
	Where results make sense

Topic: Representationalism

Related Topics

Indirect realism

In the News (Tue 29 Dec 09)

Northern Trust

Marvin Harrison

Peter Chernin

Gary Locke

Match Play

Penelope Cruz

Mickey Rourke

AR Rahman

Danny Boyle

Hugh Jackman

	Representationalism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Representationalism, or the representational theory of perception, is a philosophical doctrine that in any act of perception, the immediate (direct) object of perception is a sense-datum that represents an external object, which is the mediate (indirect) object of perception.
		Representationalism is one of the key assumptions of cognitivism in psychology.
		But if Representationalism is thought of as an explanation of how we indeed see, then it falls foul of the homunculus fallacy which would suggest that representationalism is either an incomplete or invalid description of perception.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Representationalism (561 words)

	Representationalism - Open Encyclopedia (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-18)
		Representationalism also has the advantage that it allows dreams and imaginings to be considered on the same basis as perceptions, perhaps, as recent fMRI studies have shown, using similar areas of the brain.
		An apparent problem with representationalism is that it seems to assume that something in the brain, a homunculus is viewing the content of the brain.
		The need for a homunculus in a theory of mind shows that the theory is either incomplete or invalid, in the case of representationalism the theory is clearly incomplete, not invalid.
	www.open-encyclopedia.com /Representationalism (333 words)

	Representationalism -- Facts, Info, and Encyclopedia article (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-18)
		Representationalism, or the representational theory of perception, is a (Click link for more info and facts about philosophical) philosophical doctrine that in any act of (The process of perceiving) perception, the immediate (direct) object of perception is a sense-datum that represents an external object, which is the mediate (indirect) object of perception.
		Representationalism is one of the key assumptions of (Click link for more info and facts about cognitivism) cognitivism in (The science of mental life) psychology.
		A problem with representationalism is that it assumes that something in the brain, described as a (A tiny fully formed individual that (according to the discredited theory of preformation) is supposed to be present in the sperm cell) homunculus, is viewing the perception.
	www.absoluteastronomy.com /encyclopedia/r/re/representationalism.htm (571 words)

	[No title]
		Representationalism (about a class of phenomenal properties) is the thesis that for every phenomenal property (in that class), there is some representational property such that necessarily, a mental state (or a subject) has that representational property if and only if it has that phenomenal property.
		Representationalism is the thesis that phenomenal properties are identical to certain pure or impure representational properties.
		Representationalism holds that phenomenal properties are equivalent to pure or impure representational properties: properties of representing a certain content (in a certain manner).
	consc.net /papers/representation.html (12865 words)

	Representational Theories of Consciousness
		Strong representationalism (defended by Dretske, Tye and Lycan) is the view that representation of a certain kind suffices for a quale, where the kind can be specified in functionalist or other familiar materialist terms, without recourse to properties of any ontologically "new" sort.
		Weak representationalism is somewhat controversial for pains, itches and other sensations, since it is not obvious that such sensations represent anything at all.
		Representationalism itself is a claim only about qualia in our sense, while transparency is about features of experience more generally.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/consciousness-representational (10990 words)

	Clasical and COnnectionist Models - Eric Lormand
		Understandably, representationalism is sometimes simply put as the claim that there are mental representations--entities with content mediating between sensation and motor control-- and that these representations are (by token physicalism) physical.
		If representationalism is to yield an explanation of how physical systems can implement special relations among attitudes toward the same content, we need a construal which specifies in more detail the nature of token propositional attitudes.
		First, it would be sufficient to distinguish representationalism from token physicalism, since token physicalism about propositional attitudes is committed only to the existence of representational physical states or events, and not to the existence of representational physical objects.
	www-personal.umich.edu /~lormand/phil/cogsci/diss_ch0.htm (9214 words)

	[No title]
		Representationalism's distinctive epistemological thesis is that knowledge or justified belief about external objects is indirectly arrived at.
		The claims of this chapter are that all of the major contemporary versions of foundationalism are representationalist in principle, that representationalism fails, that the major arguments against foundationalism attack only (with one exception) representationalist foundationalism, and that the problems that typically motivate representationalism can be solved without resort to representationalism.
		Representationalism is adopted to allow a foundationalist methodology to proceed without begging questions against skeptical worries, whether those worries be about perceptual illusions or evil demons.
	enlightenment.supersaturated.com /essays/text/stephenhicks/diss/hicksdiss3.html (9642 words)

	Diana Mertz Hsieh: Representationalism and Perceptual Error (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-18)
		Representationalism (or indirect realism) with respect to perception is the view that "we are never aware of physical objects, [but rather] we are only indirectly aware of them, in virtue of a direct awareness of an intermediary [mental] object.
		In opposition to representationalism, both (direct) realism and idealism agree that perception is direct and unmediated, despite their disagreements about what the object of perception is. (Dancy, 145) In any form of direct perception, no correspondence relationship is possible, since there is only one object of perception.
		I will argue that representationalism is unstable because it is a hybrid between realism and idealism, but that idealism is no better, since it is self-refuting and implausible, especially as applied to perception.
	www.dianahsieh.com /undergrad/rape.html (5028 words)

	Representationalism
		Representationalism is the philosophical position that the world we see in conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a miniature virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation.
		Representationalism validates a phenomenological approach to studying perception, i.e.
		Antti Revonsuo is one of the most outspoken modern advocates for representationalism, although he feels uncomfortable with that term due to the confusion with Tye and Dretsky's corruption of the word.
	cns-alumni.bu.edu /~slehar/Representationalism.html (1295 words)

	Qualia
		Representationalism, as I have presented it so far, is an identity thesis with respect to qualia: qualia are supposedly one and the same as certain representational contents.
		There is also a weaker version of representationalism, according to which it is metaphysically necessary that experiences exactly alike with respect to their representational contents are exactly alike with respect to their qualia.
		The latter cases only threaten strong representationalism, the former are intended to refute representationalism in both its strong and weaker forms.
	setis.library.usyd.edu.au /stanford/entries/qualia (8015 words)

	Representationalism - Encyclopedia.WorldSearch (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-18)
		A problem with representationalism is that it assumes that something in the brain, described as a homunculus, is viewing the perception.
		But if Representationalism is thought of as an explanation of how we indeed see, then it falls foul of the homunculus fallacy.
		A further difficulty is that, since we only have knowledge of the represetnations of our perceptions, how is it possible to show that they resemble in any significant way the objects to which they are supposed to correspond?
	encyclopedia.worldsearch.com /representationalism.htm (507 words)

	Direct realism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		In contrast, indirect realism and representationalism claim that we are directly aware only of internal representations of the external world.
		Reid argued strenuously against the notion that ideas, or sense-data, are the immediate objects of perception at all -- he rejected representationalism.
		One of Reid's arguments was very simple, and went like this: If representationalism is correct, then we are forced to either skepticism or phenomenalism.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Direct_realism (1337 words)

	[No title]
		Though transparency claims are often associated with strong representationalism, they are also endorsed by proponents of weaker versions of representationalism. In fact, even among non-representationalists there is widespread agreement that experience is transparent.
		Representationalism, in other words, should be unrestricted. A theory of phenomenal character that applies just to perceptual phenomenal character and not to phenomenal character generally at least ought to explain why we cannot account for nonperceptual phenomenal character in the way that we can account for perceptual phenomenal character.
		Thus, insofar as these sorts of considerations suggest that representationalism must be unrestricted in order to be plausible, it looks like representationalism requires not just strong transparency, but strong transparency for the full range of phenomenal experiences.
	phil-rlst.academic.claremontmckenna.edu /akind/Transparency.doc (5953 words)

	Brad Thompson's Homepage (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-18)
		Representationalism is sometimes advertised as providing a novel response to the argument from hallucination, one that accepts the presence of a "common factor" between veridical and hallucinatory experience without positing sensory intermediaries between the mind and the world.
		Generically, representationalism appears to have a response to the argument from hallucination that avoids a commitment to qualia or sense-data.
		But vehicle-based representationalism lacks many of the virtues that are frequently advertised for representationalism more generally, and fails to avoid a kind of indirect realism.
	faculty.smu.edu /bthompso/papers.html (933 words)

	CHAPTER 1 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-18)
		We can call the versions of representationalism which take the phenomenal character of experience to supervene on, or to be a kind of, representational content of experience ‘phenomenal representationalism’, and those which claim that phenomenal character runs beyond the representational content of experience ‘non-phenomenal representationalism’.
		It should be noted at the outset that this is a somewhat nonstandard use of ‘representationalism’, on at least two counts.
		The first is that ‘representationalism’ is a label which has been attached to a number of positions which would seem to fall into the camp opposite that of the position I consider to be representationalism, such as the sensa realist views of Jackson (1977) and Locke (1700).
	www.mindstuff.net /Dissertation/WTWdissertchap1.html (8717 words)

	20th WCP: Representationalism and Antirepresentationalism - Kant, Davidson and Rorty
		Representationalism and Antirepresentationalism - Kant, Davidson and Rorty
		ABSTRACT: The notions of representationalism and antirepresentationalism are introduced and used in contemporary philosophical discussions by Richard Rorty to describe his and the neopragmatists' attitude toward traditional problems of epistemology.
		The notions representationalism and antirepresentationalism are introduced and used in contemporary philosophical discussions by Richard Rorty, to describe his and the neopragmatists attitude towards traditional problems of epistemology and "to make safe the world" for a "postepistemological" thinking.
	www.bu.edu /wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoBoro.htm (6490 words)

	Fibreculture Journal Issue 3
		In this sense, the general structural relations of the print model make it easy for representationalism and the subject of the age of print is broadly defined by these structural elements and relations of a print economy and model of textuality.
		Representationalism requires a stable formation in order to function, and infusions of noise into the system are rendered as pathologies, especially of the subject positioned within the system.
		We have invoked a critique of representationalism in order to seek a way for a post-print model of textuality not to be overwhelmed by the colonisation of a new model, in particular through the concept of remediation, by the dominant representationalism of the print model.
	journal.fibreculture.org /issue3/issue3_roe.html (8213 words)

	Spiritual Representationalism (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-18)
		It is artists such as the later that are considered in the new age of art under Spiritual Representationalism.
		Spiritual Representationalism creates the bridge between that which is not-human and the human understanding of the three-dimensional universe.
		Therefore, the first step in the process of creating a work of art in the school of Spiritual Representationalism is that the artist must to some degree focus his consciousness on dimensions beyond the normal 3-D physical reality and receive information, insight, and new concepts from these other dimensions.
	www.thomasalord.com /spiritualrepresentationalism.htm (481 words)

	Inverted Qualia
		One advantage of representationalism is that it appears to reduce “phenomenal consciousness” (Block 1995) to a certain kind of intentionality.
		If representationalism is true, then the phenomenal difference between Invert and Nonvert is due to a difference in the colors that their experiences represent the tomato as having.
		3.9...For the Inconsistency of Content-Externalism, Representationalism, and Qualia-Internalism
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/qualia-inverted (14840 words)

	Epistemological Problems of Perception
		Defenses of representationalism have taken a variety of forms, but I will assume here that the best general sort of defense for such a view is one along the lines suggested, albeit not very explicitly, in Locke (and indeed also, though even less explicitly, in Descartes).
		First, the argument assumes that the competitors to representationalism are all parasitic upon the representationalist explanatory hypothesis in the way indicated, and it is worth asking whether this is really so.
		For anyone who has struggled with the idea of sense-data (or the adverbial alternative) and with the difficulties and complexities of representationalism and phenomenalism, the apparent simplicity of direct realism, the way in which it seems to make extremely difficult or even intractable problems simply vanish, may be difficult to resist.
	setis.library.usyd.edu.au /stanford/entries/perception-episprob (6946 words)

	Experience (and Mental Representation) Outside the Brain (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-18)
		However, current versions of representationalism remain unsatisfactory in that they fail to provide a convincing solution to the "hard problem." (Tye, in fact, holds that the "hard problem" is a pseudo-problem, and thus needs no solution, but his arguments on this point are unconvincing.)
		I argue that this failure of current versions of representationalism arises from the assumption that mental representations, and in particular those representations that are conscious experiences, are token identical with brain states.
		However, this failure is different from and, I believe, complementary to, the failure of representationalism.
	www.calstatela.edu /faculty/nthomas/outbrain.htm (434 words)

	Representation, Reduction, etc.
		It is the lowest common denominator of representationalism and all the concomitant varieties of naturalism or physicalism, be they functionalist, computationalist, connectionist, etc. On top of that, the only intentionalism being actively defended is a 'weak' intentionalism which does not attempt to explain the phenomenal character of imagination, among other obvious oversights.
		But as it is mostly the case, philosophical systems not only bear the possibilities and hints of their overcomings, they "bear" also their "overcomers" with the result that philosophical systems which are left behind, leave their traces, their "genetic codes" in the "overcomer" philosophies.
		Searching under coherentism and representationalism I find a useful survey of the various epistemological options from an foundationalist, direct realist point of view.
	mywebpages.comcast.net /dantsmith/nexu18.htm (3806 words)

	representation (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-18)
		The claim of Representationalism is that a necessary property of artworks is that they represent in just this way.
		Representationalism, like the Imitation Theory, is too exclusive.
		So, like the other versions of representationalism, Neo-Representationalism appears to be too exclusive, and thus not a satisfactory definition of art.
	aesthetics.moonfruit.com /representation (852 words)

	JAC 14 (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-18)
		In my experience, the predominant theory that guides students in their workings with language is some variation of representationalism: words (re)present preexisting ideas that are simply named or labeled by words as needed.
		The danger of representationalism lies in its tendency to diminish the importance (and obligation) of being self-conscious about language use, and this includes both speaking and writing.
		This position is grounded in representationalism to the extent that it assumes an inordinate cleavage between word and concept.
	jac.gsu.edu /jac/14.2/ReaderResponse/3.htm (1786 words)

	Philosophical Theories of Consciousness (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-18)
		The main motivation for representationalism may seem purely theoretical: it holds the promise of reductive explanation of consciousness in well understood informational and/or teleological terms.
		Scenarios of varying degrees of fancifulness are adduced, in which allegedly (i) a conscious experience has no representational properties, or (ii) two possible experiences with different phenomenal properties have the same representational properties, or (iii) inversely, two possible experiences with the same phenomenal properties have different representational properties.
		Therefore, even if representationalism turns out to be a satisfactory account of qualitative character, it is unlikely to be a satisfactory account of phenomenal consciousness proper.
	www.ephilosopher.com /kriegel/index.php?Papers/Philosophical+Theories+of+Consciousness (6430 words)

Try your search on: Qwika (all wikis)