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| | Realism, model theory, and linguistic semantics |
 | | Strikingly, Lakoff opposes realism as a metaphysical position, favoring instead some supposedly mild form of idealism such as that recently espoused by Hilary Putnam, going under the name "internal realism." For what he takes to be connected reasons, Lakoff also rejects truth conditional model-theoretic semantics for natural language. |
 | | Realism is defined in Anthony Flew's A Dictionary of Philosophy as: "Most commonly the view (contrasted with idealism) that physical objects exist independently of being perceived."{1} As such, it seems to be purely a metaphysical position, logically independent of semantics. |
 | | However, realism is frequently held to have semantic consequences and, in particular, it seems, at least, to strongly encourage a claim that our words and phrases refer to mind independent things. |
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