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| | shorst.psychophysics.spp97 |
 | | These three examples will illustrate the points, respectively, (1) that psychophysics deals with relationships between stimuli and "subjective" phenomenological properties, (2) that in some cases it is very much the qualitative properties of mental states that are the subject matter of psychophysics, while (3) in others, intentional properties also seem to play a major role. |
 | | When researchers in psychophysics of perception present papers at their professional meetings, I am told, a great deal of care is lavished upon producing the best possible visuals&emdash;i.e., visuals that allow the audience to experience the effect for themselves. |
 | | Second, the mental states that appear in psychophysics under phenomenological descriptions appear not as the posits, but as the data for theoretical psychology, and thus are not so readily subject to elimination as a consequence of theory change. |
| shorst.web.wesleyan.edu /papers/shorst.psychophysics.spp97.html (3892 words) |
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