| | manipulability of voting systems, The American Mathematical Monthly, The - Find Articles (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-03) |
 | | When one speaks of a mathematical analysis of voting, two results spring to the forefront: the voting paradox of Condorcet [7] and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem [1]. |
 | | Intuitively, it means that there is at least one situation in which this voter prefers the election outcome resulting from his submission of a disingenuous ballot to the outcome resulting from his submission of a ballot corresponding to his true preferences. |
 | | Thus, we are assuming that the voter in question has complete knowledge of how everyone else voted (or perhaps better: will vote), and we are asking if he can take advantage of this knowledge to secure a better outcome-better, that is, from his point of view-by submitting an insincere ballot. |
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