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| | Mental Images: In search of a Theory |
 | | Nobody denies that the content and behavior of our mental images can be the result of what we intend our images to show, what we know about how things in the world look and work, and the way our cognitive or our imagery system constrains us. |
 | | constitutive of having and using mental images, and which arise because of what we believe, intend, or attribute to the situation we are imagining. |
 | | The distinction between effects attributable to the intrinsic nature of mental representations and mechanisms, and those attributable to more transitory states, such as people’s beliefs, utilities, habits, or interpretation of the task at hand, is central not only for understanding the nature of mental imagery, but for understanding mental processes in general. |
| bbsonline.cup.cam.ac.uk /Preprints/Pylyshyn/Referees (4422 words) |
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