| |
| | [No title] |
 | | Given any payoff matrix, the standard assumption is that the players choose their strategies simultaneously (in any event, that each player must choose a strategy in ignorance of the strategic choice of the other player — or, as described in the original handouts, by “secret ballot”) and without pre-play communication. |
 | | For simplicity, suppose the payoff matrix is 2 × 2, i.e., there are two just two players, each with a choice between two strategies, so the game has just four possible outcomes (cells in the matrix). |
 | | And suppose that the payoff matrix is common knowledge to each player, i.e., each player knows what the other player’s payoffs (interests/preferences/values are). |
| userpages.umbc.edu /~nmiller/POLI388/VARIATIONS.htm (685 words) |
|