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| | MOAA: Bookshelf |
 | | The battle of Khafji should not have happened, and it was not expected, but once joined, it revealed much about the nature of the Gulf War in 1991. |
 | | Morris says the coalition effort to recapture Khafji was a near disaster, because the Arab forces (Saudi and Qatari) attacked with no proper reconnaissance, no fire support preparation, no tactical imagination, and little interest in a stand-up fight with the feared Iraqi military. |
 | | Morris concludes that the battle of Khafji ushered in new technology and revealed weaknesses in both Iraqi and Arab coalition force capabilities and resolve, but small-unit tactics, leadership, initiative, and guts always will be the deciding factors in a ground fight. |
| www.moaa.org /magazine/July2004/bookshelf.asp (1646 words) |
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