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 | | Working Psychotherapist Phenomenological causality and Julian Jaynes This is the second part of our discussion about your thesis concerning what you labeled ‘phenomenological causality’; you are argung that Julian Jaynes’ neglected work, The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind (Jaynes, 1990), constitutes the most striking of all illustrations of your thesis. |
 | | Jaynes does not fully see that, though there are significant parallels between schizophrenic experience and modes of behaviour, and the bicameral modes passed down to us, schizophrenic experience itself is twisted and distorted into new and bizarre forms by the attempt to communicate something of its search for authorisation, despite the sense of foreigness. |
 | | Jaynes greatly neglects the intrinsic logic, and phenomenology of experience, of the realm of the spiritual, and indeed also, emphatically in line with categorical pure ‘this-worldists’, like Humphrey (1995), he simply neglects or dismisses the paranormal - which is highly relevant to the bicameral experience (voodoo, for instance, c.f., Ekeland, 1997). |
| hewardwilkinson.co.uk /Jaynes.doc (6808 words) |
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