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Pleasure (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) |
 | | Pleasure, although it sometimes seems to share a thought's content, is not easily assimilated to mere thought and resists any analysis in terms of belief or judgment, despite the claims of ancient Stoics (Long and Sedley 1987, §65, B, C and D) and their followers (opposed by Hamlyn 1978; Sorabji 2000; Helm 2000, ch. |
 | | Pleasure and theories involving it came to be increasingly disregarded by philosophers nevertheless, despite defenses of aspects of historical hedonism by Richard Brandt (1979, 1982, 1993) and Irwin Goldstein (1980, 1985, 1989) and neuroscientific discoveries widely taken to suggest that pleasure might be a motivatonally powerful isolable experience, much as the simple picture had supposed. |
 | | Pleasure could be accorded a place in the best life attainable for beings like ourselves, imperfect enough to have recurrent needs but sometimes aware of their however partial and temporary satisfaction. |
| plato.stanford.edu /entries/pleasure (16492 words) |
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