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| | Richard Rorty, Thomas Nagel, and the Platonic Myth |
 | | First, Rorty questions the usefulness of Nagel's argument that (1) science cannot reduce the first-person point of view to a physicalist third-person point of view and that (2) it cannot account for the intuitions left over after an analysis, for example, of moral judgement. |
 | | If Rorty were an analytic philosopher, he might argue that Nagel's case, at best, is trivially true--like the analytic proposition "all bachelors are unmarried males," which is true, but hardly profound and hardly what pragmatists such as Rorty and Dewey see as being useful in a Baconian sense. |
 | | Rorty's critique of intuitive realism, however, is only one part of a critique of what he calls the "Platonic myth." He places nearly every non-pragmatic philosophy--from Platonism to positivism--within this tradition and even places Kant and Plato, who had vastly different things to say about transcendental philosophy, within that tradition. |
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