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	Regress argument - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		The Regress Argument (also known as The Problem of Criterion and the diallelus) is a problem in epistemology and, in general, a problem in any situation where a statement has to be justified.
		The argument is usually attributed to Sextus Empiricus, and has been restated by Agrippa as part of what has become known as "Agrippa's Trilemma".
		Foundationalism seeks to escape the regress argument by claiming that there are some beliefs for which it is improper to ask for a justification.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Regress_argument (1690 words)

	Coherentism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		The regress argument says that, given some statement P, it appears reasonable to ask for a justification for P. If that justification takes the form of another statement, P', one can again reasonably ask for a justification for P', and so forth.
		Coherentism denies the validity of the regression argument.
		The regression argument makes the assumption that the justification for a proposition takes the form of another proposition: P" justifies P', which in turn justifies P. For coherentism, justification is a holistic process.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Coherentism (1128 words)

	Regress argument -- Facts, Info, and Encyclopedia article (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		The Regress Argument (also known as The Problem of Criterion and the diallelus) is a problem in (The philosophical theory of knowledge) epistemology and, in general, a problem in any situation where a statement has to be justified.
		According to this argument, any ((logic) a statement that affirms or denies something and is either true or false) proposition requires a (A statement in explanation of some action or belief) justification.
		The argument is usually attributed to (Click link for more info and facts about Sextus Empiricus) Sextus Empiricus, and has been restated by (Roman general who commanded the fleet that defeated the forces of Antony and Cleopatra at Actium (63-12 BC)) Agrippa as part of what has become known as "Agrippa's Trilemma".
	www.absoluteastronomy.com /encyclopedia/r/re/regress_argument.htm (1946 words)

	Michael Tooley's Philosophy Home Page
		Notice that Lawrence Bonjour formulates the Epistemic Regress Argument in terms of knowledge, rather than in terms of justified belief, even though the only aspect of the concept of knowledge that enters into Bonjour's formulation of the argument is that the belief be justified.
		In contrast to the epistemic regress argument, the present argument does not show that all of one's justified beliefs are ultimately justified on the basis of beliefs that are non-inferentially justified.
		First, there is the epistemic regress argument discussed earlier, the thrust of which was that there does not seem to be any satisfactory alternative to the idea that all inferentially justified beliefs must be justified, ultimately, on the basis of beliefs that are justified, but not justified on the basis of evidence.
	spot.colorado.edu /~tooley/Chapter4.html (6682 words)

	Sic Transitivity
		The regress argument is a deductive argument for, in the first place, the conclusion that at some point inferential justification or reason-giving must end, on pain of either vicious regress or vicious circularity.
		The regress argument for foundationalism thus presupposes that all the relevant forms of inferential justification are transitive.
		The same counter-example also undermines their revised regress argument for foundationalism, which expressly requires E to be transitive; and a related example shows how a proposition can easily occur in its own inferential ancestry without the sort of vicious circularity they argue must follow.
	www.vanderbilt.edu /~postjf/m&mdraftfin.htm (1175 words)

	Epistemology - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Two common arguments are that these sorts of knowledge can only be derived from experience (as John Stuart Mill argued), and that they do not constitute "real" knowledge (as David Hume argued).
		Here we are on firmer philosophical ground; since skeptics accept the validity of reason, they can present logical arguments for their case.
		For instance, the regress argument has it that one can ask for the justification for any statement of knowledge.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Epistemology (3274 words)

	Philosophy Department - David Owen Scepticism with regard to Reason
		As these arguments explain how we manage to retain beliefs in the face of sceptical arguments, it seems charitable to interpret his negative arguments as attempts to show that our beliefs based on reason threaten to cease to be beliefs at all.
		But the point of Hume’s argument is "the total extinction of belief and evidence" (1.4.1.6) or "a total suspence of judgment." (1.4.1.8) It is a sceptical argument, not the argument of a negative dogmatist.
		The sceptical threat of the negative arguments of 1.4.1 is not that the beliefs we have may turn out to be unjustified; it is that the beliefs, by losing their force and vivacity, may not survuve as beliefs, but only as mere ideas.
	phil.web.arizona.edu /faculty/extra/dowen/dowen_swrtr.htm (10703 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		The regress argument for scepticism, as I will explain in section I, seeks to establish that all of our beliefs are, ultimately, }{\i\f0 groundless}{\f0 (I will also use the term "unjustified", taking the justifiability of a belief to be the possibility of giving grounds for it).
		But assuming for the sake of argument that something like it will fall out of whatever theory of belief-individuation supports claim 1 as well, then it cannot be possible to doubt any proposition the doubting of which will call int o doubt all others.
		This response s ought to accept the upshot of the regress argument, in that many of our foundational beliefs (if not all of them) are groundless, but then to deny that scepticism follows.
	www.mit.edu:8001 /people/anth/GroundlessBelief.rtf (3603 words)

	A PHILOSOPHY 111A PAGE ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		The argument has been conceptualized as an exclusion of intuitionism from the overlapping consensus and a definition of the criteria for public reason as derivable from a coherentist or constructivist theory with a wide circle of justification.
		One objection to the argument that a person who is a brain in a vat would be completely selfish is that it presupposes that people who believe they are people in a world with other people have a reason, just because of that fact, to be altruistic.
		A more general objection to the argument that one who believes that he is a brain in a vat might behave differently than one who believes that he is a creature in the world is the definitional consideration that one can never have any evidence that one is a brain in a vat.
	people.brandeis.edu /~teuber/rawls6.html (17233 words)

	Facts Paper
		One might be tempted to respond to this regress similarly to the way I responded to the first circularity claim, like this: the regress is not a regress, because each step is identical to the one before.
		In that case, Frege's second argument has as its second premise that we are concerned with the referent of the whole only when we are concerned with the truth-value of the whole.
		The whole argument, then, is this: we are concerned with the referent of a part only when we are concerned with the referent of the whole, and we are concerned with the referent of the whole only when we are concerned with the truth-value of the whole.
	enlightenment.supersaturated.com /essays/text/bryanregister/facts.html (12104 words)

	Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification
		On the side of a subjective construal are the arguments for access internalism, according to which the fact that some people can't be held responsible for knowing better is a clear sign that their beliefs are justified, for justification is a property whose presence is detected by careful reflection.
		Whether these arguments on behalf of subjectivism in the theory of knowledge are weighty enough to overcome the strong intuitions on behalf of more objective accounts is not yet settled, though there is something approaching a consensus that subjectivism cannot quite be right in spite of the arguments in its favor.
		To the extent that the arguments are deemed plausible, a burden is created for relieving the tension that exists between the attractions of objective accounts and the arguments for subjective accounts.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/justep-coherence (6996 words)

	Regress argument Article, Regressargument Information (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		The Regress Argument (also known as The Problem of Criterion and thediallelus) is a problem in epistemology and, in general, aproblem in any situation where a statement has to be justified.
		The argument can be seen as a response to the claim in Plato 's Theaetetus that knowledge is justified true belief.
		Foundationalism seeks to escape the regress argument by claiming that there are some beliefs for which it is improper to askfor a justification.
	www.anoca.org /beliefs/belief/regress_argument.html (1622 words)

	[No title]
		Y is inferentially based on the foundational belief in X. The argument for the 4th epistemic chain, also known as the foundationalists regress argument, appears as follows: If knowledge is attainable then it must occur in an epistemic chain.
		The last point that needs to be made about the conclusion of the foundationalists regress argument is that it does not matter what beliefs a person holds as long as they are grounded.
		First, the argument appeals to a possible skeptic response, using the same logic as the foundationalist regress argument.
	www.truthawakens.com /philosophy/foundationalism.htm (1266 words)

	Essays on Philosophy (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		I liked aggressive argument, I was very, very good at it, and I somehow came to believe—or at least I said that I that believed—that such argument was the best way to the truth.
		Recall that the problem with the original regress argument was supposed to be the possibility of a chain of instrumentally valuable things stretching indefinitely into the future.
		And the same considerations apply to this sort of regress: surely it is not necessary, in order for anything to have value, that the universe be large enough to fit an infinite series of larger and larger goods.
	home1.gte.net /vze7rlxx/bt03/id8.html (3810 words)

	20th WCP: BonJour's 'Basic Antifoundationalist Argument'
		Finally, his argument against this fails since it is false that if an experiential state has representational content, then it is in need of justification.
		Another response distinguishes the claim that a person must believe with justification the premises of a justifying argument from the claim that a person must be justified were she to believe those premises.
		An experiential state can end the regress only if it can contribute to the justification of a belief and it is not in need of justification itself.
	www.bu.edu /wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm (5141 words)

	PEA Soup: Patching up a regress argument for intrinsic value (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		First, since the argument will be based on a notion of instrumental value, we must be clear about just what sort of instrumental value we have in mind.
		This argument employs a notion of instrumental value according to which something is instrumentally good just in case it leads to something good.
		Regresses in general are interesting; I wish I had something more general to say about which ones are bad and which ones aren't.
	peasoup.typepad.com /peasoup/2005/02/patching_up_a_r.html (10107 words)

	dialog 4 round 4 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		One fallacy in all of these arguments is to speak of an infinite regress but to take it only one step further.
		The view of Foundationalists and Coherentists is to deny the necessity of an infinite regress.
		Most of the cosmological arguments attempt to show that because the universe exists, a creator is needed.
	home.earthlink.net /~gbl111/dialog_4_round_4.htm (1070 words)

	Peter Klein Paper
		But it would also undermine my argument for infinitism based in part on PAA because that principle is designed to capture the widely endorsed intuition that it is rational to accept a belief only if there is some reason for thinking the belief is true.
		The Mode [of reasoning] based upon the regress ad infinitum is that whereby we assert that the thing adduced as a proof of the matter proposed needs a further proof, and this again another, and so on ad infinitum, so that the consequence is suspension, as we possess no starting-point for our argument.
		Thus, although no a priori argument is available whose conclusion is that there is an infinite regress of objectively and subjectively available reasons, as we have seen there is also no such argument for the claim that there is no such set of reasons available.
	chss2.montclair.edu /prdept/HK.htm (13538 words)

	Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification
		When an argument was implicitly or explicitly offered for the view it was most often the now famous regress argument.
		It is important, however, to distinguish two quite different regress arguments for foundationalism—the epistemic regress argument and the conceptual regress argument.
		The Principle of Inferential Justification used to generate the regress argument for foundationalism is itself controversial.
	setis.library.usyd.edu.au /stanford/entries/justep-foundational (5984 words)

	James A. Sadowsky Can There Be an Endless Regress of Causes?
		By the original argument, therefore, our intellectual planning must inherit its title to shrewd-ness from yet another interior process of planning to plan, and this process in its turn cold be either silly or shrewd.
		The regress is infinite, and this reduces to absurdity the theory that for an operation to be intelligent it must be steered by prior intellectual operation.
		This statement does not involve an infinite regress because be-ing preceded by an event is not a necessary condition for being an event.
	www.anthonyflood.com /sadowskyendlessregress.htm (1410 words)

	"Peter Klein, 'The Infinite Regress of Reasons and the Extent of Our Knowledge'"
		What I choose to call the "warrant-transfer form" responds to the regress problem by suggesting that the propositions are arranged in a circle and that warrant is transferred within the circle ― just as basketball players standing in a circle pass the ball from one player to another.
		We also saw that one argument against premise 1 ended with an arbitrary assumption, namely that closure of justified beliefs depended upon the claim that all appropriate reasoning, that is, reasoning sanctioned by closure, is like that depicted in Pattern 1.
		But if the argument for premise 2 in the argument for God’s existence were that the Bible was written by God and whatever God writes is true, then the argument would beg the question because the sub-premises employed in the argument for premise 2 imply the conclusion.
	sun.soci.niu.edu /~phildept/ipa/Klein.html (7834 words)

	Ed Brandon - Metaphysics: Realism about Universals PH3903 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		But one can also deny that there are any regresses here, since it would appear that to admit the regress is to postulate an infinity of facts somehow behind each simple fact.
		So instead of talking, as we have, of exemplification as a relation between objects/universals and universals, we should speak of it as a 'tie' or 'nexus' where the point is to emphasise "the nonrelational nature of the linkage this notion provides" (41).
		It is sometimes suggested that the regress is innocuous, but the problem isn't simply that there is a regress.
	www.cavehill.uwi.edu /bnccde/PH39C/meta5.html (2092 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		Clearly state the regress argument for skepticism, and critically discuss and evaluate one or two objections to the argument.
		Clearly state an argument against the possibility of justifying induction, and critically discuss one or two objections to this argument.
		Clearly state one or two arguments for or against Ethical Egoism, and critically evaluate those arguments.
	spot.colorado.edu /~oddie/Final.html (312 words)

	Epistemology (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08)
		Here we are on firmerphilosophical ground, since skeptics accept the validity of reason they can presentlogical arguments for their case.
		For instance, the regress argument has it that one can ask forthe justification for any statement of knowledge.
		One can also avoid the regress if one supposes that the assumption that a knowledge statement can only be supported by anotherknowledge statement is simply misguided.
	www.therfcc.org /epistemology-206.html (1951 words)

	Mormon Philosophy & Theology
		Since only God does this, he ends what appears to be an infinite regress in the argument.
		After all for this to work as an argument for design premise (1) really is "if something has a purpose then it is designed or is God." But the argument isn't much of an argument for God then.
		The obvious argument against the above is that evolution has entities with intentions that don't arise out of intentional creatures.
	www.lextek.com /clark/10393.html (844 words)

	Table of contents for The principle of sufficient reason
		The Putnam-Meyer Cosmological Argument 90 3.1.6.a The argument 91 3.1.6.b Duration 95 3.1.7.
		Second Thomistic argument: the interdependence of existence and essence 328 12.2.1.
		Third Thomistic argument: substance-accident ontology 344 Chapter 13 Modal arguments 348 13.1.
	www.loc.gov /catdir/toc/ecip0514/2005015857.html (856 words)

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