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| | Philosophy Now |
 | | As Rescher remarks, the early 20th century came to distrust the grandiose Victorian systems, such as the ‘absolute idealism’ of Bradley and his contemporaries, with their claim to understand the complete system of the world. |
 | | As a result, Rescher argues, a variety of pragmatic considerations enter into the construction of scientific and philosophical theories, such as “simplicity, uniformity, regularity, analogy, and the like” (p.176), to guide our dialectical reasoning, while systematic understanding remains the criterion of truth, and foundationalism is rejected totally. |
 | | The rejection of foundationalism is important to Rescher’s approach to philosophical reasoning, and he develops this rejection of foundationalism in the way of Bradley, with Bradley’s own emphasis on the ambiguity of ‘facts.’ This enables an idealist to defend idealism against Russell’s (and most people’s) main objection to the idealist’s theory of truth. |
| www.philosophynow.org /issue47/47thomas.htm (1521 words) |
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