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| | Mind: Anti-realism, truth-conditions and verificationism |
 | | The principle of bivalence, concerning statements of the object-language, is easily statable in a theory of truth and it may or may not be a theorem of the theory. |
 | | Quite apart, however, from the question of what relationship that principle has to realism (as understood here), it is a metaphysically interesting principle in its own right. |
 | | As for the principle of bivalence, it does seem likely that it cannot be a theorem of a verificationist theory of meaning (if only because it cannot be expressed therein), but this needs argument and, besides, the principle of bivalence, while important, is not the same as realism. |
| www.findarticles.com /p/articles/mi_m2346/is_n424_v106/ai_20035456/pg_5 (1152 words) |
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