Dworkin lost the famed Hart-Dworkin debate (cf.
		Raz ought to be read, since, in my judgment (not mine alone, to be sure), he is the richest of all the major 20th-century figures in writing on law from a philosophical point of view.
		But Raz is difficult, and parts of his philosophical corpus depend on intuitions (e.g., about the nature of authority and authoritative reasons) that may not survive the test of time: it's just impossible to predict.
	webapp.utexas.edu /blogs/archives/bleiter/000249.html (1106 words)

	NYU Press
		Authority is one of the key issues in political studies, for the question of by what right one person or several persons govern others is at the very root of political activity.
		In selecting key readings for this volume Joseph Raz concerns himself primarily with the moral aspect of political authority, choosing pieces that examine its justification, determine who is subject to it and who is entitled to hold it, and whether there are any general moral limits to it.
		Joseph Raz is Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Oxford and Fellow of Balliol Colelge, Oxford.
	www.nyupress.org /product_info.php?products_id=66 (148 words)

	Baker (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-13)
		Joseph Raz has proposed that two such incomparable kinds of value are the value of friendship and the value of money.
		Raz argues that friendship is constitutively incomparable with money – that it is part of what we mean by friendship that its value cannot be compared with the value of money.
		Raz, J, The Morality of Freedom, New York, Oxford University Press, 1986; pp321-366 and esp. 345-357.
	www.arts.uwa.edu.au /philoswww/Hons-PGAbstracts/baker.html (366 words)

	The Leiter Reports: Editorials, News, Updates: The Strange Case of Ronald Dworkin, Part I (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-13)
		In this and subsequent postings, I want to examine some of the peculiarities of Dworkin's jurisprudential work (I will ignore his influential work on equality for these purposes) that have led to this state of affairs, i.e., that his views should be so relatively moribund among legal philosophers.
		Far more peculiar, though, is that this essay contains Dworkin's first extended, published reply to Joseph Raz's authority argument (the argument that a rule of recognition can only employ source-based criteria of legal validity since only such a rule of recognition is compatible with the law's claimed authority over us).
		Bear in mind some context: Dworkin and Raz were colleagues at Oxford for three decades, and Raz's authority argument, which received its canonical articulation in a 1985 paper, has been perhaps the single most influential and discussed post-Hart contribution to legal positivism.
	webapp.utexas.edu /blogs/archives/bleiter/000484.html (763 words)

	Oxford University Press: The Practice of Value: Joseph Raz (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-13)
		Raz argues that values depend importantly on social practices, but that we can make sense of this dependence without falling back on cultural relativism.
		The result is a fascinating debate, accessible to readers throughout and beyond philosophy, about the relations between human values and human life.
		Joseph Raz, Professor of the Philosophy of Law, University of Oxford
	www.us.oup.com /us/catalog/24378/subject/LegalPhilosophyJurisprudence/~~/c2Y9YWxsJnNzPWF1dGhvci5hc2Mmc2Q9YXNjJnBmPTEyMCZ2aWV3PXVzYSZwcj0xMCZib29rQ292ZXJzPXllcyZjaT0wMTk5MjYxNDc0 (280 words)

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