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| | Yale Law Journal | P. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in ... |
 | | Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s |
 | | Although such constraints ran contrary to older conceptions of parliamentary supremacy in a republican form of government, the drafters concluded that they were necessary to ensure the place of the parliament in a democratic system of separation of powers. |
 | | The development of enforceable, yet flexible, delegation constraints in postwar West Germany and France thus marked an important constitutional innovation; it was not a doctrinal relic from the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, as commentators often suppose when focusing solely on the American case. |
| www.yalelawjournal.org /archive_abstract.asp?id=208 (324 words) |
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