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| | SEP: Notes to Pleasure |
 | | Descartes, despite his varying and sometimes misleading use of terms, seems consistently to distinguish mere pleasant sensation from the soul's contingent and variable affective reaction to it, even when he is well translated as calling the former “pleasure” (in a use close to use 2 of n. |
| | The view seems to apply also to the relation of pleasure to other acts of will on which it may depend (including Ockham's ‘middle acts’ that merely take their objects to be noninstrumentally or intrinsically good, without taking them to be, or not to be, most supremely and ultimately good and desirable). |
| | Ockham observes, in passing, that pleasure may be said, strictly speaking, not to have an object (since it is not an act), as the act of loving on which it depends does (2001, p. |
| plato.stanford.edu /entries/pleasure/notes.html (11930 words) |
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