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Topic: Moral reason

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Lawrence Kohlberg

Carol Gilligan

	Moral Skepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
		Moral skeptics might go on to be skeptics about the external world or about other minds or about induction or about all beliefs, but these other skepticisms are not entailed by moral skepticism alone.
		Moral intuitionists and some moral contextualists deny premise (2), but moral skeptics argue that too many beliefs would be justified if people did not need any reason or inference to support their moral beliefs.
		Moral skeptics conclude that this moral belief is not justified.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/skepticism-moral (6947 words)

	20th WCP: Two (Faulty) Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism
		SA, briefly put, is this: "Why should I be moral?" is either a request for a moral reason to be moral or a request for another type of reason (or perhaps a motive) to be moral.
		The moral life is not called into question by showing that it does not reduce to a concern for custom, prudence, etc., any more than prudence is called into question by showing that it does not reduce to a concern for morality.
		In other words, Alf is well aware that he has moral reasons to be moral, and that morality cannot be justified by appealing to prudence, law, and so on.
	www.bu.edu /wcp/Papers/TEth/TEthTill.htm (3132 words)

	Analyzing Wrongness as
		The task of the hapless agent facing such a moral conflict is to judge, if possible, which of her conflicting moral reasons is more compelling, and then to act on that more compelling reason.
		If she acts against the moral reason she appropriately judges to be the best reason she has, then she is subject to some degree of moral sanction.
		A conflict between moral reasons, on the other hand, can clearly be a real conflict even if one reason is more compelling than the other, and it is hard to see how guilt and blameworthiness could attach to acting for a more compelling reason rather than a less compelling one.
	facweb.bcc.ctc.edu /wpayne/analyzing_wrongness_as.htm (2960 words)

	an explanatory essay about the connection of literate values to moral reason
		The Center for Moral Reason was founded early in 2001 with the express purpose of reconciling religious faith in a supremely good being with our culture's languishing life of the intellect.
		Nevertheless, we at The Center rejected the widely peddled notion that all moral striving is therefore irrelevant (grossly mis-packaged as "salvation by faith alone"), and we indignantly deplored the ridicule of human reason in favor of hysterical pseudo-spiritualism.
		All the same, since conscientious morality is a direct product of literate habits (and an early casualty of their abandonment), the renaming of our organization by no means reflects a shift of interest away from the thoughtful pursuit of goodness.
	www.literatevalues.org /moralreason.htm (9325 words)

	The Superiority of Moral over Political Power
		It is vested in the patriarch and the new born babe; in the prince and the beggar; in the philosopher and the idiot.
		Moral power is busy in the nursery, in the schoolhouse, academy and college, in the laboratory, the library, the study, the hall of science, the meetinghouse, the conference room, and the sick chamber.
		Moral power is putting forth mighty energies to abolish slavery, and elevate four millions of degraded beings to the rank of manhood.
	www.adinballou.org /moralpower.shtml (3241 words)

	Dr. Blosser's Article: War and the Eclipse of Moral Reasoning
		This pseudo-problem did not exist within the natural law tradition of moral reasoning, in which society and the state were "natural" institutions with their own relatively autonomous, public purposes, such as justice, freedom, security, and general welfare.
		The tradition of moral reasoning required that national interest, recognized as a valid and constant motive, be given only a relative and limited status as an end of nation action, always balanced by the higher and more ultimate international order to which its national interest must contribute.
		This was the beginning of the tradition of moral reasoning that began the arduous work of formulating the conditions under which war came to be regarded as sometimes justifiable, sometimes even a duty of love to neighbor and God, as a means of defending or restoring the just peace of a rightly ordered political community.
	www.ratzingerfanclub.com /Blosser_article_eclipse.html (5778 words)

	Moral Arguments for the Existence of God (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
		Moral arguments for God's existence may be defined as that family of arguments in the history of western philosophical theology having claims about the character of moral thought and experience in their premises and affirmations of the existence of God in their conclusions.
		Moral thought and action is unified by a teleology in which the virtues are the constitutive means of attaining a good, perfected life.
		Concerning happiness it can be argued that moral agents cannot be convicted of irrationality if they abandon pursuit of their own happiness upon the realization that their duties and obligations get in the way, for they are under no rational necessity to pursue their own happiness.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/moral-arguments-god (7613 words)

	Because Bahá'u'lláh said so": dealing with a non-starter in moral reasoning
		One was (a) the proposition that the divine say-so provides the justificatory basis for a given moral claim or principle; another was (b) the proposition that the divine say-so provides a (peremptory) reason for belief in, or a (peremptory) reason for action according to, that principle.
		Instead, the justification for a particular moral claim is made in terms of the other moral principles and concepts which form a part of the total theoretical framework.
		The LSA telling you that the balance of moral reasons requires y might also provide you with a reason for believing that the original balance of moral reasons was in favour of y after all.
	bahai-library.org /bsr/bsr05/57_abizadeh_because.htm (1755 words)

	Phillip Stratton-Lake, Response to Critics
		On the assumption that reasons (in the standard normative sense) are not motives, this is a different claim from his account of the rationale as that which explains the reason.
		My view is that the moral law is not itself a moral reason to act, but is the condition of the possibility of something else being a moral reason to act.
		We may want to say that what she regards as a reason can only be a reason when embedded in a rationale that goes beyond it, but should resist the temptation automatically to enlarge the reason so that it must always fill up the same space as that taken by the complex rationale.
	ethics.sandiego.edu /video/APA/Pacific/2002/Stratton-Lake/Stratton-Lake.html (5971 words)

	David Carr - Varieties of Incontinence: Towards an Aristotelian Approach to Moral Weakness in Moral Education
		To begin with, the capacities for moral reason in terms of which Kantians and others aspire to establish the very basic ground rules of moral life are confined by Aristotle to the more modest role of deliberation within already given frameworks of value.
		with respect to received values, moral reason is construed as operating for the improvement from the inside of certain already going moral concerns, and is to that extent bounded and contextualized by such values.
		And one plausible reason for so referring to wisdom, justice, temperance and courage, of course, is not only that these are indispensable moral qualities, but that each of these particular virtues represents a specific form of moral indemnity against a certain variety of human weakness or shortcoming.
	www.ed.uiuc.edu /EPS/PES-Yearbook/96_docs/carr.html (2517 words)

	Independent Gay Forum: Corvino, John. 'Homosexuality and Morality: Part 1.'
		This introduces a five-part series on homosexuality and underscores two key points: that moral judgments must be based on reasons, and that not any reason counts as a moral reason.
		Exhausted by the moralizing of Aunt Sally — not to mention Jerry Falwell, Dr. Laura, and their ilk — we might sometimes be tempted to reject the practice altogether.
		Morality is about how we treat one another — and that's very much a matter for public concern.
	www.indegayforum.com /authors/corvino/corvino3a.html (762 words)

	A Body Without Breath: How Right and Left Have Both Stifled Moral Reason within the Christian Faith -- book review
		The reasons for the book's inacessibility are twofold: The first reason is that the book is self- published, its message not fitting in too well with any particular camp or brand of Christianity publishing or politics.
		The other reason is much more prosaic -- literally: the writing style of the book and the scholarly references are slightly over-the head of the average reader.
		There are two primary reasons for this: The first is that the average Christian has been told that truth is found only in the Bible ("ouch" for fundamentalists and Pentecostals) and that the culture has so subverted the meaning of love, knowledge, truth that most Christians are innocent lambs illiterate in moral philosophy.
	www.curledup.com /bodywith.htm (1170 words)

	Because Bahá'u'lláh said so": dealing with a non-starter in moral reasoning
		One was (a) the proposition that the divine say-so provides the justificatory basis for a given moral claim or principle; another was (b) the proposition that the divine say-so provides a (peremptory) reason for belief in, or a (peremptory) reason for action according to, that principle.
		Instead, the justification for a particular moral claim is made in terms of the other moral principles and concepts which form a part of the total theoretical framework.
		The LSA telling you that the balance of moral reasons requires y might also provide you with a reason for believing that the original balance of moral reasons was in favour of y after all.
	www.breacais.demon.co.uk /abs/bsr05/57_abizadeh_because.htm (1755 words)

	1The Fourth Civilization Chapter 3.3 Ethics and Pure ReasonThe Legacy of The Greek Philosophers
		Today, it is easy to underestimate the importance to these teachers of human reasoning and the spoken word (logos) they used to convey that reasoning by way of argument.
		As to the common morality, Plato's belief was that there was a moral nature with which the rational person lived in harmony, even though this might often be in contradiction to the conventions or practice of the non-rational person.
		In this view, the ability to reason as God would do is damaged by the fall, and therefore the process and the conclusions are bound to be wrong (at variance to God's) at least some of the time.
	www.arjaybooks.com /EthTech/Text/Ch3/Ch3.3.html (2139 words)

	On Moral Vegetarianism
		They don't really have "rights" (not that I'm advocating animal cruelty or anything), and besides, the animals we eat (pigs, chickens, turkeys, and cows, mostly) have been domesticated for so long that the ones born and raised for slaughter are so stupid they can't even know they're going to be killed and eaten.
		Since "moral" vegetarians seem to think that the suffering of animals is more important than the suffering of humans, maybe they think we should all die off.
		P.S. I used to have a friend who was a moral vegetarian (something about animals having a "life force aura," I think) and yet she still ate fish.
	www.goth.net /~son_of_stoker/vegessay.html (828 words)

	Ethics: Lecture 3 – The grounds of moral judgements – reason or desire (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		Therefore moral judgements are not derived from reason alone.
		Reason is concerned with the relation of ideas – i.e.
		The whole point of morality is to influence action; so moral judgements alone motivate the will.
	www.ucd.ie /philosop/documents/Phil%202029%20Lecture%203.htm (277 words)

	Janus Head/Brain Donohue/Examination of Moral Action
		Kantâs fundamental reason for rejecting the pursuit of pleasure as the animating force of morality is that pleasure, by itself, is a subjective matter.
		As I have already stated, Kantâs rejection of pleasure as the basis of moral principles leads him to conceive of a higher faculty of desire where the cause of human action is not the quest for pleasure.
		To understand the role of pleasure in moral action and thereby further clarify the relationship between the moral law and moral action, it is necessary to explicate the two senses of freedom that Kant utilizes.
	www.janushead.org /JHspg99/donohue.cfm (6720 words)

	Unilateral Moral Disarmament -- Objectivist Center -- Reason, Individualism, Achievement, and Freedom (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		We are sons and daughters of the Enlightenment, and its celebration of human reason, science, freedom, material success, and pursuit of personal happiness on earth.
		Morally torn, we fall over ourselves to declare—and to prove to ourselves—our respect for atavistic traditions, our tolerance of barbaric practices, our accommodation of tribal demands.
		A foreign policy that grows, in no small part, from a moral tradition that extols mercy, altruism, and turning the other cheek, is hardly the most conducive to a strong and effective national defense.
	www.objectivistcenter.org /articles/rbidinotto_unilateral-moral-disarmament.asp (2539 words)

	The Nature of Moral Reason - Lorraine Besser-Jones (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		A common view of morality holds that moral requirements give reasons to act that override others reasons that could conflict with it.
		Many tend to interpret OT in Kantian terms, equating a reason’s being overriding with its being categorical.
		Here, I will present an alternative understanding of overridingness that goes beyond the standard Kantian dichotomy of categorical and hypothetical reasons and enables us to move to a virtue-based theory without relinquishing the concept of an overriding moral duty.
	www.unc.edu /~besser/naturemoralreasons.htm (182 words)

	Theology Today - Vol 36, No. 4 - January 1980 - BOOK REVIEW - Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis of ...
		In this manner, reason affords one at least a minimal basis for believing that one's own condemnatory self-judgment is neither the only nor the ultimate basis for assessing one's own moral worth.
		I am persuaded that both Green's variant of the "moral argument" and his double-sided version of "applied religious reason" are important and merit the careful study of scholars and serious students of religion.
		Although Green shows the possible compatibility between the requirements of reason and many major beliefs of the traditions he examines, he fails to show that these beliefs are the inevitable outcome of religious reason's requirements.
	theologytoday.ptsem.edu /jan1980/v36-4-bookreview6.htm (1052 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		The role of reason in moral theories, A comparison between richard stanley peters and allamah seyyed muhammad husayn tabatabai/Masoud Safaei-moghadaddm; Supervised by: martin Bibby.
		The author discusses the cases of two philosophers whose differences are a single concept, that of reason, lead, as the author argues, to profound differences in moral theory metaethics and moral psychology.
		Since both moral theories are determined by their theories of reason both can be seen as rational theories.
	dbase.irandoc.ac.ir /00232/00232173.htm (281 words)

	Does the Christian Theism Advocated by J.P. Moreland Provide a Better Reason to be Moral than Secular Humanism?
		A moral response in that situation would be to rebuke God, since the very act of asking Abraham to kill his son merely to prove his own faith would in itself prove that god was evil, a tyrant, and god's standing as the supreme creator would not change the fact that his character was reprehensible.
		A humanist who recognizes his debt to the society which "created" him, or the moral teachers and agents who created his society, has just as much of a reason to be moral for their sake.
		Thus, that living morally will lead to the greatest sum of happiness or satisfaction in a person's own life can never be known for certain, nor can it be known for certain that not living morally will lead to a better life, not even by a Christian, and that is the central point at hand.
	www.infidels.org /library/modern/richard_carrier/moreland.html (4151 words)

	Is it moral to be homosexual? -- Objectivist Center -- Reason, Individualism, Achievement, and Freedom (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		The morality of homosexuality is not a philosophical issue per se, but one can use Objectivist principles to evaluate the morality of homosexuality in any given situation.
		For example, it is morally right for a woman whose nature it is to be sexually attracted to women rather than men to become romantically involved with a woman she loves and desires.
		In contrast, it is morally wrong for a man whose nature it is to be sexually attracted to women rather than men to become romantically involved with a man rather than seeking out a woman.
	www.objectivistcenter.org /objectivism/faqs/dmoskovitz_faq-moral-homosexual.asp (880 words)

	Dissertations, Essays on Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Reason
		Morality for Hume was not a universal concept, but a human construct founded on reason and human sentiment.
		The fact that individuals dispute whether an action is right or wrong and use a rational form of discussion to reach a conclusion is strong proof in favor of morality being founded on reason.
		An individual may believe that all morality is guided entirely by emotion, not reason, but may believe that there is an objective, universal moral code that applies to everyone, and in this case, emotional responses to actions would also be universal.
	www.essayboom.com /essay/Moral_Distinctions_Not_Derived-113321.html (179 words)

	When are human beings morally reponsible, and when not
		One might add to this a requirement that one have the capacity for actions to be motivated by the pure higher cognitive faculties, but generally for Kant the work of distinguishing cases rests merely on the presence of a higher faculty of desire, and that in turn on the presence of a functioning understanding.
		As far as I know, Kant never explicitly discusses the possibility of an entity that is morally responsible but lacks an empirical psychology that includes a higher faculty of desire and the capacity for this desire to be determined by pure principles of practical reason.
		There is no reason to see the natural faculty of understanding and the capacity to be moved by pure reason as equivalent.
	people.whitman.edu /~frierspr/kant_responsibility.htm (10943 words)

	Amazon.com: "moral education theory": Key Phrase page (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-20)
		theory of punishment that incorporates elements of both retributivist and deterrence theories, the theory she calls "the moral education theory of punishment" (and that she associates with the views of Plato and Hegel).
		JEAN HAMPTON The Moral Education Theory of Punishment We ought not to repay injustice with injustice or to do harm to any man, no matter what...
		Jean Hampton, from "The Moral Education Theory of Punishment" 245 more choose which emotion it will be that causes our judgments or actions than we can choose...
	www.amazon.com /phrase/moral-education-theory (596 words)

	Moral Reason and Literate Analysis Applied to Cultural Meltdown
		He grasps that the circumstances of his socio-cultural conditioning may mitigate, but cannot excuse, any errors of moral judgment he makes—that a socially mandatory behavior is still a choice, and that a bad choice remains bad despite its having been socially sanctioned.
		They reject reason in favor of "the wisdom of the ages," which is how they designate traditions whose rationale is all but totally lost, or customs that they cannot explain.
		There are one or two good reasons for that claim: but it is not broadcast resonantly by her coterie, and almost never in those quarters where it might do some good (that is, where it would create an uproar).
	literatevalues.org /prae-2.1.htm (16861 words)

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