
 Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 
  In this survey, we present an overview of the many brands of deterministic dynamical systems motivated by evolutionary game theory, including ordinary differential equations (and, in particular, the replicator equation), differential inclusions (the best response dynamics), difference equations (as, for instance, fictitious play) and reactiondiffusion systems. 
  A recurrent theme (the socalled `folk theorem of evolutionary game theory') is the close connection of the dynamical approach with the Nash equilibrium, but we show that a static, equilibriumbased viewpoint is, on principle, unable to always account for the longterm behaviour of players adjusting their behaviour to maximise their payoff. 
  H. Nikaido: Stability of equilibrium by the Brownvon Neumann differential equation, Econometrica 27 (1959), 654671. 
 www.ams.org /bull/20034004/S0273097903009881/home.html (2799 words) 
