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	Mailgate: sci.logic: Re: Existence as predicate
		> > K is "to be the present king of France" > and > B is "to be bald".
		Hi Ken, "The present king of France is bald", means, There is one and only one thing such that it is presently king of France and it is bald.
		But, in virtue of France's 'present' political strutcture we can assert, ~Ex(x is presently king of France)..there is no present king of France.
	mailgate.supereva.it /sci/sci.logic/msg19218.html (414 words)

	Bertrand Russell - On Denoting
		It is contended, for example, that the present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round, and also not round, etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can be found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred.
		Thus `the present King of France is not bald' is false if it means `There is an entity which is now King of France and is not bald', but is true if it means `It is false that there is an entity which is now King of France and is bald'.
		Thus all propositions in which `the King of France' has a primary occurrence are false: the denials of such propositions are true, but in them `the King of France' has a secondary occurrence.
	evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com /russell08.htm (5363 words)

	ALAN TURING
		It is no solution to say AThe present King of France@ means nothing because then the AThe present King of the United States@ and AThe round square@ and countless other phrases would presumably also mean, or stand for, nothing, but it is evident that all such phrases differ in meaning.
		If a revolution occurred in the United States in 2084, there might then be a King of the United States but that would not mean there would be a round square and a French King as well (or that nothing had changed to something).
		Rather, AThe present King of France is bald@ means AThere exists an x that bears the predicate of being kingly of France, and if any y also bears that predicate, y=x, and x is bald.
	www.hfac.uh.edu /phil/leiber/LinguisticsEncyclopediaTuring.htm (2572 words)

	Analytic philosophy -- Facts, Info, and Encyclopedia article (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		The split between the two began early in the twentieth century.
		This was at the same time that Heidegger was dominating philosophy in Germany, and becoming influential in France, and his work became the object of frequent derision in English-speaking philosophy departments.
		Russell sought to resolve various philosophical issues by applying such clear and clean distinctions, most famously in the case of the (Click link for more info and facts about Present King of France) Present King of France.
	www.absoluteastronomy.com /encyclopedia/a/an/analytic_philosophy.htm (2254 words)

	Justin Woods: Essay 1
		Therefore, either 'the King of France is bald' or 'the king of France is not bald' must be true or false, but not both.
		For instance, 'the present King of France is not bald' is a sentence that can be interpreted in two ways, according to the term 'not'.
		With the first interpretation, the denoting phrase 'the present King of France' is said to have a primary occurrence.
	www.shef.ac.uk /~ptpdlp/essays/woods1.html (3888 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		Hence one would suppose that ‘the King of France is bald’ ought to be nonsense; but it is not nonsense, since it is plainly false.” (214) *Next Russell turns to 3 puzzles, to see if his theory handles these.
		“The present King of France is not bald.” --Not if it means: “There is one and only one entity that is the King of France, and he is not bald.” On this interpretation, ‘the King of France’ is primary and the sentence is false.
		On this interpretation, the sentence means: “It is false that there is presently a King of France and he is bald.” *Russell’s response to Puzzle #3: “All propositions in which Apollo occurs are to be interpreted by the above rules for denoting phrases.
	comp.uark.edu /~efunkho/Lecture6.doc (914 words)

	ipedia.com: Definite description Article (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		It surely can't be true, for there is no present King of France.
		Similarly, for "the present King of France is not bald", we have the identical assertions 1.
		so "the present King of France is not bald", because it consists of a conjunction, one of whose terms is assertion 1.
	www.ipedia.com /definite_description.html (755 words)

	Mailgate: sci.logic: Re: Existence as predicate
		>> >> K is "to be the present king of France" and >> B is "to be bald".
		the definite > description "the present king of France", and the predicate "is bald".
		> > In "the king is dead, long live the king!" the same description occurs > twice, because it´s meant to be an encapsulation of the idea of the > continuity of the royal line of succession.
	mailgate.supereva.it /sci/sci.logic/msg19220.html (342 words)

	Philosophy Department - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society
		The sentence “The present king of France is bald” is translated “One and only one x is the present king of France, and that x is bald.” Since there is no present king of France, the first conjunct of that sentence is false, which makes the whole thing false.
		If existential import is only a conversational implication of sentences such as “The present king of France is bald,” then sentences such as “Some trees are green” are also going to only imply existential import.
		A secondary occurrence of the existential quantifier would read “___ one and only one x has the property of being the present king of France ___ that x has the property of being bald,” where the ___’s are filled with some logical operator.
	www.wmich.edu /philosophy/heraclitean/vol21/payne (2467 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		In this particular example, “the present King of France” is mentioned, but whose existence is not part of the assertion, that is, (1) does not belong to the asserting force of (KF).
		As there is no king in France at present, (1) is not met, therefore (KF) is simply false when it is used now according to Russell.
		Since France is not a monarchy at this point in history, anyone who sincerely uses this sentence to make a statement about reality shall not impart anything but absurdity.
	www.math.ucla.edu /~cai/Strawson_Russell.html (855 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		(1) The present King of France is bald According to Russell, (1) is false because it asserts the existence of the present King of France.
		However, since Strawson (1952), a number of philosophers and linguists have maintained that (1) does not assert or even entail the existence of the present King of France, but rather presupposes his existence.
		The philosophical controversy surrounding presupposition comes in at the very begining -- determining whether sentences like (1) presuppose the existence of the King of France (that is, whether he must exist in order for them to be true or false), or whether sentences like (1) entail the existence of the Present King of France.
	www-personal.umich.edu /~ludlow/peter7.txt (998 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		Definite descriptions are expressions such as: the present Queen of England the present King of France the tallest mountain on earth the tallest golden mountain the most populous Canadian province What do they all have in common: they pick our one definite object by means of a description of that object.
		So, in principle, one of the two sentences: (4) The present King of France is bald (5) The present King of France is not bald will be true, since (5) is the negation of the (4).
		Russell’s way of explaining the difference is to say that the definite description ‘the King of France’ can be interpreted as having either a primary or a secondary occurrence.
	artsandscience.concordia.ca /Philosophy/prof/216week06acetates.doc (1879 words)

	[No title]
		For example, `either it is the case that the present king of France is bald or it is not the case that the present king of France is bald' looks to express a logical truth, hence, a fortiori, to be truth valuable; hence, a fortiori, to be meaningful.
		As van Fraassen conceives of a classical valuation, if the name `Pegasus' or the definite description `the present king of France' does not denote in a partial model M, there are no constraints on what truth-values may be assigned to atomic sentences containing them in a classical valuation M* on M.(fn.).
		In effect, sentences like `The present king of France is male' and `Pegasus has wings' and `The man who is taller than himself is Russian' are treated as mere surds; i.e., as having assigned truth-values but no internal semantic structure.
	ruccs.rutgers.edu /pub/papers/evaluate19.txt (7194 words)

	Theory of Descriptions - Russell's seminal paper 'On Denoting' (1905)
		We may distinguish three cases: (1) A phrase may be denoting, and yet not denote anything; e.g., `the present King of France'.
		It is contended, for example, that the present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round, and also not round, etc.
		One of the first difficulties that confront us, when we adopt the view that denoting phrases express a meaning and denote a denotation, concerns the cases in which the denotation appears to be absent.
	www.odyssey.dircon.co.uk /rod.htm (5332 words)

	Descriptions
		Prior (1967), in seeking to mount a defense of presentism — the doctine that there are no future or past objects — encountered the problem of individuals that no longer exist.
		In Strawson's view, an utterance of the sentence in a world where there is no present King of France is neither true nor false; perhaps the sentence has a truth value gap, or perhaps it fails to express a determinate proposition (Strawson vacillated on this), but either way it does not appear to be false.
		For example, ‘My mother is dating the present King of France’ seems clearly false, as does ‘The present King of France cleans my swimming pool’, and he concluded that these are clearly cases where the Strawsonian truth conditions have gone awry.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/descriptions (17338 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		Since I've argued that tropes are similar to one another, and entities token-distinct from one another, only in the context of a knowing subject, I've implied that facts (which rely for their obtaining on type-identity/similarity of tropes and token-dinstinctness of entities) also exist only in the context of a knowing subject.
		For Russell, "The present king of France is bald" is false (since such a sentence asserts that there is a present king of France, and there is none).
		The fact asserted by the sentence in question fails to obtain: it's not the case that the present King of France is bald.
	enlightenment.supersaturated.com /onlinecon/facts.html (4380 words)

	Bertrand Russell
		Letting K abbreviate the predicate "is a present King of France" and B abbreviate the predicate "is bald," Russell assigns sentence (1) the logical form
		According to one reading of the Law of Excluded Middle, it must be the case that either "The present King of France is bald" is true or "The present King of France is not bald" is true.
		By appealing to analysis (1′), it follows that there is a way to deny (1) without being committed to the existence of a present King of France, namely by accepting that "It is not the case that there exists a present King of France who is bald" is true.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/russell (3963 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		Strawson notes his disagreements with Russell’s analysis of “The present* King of France is wise.”: It is not the case that an utterance of this sentence must be either true or false.
		Strawson: Since there is no present King of France, if the sentence were uttered now it would be neither true nor false.
		To respond with “There is no King of France” is not to contradict the utterance.
	comp.uark.edu /~efunkho/Lecture8.doc (1207 words)

	Bertrand Russell Biography
		It is normally illustrated using the phrase "the present King of France", as in "The present king of France is bald." What object is this sentence about, given that there is not, at present, a king of France?
		Among other things, the problem with this solution is that some such sentences, such as "If the present king of France is bald, then the present king of France has no hair on his head," not only do not seem nonsensical but appear to be obviously true.
		Roughly the same problem would arise if there were two kings of France at present: which of them does "the king of France" denote?
	www.biographybase.com /biography/Russell_Bertrand.html (1883 words)

	Bertrand Russell - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		Frege seemed to think we could dismiss as nonsense any proposition whose words apparently referred to objects that didn't exist.
		Among other things, the problem with this solution is that some such propositions, such as "If the present king of France is bald, then the present king of France has no hair on his head," not only do not seem nonsensical but appear to be obviously true.
		After his parents' premature deaths, Russell and his older brother, Frank, the future 2nd Earl, were raised by their staunchly Victorian grandparents, Lord Russell, the former Prime Minister, and his second wife, the Countess Russell, nee Lady Frances Elliot.
	www.hackettstown.us /project/wikipedia/index.php/Bertrand_Russell (6424 words)

	International Catholic University 40.3 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		A. Problem: Since France has no king, what determines the truth or falsehood of the sentence "The present king of France is bald?"
		"The present king of France is bald" should be read this way: "There is an x such that x is (now) the king of France (and nothing other than x is king of France) and x has baldness." The latter is clearly false.
		Developed by both Wittgenstein and Russell around the time of World War I. The meaning of a sentence is captured by a primitive relationship between simple expressions (atomic sentences) and their simple worldly bearers (atomic states of affairs).
	home.comcast.net /~icuweb/c04003.htm (440 words)

	Russell’s theory of descriptions (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		Why this already departs from Frege’s categorization of expressions, which put phrases like ‘the present king of England’ in the class of proper names, but phrases like ‘some man’ in the class of devices of generality.
		It is contended, for example, that the present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round, and also not round; etc. But this is intolerable...”
		His explanation of the ambiguity in ‘The King of France is not bald.” Comparison with ‘Everyone is not bald.’
	www.arts.mcgill.ca /philo/speaks/415/russell-descriptions.html (2155 words)

	Russell
		The traditional principle seems violated by subject-less assertions such as "Either the present king of France is bald or the present king of France is not bald."
		On proper analysis "Either the present king of France is bald or the present king of France is not bald" asserts that either there is a present king of France who is bald or there is a present king of France who is not bald.
		When, in fact, there is no king of France, both disjuncts are clearly false.
	www.philosophypages.com /hy/6m.htm (1629 words)

	Philosophical Poetry » 2005 » January » 27 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		Of course, there was no king of France at the time, so the sentence referred to a nonexistent object.
		For example, “the present king of France.” He claimed that the logical meaning of attributing a property to a definite description was different than the surface meaning.
		Far from being meaningless, the sentence simply became false—without resorting to positing the existence of the nonexistent present king of France.
	danweasel.com /archives/2005/01/27 (1507 words)

	Bertrand Russell biography .ms (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		Alexius Meinong had suggested that we must posit a realm of "nonexistent entities" that we can suppose we are referring to when we use expressions like this; but this would be a strange theory, to say the least.
		Frege seemed to think we could dismiss as nonsense any sentences whose words apparently referred to objects that didn't exist.
		After his parents' death, Russell and his older brother Frank (the future 2nd Earl) were raised by their staunchly Victorian grandparents - the Earl and Countess Russell (Lord John Russell and his second wife Lady Frances Elliot).
	bertrand-russell.biography.ms (2179 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-09-18)
		robert: Peikoff likes to leave a lot of his stuff in the oral tradition--so his reference to "The present king of France is bald" comes in one of his lectures on modern philosophy, if memory serves.
		If "The present moderator of this discussion is bald" is false, then "The present moderator of this discussion is not bald" is true.
		Whereas, if "The present king of France is bald" is false, it does not follow that "The present king of France is not bald" is true.
	enlightenment.supersaturated.com /onlinecon/aboutbryan.html (1816 words)

	[No title]
		However, I present examples where such sentences are, in fact, judged true.
		I propose that a definite description may be accommodated as a conditional, and that, in such cases, it is precisely the failure to refer that makes the sentence true.
		Horn, L.: 1997, `All John’s Children Are as Bald as the King of France: Existential Import and the Geometry of Opposition’, in K. Singer, R. Eggert, and G. Anderson (eds.), Papers from the Thirty-Third Regional Meeting, pp.
	www.bgu.ac.il /~arikc/kof.doc (1794 words)

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