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| | Kazutoshi Hando, The Pacific War Research Society, Japan's Longest Day (Tokyo: Kodansha International, Ltd., 1968), pp. ... |
 | | Anami and the two Chiefs of Staff were unable, apparently, to accept the idea of either defeat or surrender, both of which went against all their training; these proposals, thus, were aimed at minimizing, perhaps even denying, the fact of both defeat and surrender. |
 | | Shimomura telephoned Anami, and in the course of their conversation he got the impression that Anami knew little or nothing about the statement but that extremely strong pressure was being applied by the younger officers. |
 | | The Emperor received General Anami in audience, and the General-so his brother-in-law said later-reported that the Emperor had reprimanded him because of his "proclamation." Anami's explanation was that the Army would naturally have to go on fighting until the surrender became a fact. |
| www.mtholyoke.edu /acad/intrel/hando/hando.htm (11264 words) |
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