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	On A Distinction Between Access and Phenomenal Consciousness
		Block suggests that we run into problems when we analyse certain aspects of consciousness using premises that cannot be applied to other aspects of consciousness.
		Block cannot say, however, that these people have A-consciousness of the stimuli in their blind region, because the content of the blind region is not available for the rational control of action.
		Block described this possibility by using the example of a person who suddenly became aware of the fact that she had been hearing the sound of a clock ticking for some length of time.
	www.def-logic.com /articles/silby011.html (2945 words)

	Ned Kelly
		Ned Kelly's Gang members died during the siege and Kelly himself was hanged at the Melbourne gaol on 11 November 1880.
		Ned Kelly's Gang members died during the seige and Kelly himself was hanged at the Melbourne gaol on 11 November 1880.
		Ned was brought to the Melbourne Gaol on June 29 1880 from Benalla, where he had spent a night in the cells after capture at Glenrowan.
	www.ripefruit.com /melbourne/sights/ned_kelly.htm (1275 words)

	Ned Block - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Ned Block (born 1942) is a philosopher of mind who has made important contributions to matters of consciousness and cognitive science.
		Block was for many years professor of philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and now teaches at New York University (NYU).
		Block is married to the developmental psychologist Susan Carey.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Ned_Block (398 words)

	NED BLOCK Articles Ned Block (born 1942) is a philosop
		Ned Block (born 1942) is a philosopher of mind who has made important contributions to matters of consciousness and cognitive science.
		Block also tried to develop a counterexample to functionalism; there could exist a system which has the same functional states as a human but no consciousness.
		Block is married to the developmental psychologist Susan Carey.
	www.amazines.com /Ned_Block_related.html (518 words)

	Sidestepping the Semantics of ‘Consciousness’
		Block explains the conflation of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness by appeal to the ambiguity of ‘consciousness’.
		Block suggests that there are several equally legitimate ways to characterize ambiguity, and says he favors doing so “in terms of conflation: if there can be conflation, we have ambiguity.” (sect.
		I believe Block would do best to explain the conflation between P and A in terms of something like “carelessly sliding over representational distinctions,” without committing himself to whether such distinctions are across distinct representations or elements within a single representation.
	research.haifa.ac.il /~antony/papers/Block.htm (1290 words)

	The Non Sequitur of Block's Functionalist Critique
		By two related examples, Block attempts to demonstrate that functionalism is guilty of liberalism in exactly the same way; that is, the functionalist definition of mind is satisfied by systems which ‘clearly’ possess no mind at all.
		Block calls his example the “homunculi-headed robot.” It consists of an external body, identical to that of the reader, but with the brain replaced by a group of little men.
		Block attempts to answer this criticism by stating that response speed is irrelevant (241), and perhaps it is for a very crude version of functionalism.
	homepages.nyu.edu /~rpm213/Docs/Block.html (826 words)

	Philosopher Ned Block receives Muh Award - MIT News Office
		Block received the S.B. degree in physics and humanities in 1964 and taught philosophy at MIT for 25 years, serving for 6 years as chair of the philosophy section in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy.
		Block, who said he "loved MIT, especially the fantastic students," will return to campus to deliver a talk, "What Is Consciousness in the Brain?" on Wednesday, March 2 at 5 p.m.
		Block's expertise is in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of cognitive science.
	web.mit.edu /newsoffice/2005/muh.html (773 words)

	Consciousness studies: Nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy - Psychology Wiki - a Wikia wiki
		Ned Block is in the NYU Department of Philosophy.
		Block shares Chalmers' belief that we can have conscious experiences that are not possible to produce by any type of computational algorithm and that the source of such experiences is "the hard problem" of consciousness.
		If Block's distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness is correct, then it has important implications for attempts by neuroscientists to identify the neural correlates of consciousness and for attempts by computer scientists to produce artificial consciousness in man-made devices such as robots.
	psychology.wikia.com /wiki/Consciousness_studies:_Nineteenth_and_twentieth_century_philosophy (7861 words)

	Puke Ariki - Taranaki Stories - A chip off the old block - Ned Shewry
		Ned Shewry was to become a household name in New Zealand for nearly a quarter of a century.
		When he was 17 Ned took up farming with his older brother Archie on a block next to their parents on the Moki Road.
		Ned thrived on "bushwacking," he soon became adept with an axe and learnt the most economical way to fell a tree, the art of how to balance and get his hips behind the axe, like a golfer.
	www.pukeariki.com /en/stories/sport/nedshewry.asp (1902 words)

	On the relation between phenomenal and
		Block thinks that there is a widespread confusion in the recent philosophy and neuropsychology literature regarding the function of consciousness.
		In contrast, Block's conclusion is that it is Access-consciousness that is missing in blindsight patients (and, as such, responsible for the lack of voluntary action); Phenomenal-consciousness may or may not be missing (but that is irrelevant); and the fallacy lies in "sliding from an obvious function of A-consciousness to a non-obvious function of P-consciousness" (p.
		Block tries to provide support for his distinction by presenting a number of cases that are purported to demonstrate how P-consciousness can exist in the absence of A-consciousness, and conversely.
	web.clas.ufl.edu /users/maydede/BBS.html (2439 words)

	Muh winner opens a window on the mind - MIT News Office
		Block received the S.B. degree in physics and humanities in 1964 and taught philosophy at MIT for 25 years, serving for six years as chair of the philosophy section in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy.
		Block summarized recent experiments suggesting that some conscious phenomena might have a brain basis that is not available to "consuming systems in the brain such as reasoning, planning, memory and voluntary direction of action."
		Philosopher Ned Block receives Muh Award - An alumni award in the humanities, arts and social sciences will be presented to Ned Block, professor of philosophy and psychology at New York University, who will speak March 2 at MIT.
	web.mit.edu /newsoffice/2005/muh-talk-0309.html (935 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		Block believes that there is good reason to think that such a system has mental states.
		Block doubts whether it ever was inconceivable that temperature could be a property of matter 2.
		Block believes that there is a disanalogy between saying that something is not within the domain of psychology and saying that something is not within the domain of physics (148b) a.
	www.iit.edu /~schmaus/Philosophy_of_Mind/lectures/Crumley/Block2.txt (3081 words)

	Blockhead at AllExperts
		In this paper, Block argues that the internal mechanism of a system was important in determining whether that system was intelligent, and also to show that a non-intelligent system could pass the Turing Test.
		From this, Block leads us to see that such a machine could continue a conversation with a person on any topic, because the computer would be programmed with every sentence that it was possible to use.
		Block says that this does not show that there is only one correct internal structure for generating intelligence, but simply that some internal structures do not generate intelligence.
	en.allexperts.com /e/b/bl/blockhead.htm (391 words)

	John Gregg: The Turing Test (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		Assuming that you accept that Block's machine is not conscious (even if, by some characterizations of the term, it is intelligent), if you have a favorite computer architecture that you think is conscious, you really should specify where the difference is between your machine and Block's.
		Block's machine is monstrously complex - as complex as any you could propose - the complexity is in the table.
		The onus is squarely on the defender of some purported conscious computer algorithm to explain exactly where (and why) in the mapping between that algorithm and Block's the fairy of consciousness waves her magic wand.
	home.comcast.net /~johnrgregg/turing.htm (1069 words)

	Commentary on Block
		Block amply demonstrates that there is ubiquitous confusion among researchers about consciousness, and he is right to locate a major source of the confusion in the spectrum of differences he attempts to tame with his purported distinction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.
		Indeed, Block relies heavily on appeals to our intuitions to hold it in place until he can get it properly defined and defended, but once that effort gets underway, he runs into a swarm of difficulties from which there is apparently no escape.
		For Block to put his claim about blindsight in direct competition with my alternative, he must control for richness of content, which I claim is the only other important variable; he must stipulate--in whichever way he chooses--that the richness in content is the same in both fields.
	ase.tufts.edu /cogstud/papers/blockrvw.htm (1277 words)

	Taming the Mongrel
		Block, 1995] has recently pointed out that the concept of consciousness is a ``mongrel" one: the term `consciousness' connotes different things to different people -- sometimes radically different things.
		A state is access-conscious (A-conscious) if, in virtue of one's having the state, a representation of its content is (1) inferentially promiscuous, i.e., poised to be used as a premise in reasoning, and (2) poised for [rational] control of action and (3) poised for rational control of speech.
		Block tells us that M-consciousness corresponds to at least three notions in the literature: inner perception, internal scanning, and so-called ``higher order" thought.
	www.rpi.edu /~brings/EVOL/evol6/node2.html (665 words)

	Ned Kelly (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		Edward 'Ned' Kelly was the first-born son of an Irish Catholic couple.
		Ned was brought to the Melbourne Gaol on June 29 1880 from Benalla,
		Ned was due to have his committal hearing at the City Police Court
	www.australia-about.com /ned.html (1334 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		Block emphasizes that the functionalist argument is: 1.) not just that the same Turing machine could be realized by systems of different material composition 2.) but that there is no physical property in common to all and only the physical realizations of a specific Turing machine states.
		B. Block has us imagine that we have little men inside our heads each of whom carries out a single function specified by our machine table description (136b-137a) 1.
		however, to ask Block to suppose that he has fleas in his head and qualia is to ask him to suppose the very thing he doubts, thus begging the question (139b) I.IV Putnam's Proposal (139b) A. One could try to avoid these problems with homunculi simply by stipulation 1.
	www.iit.edu /~schmaus/Philosophy_of_Mind/lectures/Crumley/Block1.txt (3642 words)

	Harvard University Press: Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I by Ned Block
		The papers assembled in Block's anthology will prove to be of lasting value to anyone wishing to engage the philosophical dimension of cognitive science.
		Block's anthology is sure to become a standard reference for philosophy of psychology; the papers [have]...already fixed the general direction of this field for the next several years.
		Ned Block is Professor of Philosophy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
	www.hup.harvard.edu /catalog/BLOREX.html?show=reviews (110 words)

	Muhammad Aurangzeb Ahmad's eXploring Intelligence - Ned Block
		Block, Ned Mental Paint in Reflections and Replies, edited by Martin Hahn and Bjorn Ramberg and published by MIT Press, 2003.
		Block, Ned Sexism, Racism, Ageism and the Nature of Consciousness The Philosophy of Sydney Shoemaker, Philosophical Topics, 26, 1 and 2, 1999.
		Block, Ned The Mind as the Software of the Brain (An Invitation to Cognitive Science, edited by D. Osherson, L. Gleitman, S. Kosslyn, E. Smith and S. Sternberg, MIT Press, 1995)
	www.cs.rit.edu /~maa2454/expint/?Philosophy_of_Mind:People:Ned_Block (445 words)

	[No title]
		Ned Block has argued forcefully in several places (see his 1990, 1996, forthcoming (a)) that the example of Inverted Earth refutes strong representationism of the externalist variety.
		In Block's original version of the tale, one night while you are asleep, a team of alien scientists insert color-inverting lenses in your eyes and take you to Inverted Earth, where you are substituted for your Inverted Earth twin or doppelganger.
		I should add that Lycan's response to Block was not delivered at the meeting in whose proceedings it was published (to which I also contributed), and I did not see it until after I had written the present section.
	www.utexas.edu /cola/depts/philosophy/faculty/tye/invert.htm (9194 words)

	P S Y C H E
		Block's important paper "On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness" is the centerpiece of the section.
		Block's article is followed by four critical commentaries, by Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers, Jennifer Church, and Tyler Burge.
		Ned Block rejects Harman's "representationalist" thesis, and offers a modified version of the inverted spectrum case, called "Inverted Earth," to challenge Harman.
	psyche.cs.monash.edu.au /book_reviews/blocketal/index.html (2545 words)

	New York University > Silver Dialogues > Ned Block
		Ned Block, a Professor in the Departments of Philosophy and Psychology since 1996, came to NYU from M.I.T where he was the philosophy chairman.
		Block is one of the most influential philosophers of his generation.
		Block earned his S.B. in Physics and Philosophy from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1964) and his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Harvard University (1971).
	silverdialogues.fas.nyu.edu /object/silver.nedblock (208 words)

	"Conceptual Role Semantics" by Ned Block
		The source of the view is Wittgenstein (1953) and Sellars, but the source in contemporary philosophy is a series of papers by Harman (see his 1987) and Field (1977).
		For example, the truth condition of 'I am happy' and 'Ned is happy' are the same, but the meanings of those sentences differ.
		Block, N. 1987, "Functional Role and Truth Conditions," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LXI, 1987, 157-181.
	www.nyu.edu /gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/ConceptualRoleSemantics.html (3696 words)

	The NED Data Exchange Program
		If the "append input data to existing file" is checked, and the output file is a NED file, then the data currently existing in the output file is loaded.
		Although this program was meant to move data between NED and other software packages, there is nothing that prevents you from selecting something other then NED for both the input and output files.
		Since the data is loaded into a NED data structure, there is nowhere to store this value.
	www.fs.fed.us /ne/burlington/ned/import/import.htm (1022 words)

	Ned Block: ZoomInfo Business People Information (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		IT'S ALL IN YOUR HEAD: Noted New York University professor Ned Block discusses consciousness and the brain in the Gramlich Memorial Lecture on Monday.
		Ned Block (NYU) alerts me to the fact that the new National Research Council study of graduate programs (the last one came out in 1995) proposes to divide Philosophy into the following subfields for evaluation purposes:
		Professor Ned Block NED BLOCK NYU Department of Philosophy 503A Main Building 100 Washington Square East New York, NY 10003 tel: (212) 998-8322 fax: (212) 995-4179 or (212)-475-2338 e-mail: ned.block@nyu.edu NED BLOCK (Ph.D., Harvard), Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, came to NYU in 1996 from MIT where he was Chair of the Philosophy Program.
	www.zoominfo.com /people/block_ned_2132092.aspx (194 words)

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