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| | Putnam's "The Nature of Mental States" |
 | | No, even though it reduces mental types to functional types (so in one sense it is), the type-type refers to the relationship between mental states and physical states. |
 | | The functional state of a system is instantiated physically - a functional state just is a physical state of some sort or another - but it needn't be the same physical state each time an organism is in the same functional state, and this is the advantage of functionalism over materialism. |
 | | But if, as Shaffer claims, this mental property is not irreducibly mental, but can be reduced to the physical, there is no problem for the type-type view: everything mental (states, events, properties, whatever) can be reduced to the physical. |
| www.stanford.edu /~lmaguire/phil186/putnam.htm (1121 words) |
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