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| | SSRN-Rational Choice and Categorical Reason by Bruce Chapman |
 | | This paper argues that, for many decision-making problems, the normative account of rationality that animates rational choice theory, and not just the positive account that is criticized by the behaviorists, is deficient, even as a theory of ideally rational behavior, and that an alternative account of rational choice is required. |
 | | Thus, real world agents are only, it is said, capable of a bounded rationality, using rules of thumb and various heuristics (sometimes helpful, sometimes not) rather than the fully fledged maximizing rationality that is still largely accepted as the ideal for rational choice. |
 | | Rather, the departures from the standard account of rational choice are typically characterized, and criticized, as failures to be rational. |
| papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=315799 (516 words) |
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