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 | | Now, once the actuality of moral pluralism is acknowledged, and once it is agreed that normative claims may be contingent upon one's social, historical, or cultural context, it becomes apparent that the possibility of universal moral validity depends directly on the difference between contingent and universal norms. |
 | | Clearly, a principled moral outlook of the Kohlbergian sort cannot itself serve-in the name of unconditional validity-as the justificatory grounds of those institutions which are intended to condition or produce it, unless a particular outcome of moral development has been presumed from the start. |
 | | Universal here is to be taken to mean, "among all concerned with or affected by the norm in question"; that is, the rightful participants in the moral discourse. |
| web.syr.edu /~mdlattim/notebook/Habermas/Gaon_Stella.html (6188 words) |
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