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Public good

Public good - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Because pure public goods are rare (though they include such important cases as national defense and the system of property rights), in common parlance among economists "public goods" usually refers to impure public goods or those confined to particular localities. The economic concept of public goods should not be confused with the expression "the public good", which is usually an application of a collective ethical notion of "the good" in political decision-making. Common goods should not be confused with another subtype of public goods: the collective goods (also known as social goods), which are defined as goods that could be delivered as private goods, but are delivered instead by the government for various reasons (usually social policy). en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Public_goods   (2435 words)

CONK! Encyclopedia: Category:Games   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15) Games are forms of entertainment derived from a set of artificial rules, typically with a known goal to be reached. Games can be in the form of physical activities (see the sports category), mental, or a mixture of the two. Also, games (including sports) can be classified as cooperative, solitaire, or competitive. www.conk.com /search/encyclopedia.cgi?q=Category:Games   (69 words)

Matthew Yglesias: Children as Public Goods   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15) The reason for the flawed "public goods" analogy (criticisms of that analogy should emerge here) is basically to try to figure out a way to say that childraising is in a significant way a more meritorious and necessary activity than going to Greatful Dead concerts or playing the lottery. Since public education is one of the major social functions of economics, perhaps economic 101 should be taught better -- in particular, teaching the limits of economics at the beginning, instead of sneaking them in electively at the higher levels. "Good child rearing" is, one might argue, to the memetic continuation of society as "natalism" is to the genetic continuation of a population. yglesias.typepad.com /matthew/2005/04/children_as_pub.html   (4630 words)

Public goods games: well-mixed populations In an evolutionary setting of public goods interactions the dynamics of cooperators and defectors in large populations is considered. Evolutionary game theory relates payoffs and reproductive fitness such that the spreading of either strategy is determined by its average performance in game theoretical inteactions as compared to the competing strategy. The public goods game is characterized by the fact that, irrespective of the group composition, it is always better to defect and withhold the investment (just as in the pairwise prisoner's dilemma). www.univie.ac.at /virtuallabs/PublicGoods/mixed.html   (815 words)

Public Goods We could think of pollution as a "public bad," which is the opposite of a public good. For example, education is good for the public. Game theory is the branch of economics in which John Nash ("A Beautiful Mind") earned his Nobel Prize. arnoldkling.com /econ/markets/public.html   (936 words)

Nat' Academies Press, The Drama of the Commons (2002) In a common-pool resource game, it is nice or kind not to appropriate too much, while in a public goods game it is kind not to contribute too little to the public good. In this section we discuss a one-stage public goods game (similar to the standard common-pool resource game) and a two-stage public goods game, where after the first stage, subjects have a sanctioning opportunity (similar to the common-pool resource with sanctioning opportunities). At stage 1 the game is identical to the previous game. www.nap.edu /books/0309082501/html/176.html   (885 words)

Public Goods Game   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15) The value of a token kept is typically specified to be greater than the "internal return" that the individual receives from making the contribution, so there is a private incentive not to contribute, the strength of which depends on the size of the internal return. The public goods game has fascinated social scientists because the conflict between social and private incentives provides a platform for studying other-regarding preferences (e.g. You also choose the number of rounds, the token endowment, and the internal and external returns for contributions to the public good. veconlab.econ.virginia.edu /pg/pg.htm   (573 words)

Prevent Disease.com - Concern with Reputation Helps Motivate Fair Play In this study, researchers had students play two monetary games, the public goods game in which they publicly donated to the common pot, and a second game called indirect reciprocity, in which players publicly donated money to other people in the group, but never received direct donations back from those particular people. The researchers hypothesize this was because players who were ``stingy'' in the public goods game developed a negative reputation and were ``punished'' by their fellow players in the subsequent indirect reciprocity games. The investigators found that the impetus to cooperate was fragile: when the players did not expect to continue the indirect reciprocity game, their cooperation in the public goods game lapsed. preventdisease.com /news/articles/reputation_fair_play.shtml   (489 words)

Publications by Christoph Hauert   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15) The public goods game represents a straightforward generalization of the prisoner’s dilemma to an arbitrary number of players. Since the dominant strategy is to defect, both classical and evolutionary game theory predict the asocial outcome that no player contributes to the public goods. The three resulting strategiesFcollaboration or defection in the public goods game, as well as not joining at allFare studied by means of a replicator dynamics, which can be completely analysed in spite of the fact that the payoff terms are nonlinear. www.people.fas.harvard.edu /~hauert/publications/hauert_jtb02_abs.html   (167 words)

Markets, Part two For goods and services that are less controversial than cocaine, economists tend to oppose both tariffs and quotas. There is a disconnect between the public perception of the problem of monopoly and economists' perception of the problem of monopoly. It is argued that there is a "public good" issue because high fuel consumption causes pollution and also adversely impacts our ability to conduct foreign policy free from the influence of oil-producing countries. www.arnoldkling.com /econ/markets/mktchapter2.html   (4967 words)

Cooperation in Public Goods Games In this context, two models have attracted most attention: the prisoner’s dilemma for pairwise interactions and the public goods game for group interactions. In well-mixed populations the participants in the public goods game are randomly selected. For sufficiently attractive public goods interactions, the clustering advantage is sufficient to ensure persistent co-existence of cooperators and defectors or even domination of cooperation. www.univie.ac.at /virtuallabs/PublicGoods   (615 words)

Tunnel Vision: Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness of Confusion? The experimenter is trying to answer why subjects don't follow the so-called 'dominant' strategy, which is to invest nothing in a public goods game; and Andreoni's assumption is that any subject who does invest must either be kind or confused. It was an interesting result for Andreoni to show that in a public goods game, when subjects are given a ranking of what they earned compared to others, they tend to give less than when they were not given this information. Although some level of confusion may be present in the laboratory, as in real world contributions, the finding of the authors that about half of all cooperation in the standard public goods game was due to confusion seems too high. bartwilson.blogspot.com /2005/03/cooperation-in-public-goods.html   (1876 words)

Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science: Public Goods and Voting Abstract: The public goods experiment reported here is based on a clever design that decomposes the marginal per capita return into an internal return (to oneself) and an external return (to each other person). Contributions in one-shot games are generally increasing in internal returns, external returns, and group size, and a logit model of individual behavior tracks treatment averages well, both for linear and non-linear altruism specifications. Abstract The public goods game used here has the property that individual marginal values are declining functions of the amount of the public good, so that optimal provision levels are less than subject's initial token endowments. www.people.virginia.edu /~cah2k/puby2k.htm   (13743 words)

RIEB Discussion Paper Series (English) No.104   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15) The purpose of this paper is to provide reasonable microfoundation to justify the concept of a conjectural valuations equilibrium which is often used in the literature on the private provision of public goods by incorporating an explicit dynamic process of learning with the help of the differential game. By interpreting the steady state conjectures in such a dynamic provision game as the conjectural variations variations in the corresponding static game, we derive zero or nonzero conjectural variations as an outcome of a learning process. Furthermore, we find that there may be uncountable conjectural variations and the possibility of matching behavior (i.e., positive conjectures), when nonlinear feedback strategies are available and when the domain of a state variable is appropriately restricted. www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp /academic/ra/dp/English/dp104.html   (120 words)

Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science: Step Level Public Goods Abstract: The experiment is focused on the effects of value heterogeneity and group size on contributions to a step-level public good. Abstract: The experiment has that the property that at least two of the three individuals in a group must contribute in order for the public good to be provided. A meta-analysis of previous papers and new data show that the step return is correlated with the incidence of successful provision of the public good. www.people.virginia.edu /~cah2k/stepy2k.htm   (1197 words)

The Human Behavioral Ecology Bibliography Good hunters receive reproductive benefits among Lamalera marine foragers. Gurven, M. Economic games among the Amazonian Tsimane: Exploring the roles of market access, costs of giving, and cooperation on pro-social game behavior. The ultimatum game and the public goods game among the Tsimane’ of Bolivia. faculty-staff.ou.edu /A/Kermyt.G.Anderson-1/HBE   (8375 words)

Incremental Commitment and Reciprocity in a Real-Time Public Goods Game -- Kurzban et al. 27 (12): 1662 -- Personality ... Incremental Commitment and Reciprocity in a Real-Time Public Goods Game -- Kurzban et al. contributing more to the public good than other group members. public good at a level at or slightly above the contribution psp.sagepub.com /cgi/content/abstract/27/12/1662   (203 words)

Conditional cooperation and group dynamics: Experimental evidence from a sequential public goods game ewp-exp/0307001 We design a novel sequential public goods experiment to study reciprocity, or conditional cooperation. In contrast to the standard simultaneous contribution game, our sequential design provides direct evidence on how subjects condition their own contributions on the contributions of other subjects in the experiment. These hypotheses are often assumed in the public goods literature, yet neither has been directly supported. econwpa.wustl.edu /eprints/exp/papers/0307/0307001.abs   (334 words)

Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods ewp-game/9707010 A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve price declared previously by the auctioneer. For the two-bidder case with private values drawn from a uniform distribution we characterize the continuously differentiable symmetric equilibrium bidding functions for the agents, and find the optimal reserve price for the auctioneer when such functions are used by the bidders. econwpa.wustl.edu /eprints/game/papers/9707/9707010.abs   (313 words)

Gordon's Notes: January 2005 And this was good news to the foundation. Africa is also a good lesson on the limits of a libertarian state. If he didn't have such a good track record, and if Bush were not brutally wilfull, this would not be believable. jfaughnan.blogspot.com /2005_01_01_jfaughnan_archive.html   (9631 words)

George Mason University School of Law: Faculty: Faculty Publications Following is a list of recent publications for all law school faculty. “The Impact of Exchange Context on the Activation of Equity in Ultimatum Games,” with Elizabeth Hoffman and Vernon Smith, 3(1) Experimental Economics 5-9 (2000). “The Impact of Exchange Context on the Activation of Equity in Ultimatum Games,” with Elizabeth Hoffman and Kevin McCabe, Experimental Economics 3(1), pp. www.law.gmu.edu /faculty/publications.php   (12136 words)

Volunteering leads to rock-paper-scissors dynamics in a public goods game : Nature   (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-15) With optional participation in the public goods game, 'loners' (players who do not join the group), defectors and cooperators will coexist through rock−paper−scissors dynamics Here we show experimentally that volunteering generates these dynamics in public goods games and that manipulating initial conditions can produce each predicted direction. If, by manipulating displayed decisions, it is pretended that defectors have the highest frequency, loners soon become most frequent, as do cooperators after loners and defectors after cooperators. www.nature.com /doifinder/10.1038/nature01986   (213 words)

Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term - Roth, Erev ... Abstract: This paper considers the behavior observed in experiments with three different two-stage sequential games; a public goods provision game, a market game, and an "ultimatum" bargaining game, which will all be described shortly. but also that the perfect equilibrium prediction for each game is that all or almost all of the gains will be captured by one player. However, the observed behavior for the three games is... citeseer.ist.psu.edu /305629.html   (374 words)

The Institute for Research on Unlimited Love These include a clinical intervention study in breast cancer patients and their partners, an epidemiologic case-control study of military veterans experiencing PTSD, and a sociological study of how broken lives are healed and empowered among participants in a charismatic church ministry program. Recent publications include two monographs on domestic violence published by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, and two studies published by the Manhattan Institute on the efficacy of the “faith factor” in reducing crime and drug use among at-risk youth in urban communities. I believe that apology/forgiveness, as well as altruism have moral moorings, which means concern with seeking the good, and seek it in relation to others. www.unlimitedloveinstitute.org /grant/index.html   (14338 words)

An Application of the English Clock Market Mechanism to Public Goods Games We conducted a laboratory study with a public goods game in which contributions are not submitted all at once but incrementally as coordinated in real time by a clock. This public goods institution exploits the idea that people are conditionally cooperative (i.e., they match at least the minimum contribution of the others) rather than opportunistic in order to implement the Pareto-optimal outcome. Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment," IEW - Working Papers iewwp016, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. www.ideas.uqam.ca /ideas/data/Papers/esidiscus2001-04.html   (760 words)

Interior collective optimum in a voluntary contribution to a public-goods game This study shows a public good experiment with four different treatments. The payoff function is chosen so that the Nash equilibrium (NE) and the collective optimum (CO) are both in the interior of the strategy space. This study tries to test the effect of varying the level of the collective optimum, which changes the ' social dilemma ', involved in the decision as to how much to contribute to the public good. ideas.repec.org /a/taf/apeclt/v11y2004i3p135-140.html   (332 words)

Incremental Commitment and Reciprocity in a Real Time Public Goods Game (ResearchIndex) Abstract: Allowing players in public goods games to make small incremental commitments to contributing to the good might facilitate cooperation because it helps to prevent players from being "free ridden," contributing more to the public good than other group members. Two experiments using a real time version of the voluntary contribution mechanism were conducted to investigate the hypothesis that players are generally willing to contribute public goods conditional on beliefs that others are doing so at... 1.3: Revisiting Confusion In Public Goods Experiments Daniel.. citeseer.ist.psu.edu /482358.html   (259 words)

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