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| | Marcelo Dascal: The Balance of Reason |
 | | The main thesis of this paper is that Leibniz’s encompassing rationalism, as expressed by the Principle of Sufficient Reason (as in the formula nihil est sine ratione: Grua 13, 267, 268, etc.), requires a substantial modification of the conception of Reason usually attributed to Leibniz. |
 | | The reason for “existence” (in a broad sense, applied to both necessary and contingent “things”), he claims, is always a comparative matter, a matter of the existing thing having “more reason” to exist than other things that might exist instead of it (Grua 303). |
 | | At times Leibniz seems to come close to such a view, as when, after affirming that the PSR is a principle “divinely implanted in our mind and confirmed by both reason and experience”, he adds the ominous cautionary phrase: “to the extent that we can penetrate things” (Grua 304). |
| www.tau.ac.il /humanities/philos/dascal/papers/berlin.html (3110 words) |
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