
	Where results make sense

Topic: Moral skepticism

	[No title]
		Moral skepticism is usually defined as the denial of an objective basis of morality.
		Thus, in the 17th and 18th century context, the term "moral skepticism" was an abusive label which signified that a moral theory presented a danger to traditional moral standards.
		Moral skepticism in the early 20th century empirical tradition involved issues of language as much as ontology.
	www.utm.edu /staff/jfieser/vita/research/mskepart.htm (1563 words)

	20th WCP: Self-Worth and Moral Knowledge: A Moral Argument for a Moderate Moral Skepticism
		Second, arguments for moral skepticism often apply principles that are alien to or independent of morality as understood by participants in many moral traditions.
		But the main response is that the point of the skeptical argument is in part that this should happen more than it does: advocates of these moral traditions should have a greater acknowledgment of skepticism about their own claims to moral knowledge than they ordinarily do.
		cit., and Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, tr.
	www.bu.edu /wcp/Papers/TEth/TEthGowa.htm (3511 words)

	Moral Skepticism
		Moral skeptics might go on to be skeptics about the external world or about other minds or about induction or about all beliefs, but these other skepticisms are not entailed by moral skepticism alone.
		Moral intuitionists and some moral contextualists deny premise (2), but moral skeptics argue that too many beliefs would be justified if people did not need any reason or inference to support their moral beliefs.
		Moral skeptics conclude this moral belief is not justified.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/skepticism-moral (6660 words)

	philosophical skepticism
		Philosophical skepticism should be distinguished from ordinary skepticism, where doubts are raised against certain beliefs or types of beliefs because the evidence for the particular belief or type of belief is weak or lacking.
		And, while some ancient skeptics seem to have advocated that the ideal is to have no strong opinions, most seem to have maintained that when there was a preponderance of evidence supporting the probability of one position rather than another, then belief in the more probable position was desirable.
		A theological skeptic may be an atheist, but the two positions are distinct and a theological skeptic may be a theist or an agnostic.
	skepdic.com /skepticism.html (2482 words)

	"Objectivity and Truth" by Ronald Dworkin (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		Skepticism, in the sense of disbelief, must be built up from belief of some kind; it can't be skeptical, as we might put it, all the way down.
		They assert that moral properties exist as genuine properties of acts or events, and that such properties cannot be eliminated from a full and accurate description of how the universe is. Archimedeans who take this view of the further claims hold that they are mistaken, but in a philosophical not a substantive moral way.
		If your morality was a consequentialist one, for instance, based on the positive judgment that human happiness is a moral good, and that whatever acts enlarge that good are morally required, the bleak thesis would give you no reason not to continue to think that you had a moral obligation to vote for higher taxes.
	www.nyu.edu /gsas/dept/philo/faculty/dworkin/papers/objectivity.html (19134 words)

	[No title]
		Norton, for instance, argues that Hume is a "moral realist" in the sense that the crux of morality involves objective character traits (virtues and vices) of an agent.
		From this distinction, a further distinction would arise between (1) weak metaethical skepticism which entails the acceptance of an objectively weak foundation of morality and the denial of an objectively strong foundation, and (2) strong metaethical skepticism, which entails the denial of both objectively strong and weak foundations of morality.
		On the issue of metaethical skepticism, I argued that an objective foundation of morality is not undermined either by Hume's account of artificial justice or by his narrow notion of common moral agreement (which excludes superior rational beings).
	www.utm.edu /staff/jfieser/vita/research/morskep.htm (6827 words)

	24.00: Moral Relativism (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		Moral Objectivists hold that there are genuine moral truths, and that some cultures have got ahold of this truth, while others are somehow missing it.
		Which moral laws apply in a given part of the world is a function of the way those people have chosen to organize their lives.
		Moral progress happens when someone says, our existing moral code falls short of the moral truth; hence it needs to be adjusted.
	www.mit.edu /~shaslang/2400-01/moralrelativ01.html (1443 words)

	FT January: Books in Review: Skepticism and Freedom: A Modern Case for Classical Liberalism (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		The first kind of skepticism entails a healthy suspicion of the ability of government to substitute itself for the prudence, preferences, and good sense of responsible individuals.
		The second form of skepticism endorses moral and cultural relativism and denies that a rational defense of the principles of the free society is possible.
		While we should be grateful to Epstein for highlighting the complex ties that bind skepticism and liberty in the modern world, at the same time, his noble failure teaches us that philosophical liberalism is incapable of doing full justice to the goods that are necessary to sustain a free society.
	www.firstthings.com /ftissues/ft0401/reviews/mahoney.html (1629 words)

	Education Policy Analysis Archives: Vol. 1 No. 14 Garlikov "Response to Strike's 'Against Values'"
		While moral discourse is in need of much help, there is a solution which is not dependent on Kenneth Strike's remedy of understanding or building character, as such, and which teaches moral reasoning without promoting particular moral values or character traits.
		I further agree with him that what he calls moral skepticism is at least in part to blame for this state in some classrooms.
		Moral argument is likely to be persuasive only to those already possessed of good character." What I have found from my diverse classes, however, is that cognition is extremely important.
	epaa.asu.edu /epaa/v1n14.html (3000 words)

	No One is Really a Moral Skeptic
		Moral relativism is at first glance the easiest of all philosophical positions to defend.
		The consistent skeptic does not have the unpleasant obligation of showing how one moral precept ties into another; nor does he face the difficult task of squaring moral principles that seem to be individually attractive but mutually repellent (i.e.
		At the most abstract level, countless people consider themselves to be moral skeptics, and rejoice in seeing through a form of discourse that all should regard as empty and uninformative.
	www.acton.org /publicat/randl/article.php?id=98 (1658 words)

	Daniel Callcut
		The course will consider a variety of arguments for moral skepticism and a variety of responses to the different kinds of skeptic.
		We will examine theories about the source of morality (topics from the area known as metaethics) and theories concerning how we ought to structure our moral thought and action (topics from the area known as normative theory).
		The aim is not only to increase familiarity with some of the central questions of public policy and social life but to develop the knowledge of philosophical tools and concepts necessary to clarify and improve one’s reasoning about these issues.
	www.unf.edu /~dcallcut/courses.html (970 words)

	Quodlibet Online Journal: Do Objective Moral Standards Exist in the World Today? - by Johnson (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		There are two main forms of ethical relativism: subjectivism and conventionalism. Subjectivism views morality as a personal decision; “morality is in the eye of the beholder.” Conventionalism views moral validity by social acceptance and which coincides with cultural relativism (Pojman 363).
		Moral values are generated by the natural influence of pain and pleasure as people seek to satisfy their base wants and desires. These values create a complex system of customs.
		Moral Skepticism cannot be carried out consistently in the way one lives. For example, all one would need to do to prove that this cannot be consistently lived out would be to steal something (i.e.
	www.quodlibet.net /johnson-morality.shtml (965 words)

	Rachels’s “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism” (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		moral objectivism, which is the view that moral principles are objectively true.
		Normative Ethical Relativism: The truth value of moral judgments in a particular culture is conventionally determined by what people in the culture believe.
		Therefore, there is no objective fact of the matter with respect to which side of a moral disagreement between cultures is correct.
	faculty.washington.edu /himma/imt551/lect1.htm (575 words)

	Philosophy, et cetera: Moral Diversity and Skepticism (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		We should begin by noting that superficial moral diversity is consistent with universal consensus regarding the fundamental moral principles.
		If moral diversity could persist despite empirical omniscience and perfect rationality, then moral skepticism would be vindicated.
		That is, moral truths are merely constructive facts about what fully informed and rational agents would converge on, were they to subject their evaluative beliefs to a reflective equilibrium process.
	pixnaps.blogspot.com /2005/06/moral-diversity-and-skepticism.html (1095 words)

	Revised Handout on Relativism
		MORAL ANTI-REALISM (METAPHYSICAL RELATIVISM WITH RESPECT TO MORALITY) = No moral judgments are true—that is, no particular moral judgments or moral rules or moral principles are true—because there are no objective moral standards or objective moral truths.
		MORAL REALISM (ANTI-METAPHYSICAL-RELATIVISM)= There are objective moral truths or standards, and thus some normative moral particular judgments and/or normative moral principles are true.
		MORAL ANTI-SKEPTICISM = It is in principle possible to acquire good reasons to believe some normative moral judgments and/or principles.
	faculty.washington.edu /wtalbott/phil240/hdrel.htm (690 words)

	Lecture 4: Moral Skepticism (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		They claim that immoral acts are just those acts that God disapproves of (and that moral acts are just those acts that God approves of).
		But even if moral facts are not empirically verifiable, it doesn't follow that there are no objective moral facts.
		According to cultural relativism, people of cultures that advocate intolerance towards others should be intolerant, because, according to cultural relativism, one should always act as one's culture dictates.
	www.cofc.edu /~portmord/101-L4.htm (528 words)

	Philosophical Dictionary: Sidgwick-Smith
		We are therefore perpetually vulnerable to the possibility of conflicting moral obligations.
		Also see IEP articles on ancient skepticism, modern skepticism, and contemporary skepticism, SEP on skepticism, ancient skepticism, and moral skepticism, Peter Suber, Richard Hooker, ColE, Danilo Marcondes de Souza Filho, DPM, CE, and ISM.
		Expanding on the behaviorist theories of Watson, Skinner engaged in strict scientific study of human behavior and proposed the application of psychology to the deliberate engineering of human societies.
	www.philosophypages.com /dy/s5.htm (763 words)

	Is moral skepticism divinely inspired? - DiscussAnything.com - (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-07)
		Local Time: 03:25 AM Is moral skepticism divinely inspired?
		That would logically entail the need for doubt, and circumstances which would provoke skepticism.
		If there is a God, I wish s/he would have given more of us the desire to question.
	www.discussanything.com /forums/showthread.php?t=57867 (899 words)

	Senior Jake Tuttle to speak on 'Moral Skepticism' March 17
		Senior Jake Tuttle to speak on 'Moral Skepticism' March 17
		Thursday, March 17, in the auditorium, Room 126, John R. Roach Center for the Liberal Arts.
		According to Tuttle, “Hume’s distinction between facts and passions ought to be distressing for moral realists, because it seems to entail the Is-Ought Problem and the even more formidable ‘Fact-Action Gap.’ Must moral claims be arbitrary or unmotivated?” Come to the colloquium for Tuttle’s answer.
	www.stthomas.edu /bulletin/news/200511/Friday/Philosophy3_11_05.cfm (145 words)

Try your search on: Qwika (all wikis)