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 | | It should be observed that the very notion of "personal probabilities" carries a significant normative dimension, since there are no laws of nature, genetic or cultural, that require persons distribute their "degrees of belief" in accordance with the axioms of probability. |
 | | Clearly, one person at two times and two persons at one time can accept an antecedent hypothetically--for the sake of argument-- without agreeing on the probability of the consequent, especially in light of access to new data, information, or evidence, when its truth or falsity (or presence or absence) makes a difference to those probabilities. |
 | | The differences in value between logical probabilities that ought to be assigned and personal or subjective probabilities that actually are assigned to various outcomes by specific persons zi at times tj thus constitute measures of the extent to which zi at tj manifests irrationality of belief. |
| www.humanities.mcmaster.ca /~ailact/fetzer.htm (7875 words) |
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