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Topic: Pokhran-II

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ISANW Newsletter, No. 6 The difference between Pokhran I and Pokhran II was the fact that on the latter occasion, the device was tested in a "weapons configuration". Pokhran II (and the subsequent DND) is a distinct break from the above policy. In the interregnum between Pokhran I and Pokhran II, the NPT and CTBT were debated and negotiated time after time, with the objective of providing a benchmark for disarmament. www.isanw.org /news/06

archive: India's Nuclear Thoughts The success of India’s post-Pokhran II diplomacy is that it has created new strategic space for New Delhi: after the indefinite extension of NPT and the comprehensive test ban treaty, there was very little room for this country to manoeuvre and “mistakes” in non-proliferation were becoming more and more costly. The success of India's post-Pokhran II diplomacy is that it has created new strategic space for New Delhi: after the indefinite extension of NPT and the comprehensive test ban treaty, there was very little room for this country to manoeuvre and istakes in non-proliferation were becoming more and more costly. But it is essential to recall that an alliance of Indian nuclear evangelists, apologists for the West and self-appointed liberals had hijacked the debate in India for a brief while after Pokhran II and painted this country’s future in the worst possible colours. www.media-watch.org /articles/0899/196.html

The Sunday Tribune - Books Pokhran II signalled the failure of the carrot and stick policy the US had been adopting to prevent India from going nuclear. The Indian deception was so foolproof that the US had no clue when Pokhran II hit the Clinton administration like a bolt from the blue. The sanctions the US imposed on India in the wake of Pokhran II could not have endeared the Clinton administration to the Vajpayee regime. www.tribuneindia.com /2004/20041010/spectrum/book5.htm

articleshow?msid=202063 Pokhran II is part of India’s defence preparedness, and it should remain a natural component of our defence strategy. Pokhran II is part of Indiaand#8217;s defence preparedness, and it should remain a natural component of our defence strategy. She predictably referred to India finding a place at the high table of the big powers and she too connected it to Pokhran II. timesofindia.indiatimes.com /cms.dll/xml/uncomp/articleshow?msid=202063

485 Achin Vanaik, Since the Pokhran tests Considering that Sino-Indian relations had been steadily improving over the last 15 years before Pokhran II, and that China had not in any way by word or deed over a long period preceding the tests provoked India, it was both unconvincing and irresponsible for India to have made China out to be the main culprit. Pokhran II and then Chagai opened a new and qualitatively more dangerous chapter in the ongoing story of India-Pakistan relations. The Agni II missile tests were successfully carried out over a range of 1500 to 2000 kilometres. www.india-seminar.com /2000/485/485%20vanaik.htm

Rediff On The NeT: Pokhran II exposes failure of CTBT seismic network The Pokhran II nuclear tests have exposed the weaknesses of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty monitoring system for its failure of seismic network to detect low-yield explosions, said Dr R Chidambaram, chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, today. He said India was forthcoming in giving details of the Pokhran II nuclear tests, and these tests are of 1998-vintage, and the robust designs were based on today's knowledge of physics, materials science, engineering and electronics. The thermonuclear device was a two-stage system using a boosted fission device as the first stage and the total yield of the device can raised to 200 KT or even more, he said. www.rediff.com /news/1998/oct/30bomb.htm

What Are the Real Yields of India's Tests? The seismic signals detected for Pokhran-I and Shakti I-III provide a benchmark for evaluating the detectability of small tests. Pokhran-I was slightly deeper than Palanquin and was barely contained, suggesting that the rock in which it was fired was roughly similar in strength to the rhyolite of Palanquin. Since the near surface of the Pokhran site is composed of loose material (sand and perhaps alluvium) that cannot cap chimney formation it seems unlikely that a 43 kt shot at 200 m could have avoided producing a subsidence crater. nuclearweaponarchive.org /India/IndiaRealYields.html

The bungle in Kargil The principal one of these was the political failure to comprehend the consequences of the nuclear tests at Pokhran last May. Pokhran's many implications for the future of Pakistan's strategy on Jammu and Kashmir were left unanalysed, a consequence of the Hindu Right's bizarre ideological fictions on a nuclear India. Pokhran opened the space for Pakistan to attempt to gain ground in Jammu and Kashmir through international intervention for the first time since 1971. INDIA'S war to regain the Kargil heights had its origins not in simple military errors, but in a larger process of self-delusion set in place with the nuclear tests at Pokhran. www.flonnet.com /fl1613/16130040.htm

Pokhran II test yielded 60 kT: Chidambaram- The Times of India he reacted to a paper published in the july 10 issue of current science, a journal of the indian academy of sciences, where a team of scientists from the uk, blackwest, reading argue that the 60 kiloton (kt) yield of the pokhran ii test on may 11, 1998, as shown by indian scientists, is unjustified. even the international data centres have accepted that pokhran i was 12-13 kt and pokhran ii 58-63 kt, he said. there is also no difficulty in raising the 45 kt yield to 200 kt and more." though pokhran ii aimed at giving india a credible deterrent, chidambaram said a great deal of work was done by barc since then. timesofindia.indiatimes.com /articleshow/msid-838551414,prtpage-1.cms

'What wrong did this man do?' Hence, to see the Pokhran tests as a natural culmination of India's nuclear policy from the 1950s is not only naive but harmful to the very basis of a secular democratic Indian state. It appears that during the interregnum some of the BJP leaders, or at least Advani, entertained the delusion that with Pokhran India had acquired a strategic nuclear edge over Pakistan; they may have even believed that Islamabad was bluffing about its nuclear weapon capabilities. The debris and dust had hardly settled at Pokhran when the following written message about "the rationale for the tests" was on its way to the White House: www.frontlineonnet.com /fl1610/16100220.htm

tribuneindia... Editorial Pokhran II was followed by nuclear tests in Chagai and the response of Pakistan to the test-firing of Agni II was anything but unpredictable. After the success of Pokhran II, it guides India into a select club of nations with missile power and entrenches New Delhi in a strategic position globally, whether Washington and its close allies like it or not. However, a common “bomb” in the basements of India and Pakistan has the potential to cause more damage and devastation to the two countries than a conventional nuclear device. www.tribuneindia.com /1999/99apr16/edit.htm

June_1_p_7.htm Friends, although this programme has been organised by our Party, Pokhran II can hardly be said to be a proud achievement of the BJP alone or of the NDA Government alone. He was the Raksha Mantri at the time of Pokhran II. Pokhran is not an isolated example of how the Communists have always been out of tune with the national mainstream. www.bjp.org /today/June_0105/June_1_p_7.htm

Rediff On The NeT: Pritish Nandy on Re-engineering Pokhran II For them, Pokhran II will be a historic watershed, when a nation (poor and vulnerable as it may be) chose to reassert the right of weaker nations to nuclear capability, to challenge the existing aristocracy of power. Pokhran II must no longer be seen as an act of brainless belligerency. Pokhran II began as a solution to our own internal problems. www.rediff.com /news/1998/jun/29nandy.htm

archive: FIRE AIMED AT THE DRAGON Remember, the development and testing of Agni II was part of the underlying text of the Pokhran II tests and of India’s decision to attempt to acquire a minimum nuclear deterrent. Remember, the development and testing of Agni II was part of the underlying text of the Pokhran II tests and of India's decision to attempt to acquire a minimum nuclear deterrent. And while Ghauri II and Shaheen may not have an equally convincing strat- egic rationale, their presence is unlikely to destabilize relations in the region. www.media-watch.org /articles/0499/539.html

The Hindu : Sino-Indian ties Pokhran was a manifestation of the strained ties. It should be remembered that China was (is) responsible for providing Pakistan with the knowhow for nuclear weaponry and its delivery mechanism. www.hinduonnet.com /2001/01/31/stories/05311307.htm

New Page 3 Unlike in India's first nuclear test in 1974 (Pokhran - I), all the devices tested in Pokhran-II were designed as weapons and hence their weight and size had to be kept to the minimum. The objectives in Pokhran-II were to test a 15-kilo ton fission weapon, a 45-kilo ton thermonuclear bomb, three sub-kilo ton devices, and to validate the computer programmes for designing nuclear weapons, said Dr. Chaidambaram. The thermonuclear bomb used a boosted fission device to start the fusion process. www.biiss.org /nuclear/July2001/04.htm

Navy Dr Iyengar exlained the composition of the basic fusion and fission bombs that were exploded in the Pokhran-I and II and the shape and mechanism of these devices in great detail with slides. Pokhran-I was a single device of 12 kilotons. Aided by slides even the not so knowledgeable were able to grasp and understand approximately how large the bombs were and the implosion and trigger systems in both the fusion and fission devices which were placed in the shafts at Pokhran. www.indiadefence.com /lecture.htm

The nuclear fallout -- II One of the benefits of Pokhran II is that now an informed quantitative debate can and should occur to base judgements on the form of provision for this most important public good for any country. The economic consequences of Pokhran II relate to both sanctions and the costs of weaponising and providing a credible nuclear deterrent, particularly against China. Moreover, as these capital flows are now dwarfed in the world economy by private flows, it is the impact of Pokhran II on the latter which matters for the economy's future. www.ccsindia.org /people_dl_nuclear.htm

pokhran ii This is the harmful legacy of Pokhran II. (ii) L K Advani, in a written statement on May 18, warned Pakistan that India is a nuclear weapons power and declared that problems such as Kashmir will have to be solved in this new geo-political light. The Pokhran tests are being shown as the BJP's important contribution to the country's might. www.ganashakti.com /old/1999/990517/feature.htm

Untitled Document Let me end this reverie with an episode that, in my mind at least, links the many layers of the Indian reality, and links Pokhran-I with Pokhran-II. It was soon after Pokhran I that this incident took place. (ii) Realised that it is April Fools' Day. www.classteacher.com /content/curriculum/samplepapers/11/easy/englishcore11qa.html

POKHRAN-II : Five Years later The fifth anniversary of Pokhran II, that had stunned the world and had resulted in sweeping global sanctions, has passed off without much fanfare - indicating that the nuclear issue has already retreated to the background. Budha Jayanti in 1998 witnessed Pokhran-II, codenamed Shakti (strength), when India tested five nuclear devices, three on 11 May and two on 13 May. Pokhran and Chagai dramatically raised the stakes in the standoff over Kashmir, one of the world's longest-running feuds. www.saag.org /papers7/paper690.html

TNI Asia Europe Relations The nuclear tests conducted by India in Pokhran [popularly known as Pokhran II] in May 1998 shocked the world and much of India. Every year since Pokhran II, there have been marches, demonstrations, exhibitions and meetings on Hiroshima day and on May 11th, the anniversary of Pokhran II. Pokhran I, despite the claim that it was only a PNE, triggered off a nuclear arms race in South Asia, with India's traditional adversary Pakistan secretly concentrating efforts to build its own nuclear weapon as a deterrent to the Indian bomb. www.tni.org /asem-seoul/004chenoy.htm

TNI Publications POKHRAN II represented a shift in Indian nuclear policy that was politically immature. To expect our pro-nuclear elite who welcomed Pokhran II, admit today that they were seriously wrong in their strategic-political assessments is unrealistic. Indeed, the political egos of our "strategic experts" being what they are, we shouldn't even expect them to have second thoughts about the 'wisdom' of regional nuclearisation or wonder whether it might not be wise to reconsider going down such a path. www.tni.org /archives/vanaik/idea.htm

Blind Old Men of Hindustan One of the milder criticisms that India faced during the immediate fall-out of the Pokhran II blasts was the ambiguous and weak definition of what a credible minimum deterrent comprises. Karnad, who was involved in putting together India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine, had been advocating India as a potent nuclear weapon state for decades before the 1999 Pokhran II tests. The strategic world has received a big shock from the recent utterances and writings of India’s ‘super hawk’ realist scholar and practitioner, Bharat Karnad. www.kashmirherald.com /may04/editorial.html

The May 1998 Pokhran Tests -Scientific Aspects Figure 3 shows the broad-band seismogram recorded by IMD at Bhopal and compares it with the seismogram recorded at Nilore in Pakistan, which is at almost the same distance from Pokhran as Bhopal. The threshold limit for seismic detection is much higher in, say, a sand medium than in hard rock; the Pokhran geological medium comes somewhere in between. `Applications of Godiva II Neutron Pulses’, by T.F. Wimett and J.D. Orndoff, Proc. www.saag.org /papers5/paper451.html

Rediff On The NeT: Vir Sanghvi on the BJP's miscalculation on Pokhran II. And when he did return to office with a majority, one of the first things he did was to give the go ahead for Pokhran II. More significantly, we also know that Pokhran II is not a BJP achievement. As the Bharatiya Janata Party goes into the assembly election campaign, its leaders are talking about many things but when Pokhran is mentioned at all, it gets a supporting role; the days when it was the government's star achievement are clearly over. in.rediff.com /news/1998/nov/09vir.htm

The Hindu : Good nukes, bad nukes OFFICIAL INDIAN nuclear dogma following Pokhran II has always maintained that India's nuclear weapons are `good' nukes, the welcome fruit of decades of self-reliant labour by Indian scientists and engineers and a symbol of India's scientific and technological strength. It is clear that the current U.S. approach in nuclear policy vis-à-vis India is dominated by the carrot rather than the stick, that was evident in the immediate aftermath of Pokhran II. Consideration of at least two important issues arising out of these recent developments suggests that our nuclear policy remains mired in the aftermath of Pokhran II. www.thehindu.com /2004/02/28/stories/2004022800851000.htm

Alsos: India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond This book is a collection of papers about India's nuclear weapons policy written by Indian intellectuals in response to the Indian government’s 1998 Pokhran II test of a nuclear device. Alsos: India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond The appendices include official documents of the Indian government, a plan for disarmament in India, and technical notes on the 1998 test. alsos.wlu.edu /information.asp?id2=1868&past=1&print=true

TNI Publications Four years ago, the VHP announced it would build a temple to a new national goddess, "Atomic Shakti", and carry Pokhran's radioactive sands in a rath yatra to each corner of India. The causal chain that links Pokhran to Gujarat is unmistakable. Today, it is reaping the harvest of the seeds sown by its campaign to build another illegitimate temple, at Ayodhya, fertilised by kar sewaks who went there from Gujarat in their thousands. www.xs4all.nl /~tni/archives/bidwai/togujarat.htm

Vigil's Discussion Forum - Five Years After Pokhran II:Where Do We Go From Here? After the tests of Pokharan II for the purpose of demonstration and our declaration of a “credible minimum deterrent” as our objective, it is pointless to argue the wisdom or otherwise of the decision to test or debate the losses and gains. (In the words of the former AEC Chairman R.Chidambaram on Pokharan II, “The 15 kt fission nuclear weapon had evolved from the PNE device tested in 1974, with substantial changes that were needed to make it smaller in size and weight from the point of view of weaponization.” — italics mine). But, Pakistani projection of an imminent nuclear war in the sub-continent on account of Kashmir issue continues (and is being highlighted by western media) without effective counter by us. www.vigilonline.com /interact/discuss/discuss.asp?plainSpeakId=9

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