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| | Epistemic Justification |
 | | Well, generic foundationalism, as Swinburne understands it, is the view that some justified beliefs are basic, i.e., not grounded on or based on other beliefs. |
 | | Following Ian Hacking and others, Swinburne notes that since the seventeenth century, two main kinds of probability have been identified: probability as “a feature of the physical world”, which Swinburne calls ‘externalist probability’, and “probability on evidence that something was the case in the physical world”, which he calls ‘inductive probability’ (pp. |
 | | Even if a logically omniscient person will have privileged access to which of her basic beliefs are logically probable, most people won’t for, the simple reason that they won’t always have privileged access to which of their beliefs are in contingent propositions or to which of their beliefs in noncontingent propositions are true. |
| web.ics.purdue.edu /~bergmann/swinburne.htm (1357 words) |
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