Zombies are dead bodies with no souls, created by the fl magic of voodoo sorcerers.
If the "zombie" exhibits all the symptoms of consciousness, then the "zombie" is not a zombie; for to exhibit all the symptoms of consciousness is to have consciousness, which the zombie is denied by definition.
The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies by Daniel Dennett
skepdic.com /zombies.html (1390 words)
[No title](Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-12)
A philosophicalzombie is a being physically indistinguishable from an actual or possible human being, inhabiting a possible world where the physical laws are identical to the laws of the actual world, but which completely lacks consciousness.
To assert that zombies are nomologically possible would be to assert that in some world that shares all of its laws with the actual world there is a being identical to some actual or genuinely possible human being who is utterly lacking in consciousness.
It seems defensible to claim instead that zombies are completely mindless; that in the absence of consciousness there are no mental states at all (this seems to be Searle's (19??) position based on the claim that mental states are those states that have the potential to become conscious to their subject).
A philosophicalzombie or p-zombie is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.
The notion of a philosophicalzombie is mainly used in arguments (often called zombie arguments) in the philosophy of mind, particularly arguments against forms of physicalism.
However, philosophicalzombies are primarily discussed in the context of arguments against physicalism (or functionalism) in general.
A zombie is a dead person that is brought back to life through a curse (voodoo, necromancy) or a mutation and has recovered some vital functions like movement.
Zombies are omnipresent in the folklore of Haïti, where they are created by voodoo, an african type of fl witchcraft.
More recently, zombies films have exposed new theories according to which man-made virus or genetical experiments are held responsible for the creation of zombies.
Philosophers who deny that there are qualia often have in mind qualia, as the term is used in the senses specified in this section.
A philosophicalzombie is a molecule by molecule duplicate of a sentient creature, a normal human-being, for example, but who differs from that creature in lacking any phenomenal consciousness.
The hypothesis that there can be philosophicalzombies is not normally the hypothesis that such zombies are nomically possible, that their existence is consistent with the actual laws of nature.
plato.stanford.edu /entries/qualia (8014 words)
Zombie Killer (consciousness, qualia, functionalism, and intentionality)(Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-12)
Philosopher'szombies are hypothetical beings that are behaviorally and functionally (or perhaps even physically) equivalent to (and thus indistinguishable from) human beings, but which differ from humans in not having conscious (or, at least, qualitatively conscious) mental states.
A zombie can tell you that the rose before it is red, and it will wince and hastily withdraw its hand if it touches a hot stove; however, unlike us, it never experiences the quintessential redness, the 'raw feel' of red, or the awfulness and misery of burning pain.
But if zombiesfunctionally equivalent to conscious humans are a real conceptual possibility (they do not have to actually exist) then functionalism must be false, because we are admitting that two functionally indiscernible beings could be mentally different - one is conscious and the other is not.
Natasha Mitchell: The zombie flick is a well loved horror sub-genre, and it was George Romero who really took the cult of the zombie and made it his own, with the film trilogy Night of the Living Dead, Day of the Dead and Dawn of the Dead.
Today, zombies are also a big hit on the net, with weird and wonderful web pages like zombie juice.com, or the Fleshrot site.
Zombies, after all, are exactly the same where the easy problems are concerned — they walk and talk and get around — but it feels like nothing at all to them.
Zombies are hypothetical creatures of the sort that philosophers have been known to cherish.
The general point is that the logical possibility of zombies is one way of illustrating that there is no logical entailment from physical facts to facts about consciousness, whereas there is such an enatilment in most other domains.
Zombie behavior would be coincidental or lying; the idea rests on a Cartesian conception of self-knowledge.
The zombies in Haiti are kind of like this, it’s a fear fantasy, somebody’s going to do something to me that’s going to rob me of my free will, turn me into their slave.
Zombies after all are exactly the same where the easy problems are concerned, they walk and talk and get around but it feels like nothing at all to them.
Having said that zombies are fun and that almost all zombie movies are funny, I think that zombies are the perfect horror movie villain because they do represent some very deep physiological fears about being a human being.
Attack of the Patent Zombies(Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-12)
The fictitious story, which Knight dubs “The Zombie Stare,” tells of an ambitious high school senior, consumed by anticipation of college admission, who prays one night to remain unconscious until receiving his MIT admissions letter.
Well, the transition from conscious being to zombie results in no external evidence of change: it's like the subject is replaced with a perfect artificial replica, and the real subject becomes unconscious.
I leave the conclusion unspecified: perhaps he goes insane and kills himself; perhaps he overcomes his existential crisis by deciding to live for the moment, since the moment is all he can be sure of; perhaps he decides to get a graduate diploma in philosophy and start a philosophy-themed blog.
It had always seemed to me that the "zombie problem," like the problem of other minds or the possibility that I might be dreaming, raised a skeptical specter of no consequence to the progress of an empirical science of consciousness.
One topic that we struggle* with at ZA is particularly relevant here: "zombie denial." The personal(*?) discovery* that one is a zombie has always been a matter of sheer chance, as it was when I happened to point the brain-scanner at myself.
The thought experiment unleashes a plague of zombies, and a vast army of zombie types, at the same time afflicting all with the skeptical worry that our surface psychology may turn out to be one of a number of psychologies*.
The zombies that philosophers’ use in their thought experiments can be exactly like us in all physical respects but have no conscious experiences.
Yet zombies behave like us, spend a lot of time discussing their thoughts and maybe their ‘feelings’, display conscious behaviour, use a rich vocabulary, and may even hold day schools and write books on being human and philosophicalzombies.
Zombies present a special problem for physicalists who believe that human rational, mental life can be explained by, or in terms of, our observable, physical aspects (usually our brains), for there’s no point in producing an account of human nature, in biological or other terms, that simply describes what zombies do.
Zombies are exactly like us in all physical respects but have no conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie.
If zombies are to be counterexamples to physicalism, it is not enough for them to be behaviorally and functionally like normal human beings: plenty of physicalists accept that merely behavioral or functional duplicates of ourselves might lack qualia.
Philosophers who believe they have a solid response to skepticism about other minds may therefore conclude that this consequence of the zombie idea is enough to condemn it.
plato.stanford.edu /entries/zombies (7181 words)
Zombies(Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-12)
The Zombie is the inhabitant of every Cartesian's room 101; an evil monster, deceitful and cunning, kidding the world that it is something which it is not: a sentient creature, able to feel pain, fall in love and generally have sensations in a broad subjective spectrum of colours, sounds, tastes, feels and smells.
The Zombie's performance is a sham, a shell of behaviour covering a core of nothingness.
Technically speaking, a Zombie is a human being who, despite having full mastery of a set of sensation-concepts, is nevertheless himself unable to have any sensations appropriate to those concepts.
To defend the purposefulness of consciousness against this attack, some philosophers deny that, according to the full and proper definition, it is possible to even imagine a zombie.
On the other hand, philosophers who accept the notion of zombies have to face the consequence that consciousness is thereby rendered seemingly useless.
Some philosophers who wish to entertain zombies try to get round epiphenomenalism by saying that zombies are imaginable but not possible.
Evolution selects properties according to their functional role, and my zombie twin performs all the functions that I perform just as well as I do; in particular he leaves around just as many copies of his genes.
he's presuming that zombies are a possible thing in the real world, as opposed to a philosophical stalking horse.
There are several plausible interpretations of the phenomena, depending on one's intuitions and philosophical preferences, and there are a lot of empirical questions that need answering before we are going to get much further.
Swampman is the subject of a philosophical thought experiment introduced by Donald Davidson, in his 1987 paper "Knowing One's Own Mind".
This argument depends upon the acceptance of semantic externalism - the claim that what one's words mean is determined not merely by some internal state, but also by the causal history of the speaker.
Others have called into question the validity of this sort of thought experiment altogether, maintaining that when a thought experiment is too far moved from the actual state of affairs, our intuitions cease to be meaningful.
I was totally blown away by this post on immediate blogroll addition Neurotopia, drawing connections between the now-widely-reported phenomenon of Ambien zombies and the less well-known theoretical zombies discussed by philosophers.
Presumably, if it's possible for a zombie to exist, that's because it's possible for there to be a creature that is physically (including neurally) identical to a human but that lacks conscious experience anyway.
Having a philosophical interest in zombie consciousness is one thing; having a theoretical interest in rotting flesh is, well, English students for you.
According to the popular lore, a zombie is one of the "undead," a body without a soul, created by the Bokor as a slave through the power of their fl magic.
For the question of whether or not zombies exist is does not end with a plausible explanation of the potential cause and effect of the Haitian phenomenon of zombiism, but leads to questions of the nature of consciousness.
Personally, I don't believe that there are such things as zombies, or p-zombies, (by their respective definitions) not because the evidence is overwhelming but because in the absence of overwhelming evidence, not believing is the more ethical standpoint.
Zombie: A soulless body who has been revived from death and can be made to work as a slave.
Zombie: A being that behaves like us and may share our functional organization and even, perhaps, our neurophysiological makeup without conscious experiences or qualia.
Summary of the philosophical import of zombies;philosophical papers on zombies; voodoo zombies, movie zombies, rock-n-roll zombies; etc.
“Wichita” Craig Ewert » 2006 » January(Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-12)
A little googling, and the right answer stares us in the face: a philosophical vampire is a creature who looks, and acts, just like a regular person, but who has no soul.
You know what a zombie is. Everyone knows what a zombie is.
A philosophicalzombie is a creature that looks, and acts, just like a regular person, but who has no consciousness, no mind.