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| | Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-21) |
 | | That a psychological state is experienced, “and is in this sense conscious, does not and cannot mean that this is the object of an act of consciousness, in the sense that a perception, a presentation or a judgment is directed upon it (Husserl 1984a, 165 [2001, I, 273]). |
 | | If all occurrent mental states are conscious in the sense of being taken as objects by occurrent second-order mental states, then these second-order mental states must themselves be taken as objects by occurrent third-order mental states, and so forth ad infinitum. |
 | | Or to put it differently, they would be quite unconvinced by the claim that a state without subjective or phenomenal qualities can be transformed into one with such qualities, i.e., into an experience with first-personal givenness or mineness, by the mere relational addition of a meta-state having the first-state as its intentional object. |
| plato.stanford.edu /entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological (7402 words) |
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