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| | Michael Tooley's Philosophy Home Page |
 | | (1) Both the methodological skepticism of Descartes, and the substantive skepticism of Keith Lehrer are directed (at least explicitly) at knowledge claims. |
 | | I want to consider skeptical challenges to claims, not that we can have knowledge, but that we can have justified beliefs, concerning (a) other minds, (b) physical objects, (c) past events, and (d) future events. |
 | | One's evidence consists, the skeptic will argue, of beliefs about one's own present, mental states, whereas beliefs about an external world, or about other minds, or about the past, of about the future, are not beliefs about one's own mental states - or at least, not about one's own present mental states. |
| spot.colorado.edu /~tooley/Chapter3.html (1642 words) |
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