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Topic: Ronald Dworkin

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	Ronald Dworkin’s Group Fetishism (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		Dworkin suggests to treat corporations as moral agents and to apply principles about individual fault and responsibility to them, and then to ask how the corporations’ members should be seen to share in that fault or responsibility.
		It is argued that Dworkin thus commits the fallacy of “group fetishism”: He presupposes that the group may have moral characteristics that are neither identical with nor derived from the moral characteristics of its members.
		Dworkin’s basic approach to the issue might be described as an anti-reductionist approach, one that assigns an indispensable role to the group.
	www.acton.org /publicat/m_and_m/2002_fall/horowitz.html (2821 words)

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		Since this is not so, and since Dworkin wants to prevent that anyone suffers or profits because of his (undeserved) natural abilities, a new procedure must be introduced.
		The main ambition of this theory is to remove impact (on the distribution of goods) of the factors that are not under control of individuals and to allow influence only of such ones that are under personal control.
		Dworkin's scheme has to be implemented in practice by complex tax and money-transfer system of the welfare state.
	www.distributive-justice.com /theory/dworkin-en.htm (333 words)

	Untitled Document
		For example, Ronald Dworkin, whose expositions we are following here, would say that a political act is committed by every judge who, meaning to give effect to existing law, makes known a readiness to summon the society's armed force to protect a landowner's security against unauthorized entries onto the land.
		Such is Dworkin's well-known account of rights "as trumps." By this account, someone claiming a right to a political act is claiming that those in a position to provide it cannot justifiably refuse to do so for utilitarian or wealth-maximizing reasons.
		The first is, in Dworkin's parlance, a right-based explanation, one that "place[s] the individual at the center and take[s] [him] as of fundamental importance." The second is a goal-based explanation, one that cares only about the over-all interests of society as a whole.
	cyber.law.harvard.edu /bridge/Philosophy/takings2a.txt.htm (1484 words)

	Is Democracy Possible Here ? - Ronald Dworkin
		Dworkin’s distinction between a tolerant religious community and a tolerant secular community, and his argument about balancing security against honor and not against rights, should be required reading for every American.
		Dworkin believes there is a lot of common ground, and he proposes two "shared principles of sufficient substance to make a national political debate possible and profitable".
		Dworkin notes the legal objections to, for example, his election reform suggestions (which largely fall foul of freedom of speech guarantees) but his claim that as a matter of fundamental fairness and principle election reform along such lines is necessary is hard to disagree with (regardless of political orientation).
	www.complete-review.com /reviews/legal/dworkinr.htm (1951 words)

	Dworkin, Ronald - HighBeam Encyclopedia (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		A frequent commentator on constitutional questions, Dworkin criticized as unworkable Robert Bork 's notion of basing contemporary jurisprudence on the "original intent" of the authors of the constitution.
		Ronald Dworkin, T.H. Green, and the communal theory of political obligation.
		Brief of Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents.(physician-assisted suicide; U.S. Supreme Court)(Transcript)
	www.encyclopedia.com /doc/1E1-dworkin.html (248 words)

	NYU > Philosophy > Dworkin, Ronald
		RONALD DWORKIN, Professor of Philosophy and Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law.
		Professor Dworkin is the author of many articles in philosophical and legal journals as well as articles on legal and political topics in the New York Review of Books.
		"Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers' Brief", by Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson.
	philosophy.fas.nyu.edu /object/ronalddworkin (329 words)

	Harvard University Press: Taking Rights Seriously by Ronald Dworkin
		Clearly and forcefully, Ronald Dworkin argues against the "ruling" theory in Anglo-American law-legal positivism and economic utilitarianism and asserts that individuals have legal rights beyond those explicitly laid down and that they have political and moral rights against the state that are prior to the welfare of the majority.
		Ronald Dworkin's theory of law and the moral conception of individual rights that underlies it have already made him one of the most influential philosophers working in this area.
		Ronald Dworkin is Sommer Professor of Law and Philosophy at New York University and Jeremy Bentham Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London.
	www.hup.harvard.edu /catalog/DWOTAK.html (382 words)

	University of Virginia News Story
		Dworkin holds bachelor’s degrees from Harvard University and Oxford University and a master’s from Yale University.
		Dworkin was Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford and Fellow of University College until 1998.
		Dworkin is a fellow of the British Academy and a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
	www.virginia.edu /topnews/releases2006/20060317RonaldDworkin.html (439 words)

	20th WCP: Dworkin's Wishful-Thinkers Constitution
		Dworkins gives two additional reasons for the view that the Constitution lays out broad principles of political morality that invite judicial innovation to meet changed circumstances and evolving moral standards.
		Dworkin's dismissal of originalism is his main answer to objections that his view of constitutional interpretation (especially his acceptance of substantive due process) gives too much power to judges who may abuse it.
		Dworkin himself points out that accounts of constitutional interpretation that feature more and more abstract principles "progressively assign judges more and more responsibility for judgment." (141) This consideration of degree is important in a system of checks and balances.
	www.bu.edu /wcp/Papers/Law/LawWenz.htm (2430 words)

	The Nature of Law (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
		Dworkin is not a classical Natural Lawyer, however, and he does not maintain that morally acceptable content is a precondition of a norm's legality.
		Dworkin's legal theory is not based on a general repudiation of the classical fact-value distinction, as much as it is based on a certain conception of legal reasoning.
		In the 1970's Dworkin argued that the falsehood of Legal Positivism resides in the fact that it is incapable of accounting for the important role that legal principles play in determining what the law is. Legal positivism envisaged, Dworkin claimed, that the law consists of rules only.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/lawphil-nature (5140 words)

	Amazon.ca: Law's Empire: Books: Ronald Dworkin (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		Dworkin (Jurisprudence, Oxford; and Law, NYU) sets out a theory of how judges determine what the law is and its application in hard cases where no set tled or clear rule of law disposes of a matter, testing his theory in common law cases turning on statutes and con stitutional cases.
		Ronald Dworkin is one of the most prominent law philosophers in the common law tradition.
		Some of the examples Dworkin uses are highly questionable; as a practicing lawyer I have become less and less convinced over the years that Dworkin really knows or understands the practices of adjudication that form the center of his book.
	www.amazon.ca /Laws-Empire-Ronald-Dworkin/dp/1841130419 (1791 words)

	Ronald Dworkin - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Ronald Dworkin (born 1931) is an American legal philosopher, and currently professor of Jurisprudence at University College London and the New York University School of Law.
		In 1969, Dworkin was appointed to the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford, a position in which he succeeded H.L.A. Hart, and elected Fellow of University College, Oxford.
		Dworkin's model of legal principles is also connected with Hart's notion of the Rule of Recognition.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Ronald_Dworkin (1828 words)

	Natural Law [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy] (via CobWeb/3.1 planet03.csc.ncsu.edu) (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		Ronald Dworkin's so-called third theory of law is best understood as a response to legal positivism, which is essentially constituted by three theoretical commitments: the Social Fact Thesis, the Conventionality Thesis, and the Separability Thesis.
		Dworkin believes that a legal principle maximally contributes to such a justification if and only if it satisfies two conditions: (1) the principle coheres with existing legal materials; and (2) the principle is the most morally attractive standard that satisfies (1).
		Dworkin believes his theory of judicial obligation is a consequence of what he calls the Rights Thesis, according to which judicial decisions always enforce pre-existing rights: "even when no settled rule disposes of the case, one party may nevertheless have a right to win.
	www.utm.edu.cob-web.org:8888 /research/iep/n/natlaw.htm (5778 words)

	Commentary Magazine - Taking Rights Seriously, by Ronald Dworkin (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		...Dworkin's method of arguing is disingenuous and irresponsible, and his standards of judgment shift whenever it suits him...
		...On this issue, Dworkin's argument, dealing as it does in a calculus of gains to the community, would appear to put him in the camp of the utilitarians, to whom he is in general opposed...
		...Dworkin states that beside the right to equal treatment there is also a right to "treatment as an equal," the right "to be treated with the same respect or concern as anyone else...
	www.commentarymagazine.com /Summaries/V64I2P77-1.htm (2452 words)

	Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality: The Independent Review: The Independent Institute
		Dworkin freely concedes that minority students who benefit from racial preferences “have not necessarily been victims” of significant racial injustice, but this condition is no reason for rejected whites and Asians to complain: no one has a right to the large advantages that a prestigious education confers.
		Dworkin, in contrast, finds absolutely “bizarre,” “implausible,” and “unthinking” “the ideas that accumulation of wealth is a mark of a successful life and that someone who has arranged his life to acquire it is a proper object for envy rather than sympathy or concern” (p.
		Dworkin says that “democracy is damaged” when citizens suffer “sharply diminished opportunity to appeal for their convictions because they lack the funds to compete with rich and powerful donors” (p.
	www.independent.org /tii/content/pubs/review/books/tir54_dworkin.html (2326 words)

	Hamilton College - News, Sports, Events - NYU Professor Ronald Dworkin Gives Truax Lecture
		Dworkin is the Sommer Professor of Law and Philosophy at NYU and Quain Professor of Jurisprudence at University College, London.
		Dworkin believes our religious culture should be formed by the organic vector of individual decisions, and not by a collective act of government.
		Dworkin closed with an argument about gay marriage, saying âMarriage, like every aspect [of community], must be formed organically.â He said there is not substitute for marriage and no justification to not allow the freedom to marry to some people and not others.
	www.hamilton.edu /news/more_news/display.cfm?id=9909 (1137 words)

	Leiter Reports: A Group Blog: Ronald Dworkin Interprets Morality
		Dworkin denies that anything can count as metaethics, at least not in the way that has been assumed by so many for so long.
		Dworkin, early on, explains: Nothing is welcome that would enable us to say that morality is bunk, in the way, say, that we would be able to say that astrology is bunk.
		But Dworkin does not literally mean (although he at one point says) that "morality is not part of any causal nexus." Moral responsibility requires that "our will and behavior be causally downstream of genuine conviction"--though not of "moral truth," which, like mathematical truth, is causally inert.
	leiterreports.typepad.com /blog/2005/10/ronald_dworkin_.html (981 words)

	Freedom's Law
		"Ronald Dworkin, one of the most distinguished constitutional thinkers of our time, offers us a collection of his previously published essays that is both eloquently written and forcefully argued...his defense of a vibrant, open, and tolerant society is one of which John Stuart Mill would be proud."
		In 1969, Dworkin was appointed the Chair of Jurisprudence at the University of Oxford, in which position he succeeded H.L.A. Hart.
		Dworkin opposes both views, arguing that the most fundamental purpose of law is not to report consensus or provide efficient means to social goals, but to be ethical; that is, to meet the requirement that a political community act in a coherent and principled manner toward all its members...." (from Ronald Dworkin's faculty biography)
	www.ou.edu /cas/psc/bookdworkin4.htm (993 words)

	Legal Positivism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy] (via CobWeb/3.1 planet03.csc.ncsu.edu) (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		On Dworkin's view, the thesis that judges have discretion only in the sense that they exercise judgment is trivially true, while the thesis that judges have discretion in the sense that their decisions are not subject to being reversed by a higher authority is false.
		While Dworkin acknowledges the existence of difficult cases that do not fall clearly under a rule, he believes they are not resolved by an exercise of judicial discretion.
		As long as Dworkin acknowledges the existence of cases so difficult that only the best of judges can solve them, his theory is vulnerable to the same charge of unfairness that he levels at t he discretion thesis.
	www.utm.edu.cob-web.org:8888 /research/iep/l/legalpos.htm (6986 words)

	Dworkin, R.: Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate.
		The result, Ronald Dworkin writes, is a deeply depressing political culture, as ill equipped for the perennial challenge of achieving social justice as for the emerging threats of terrorism.
		Dworkin, one the world's leading legal and political philosophers, identifies and defends core principles of personal and political morality that all citizens can share.
		Dworkin lays out two core principles that citizens should share: first, that each human life is intrinsically and equally valuable and, second, that each person has an inalienable personal responsibility for identifying and realizing value in his or her own life.
	pup.princeton.edu /titles/8232.html (438 words)

	The Leiter Reports: Editorials, News, Updates: The Strange Case of Ronald Dworkin, Part I (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		In this and subsequent postings, I want to examine some of the peculiarities of Dworkin's jurisprudential work (I will ignore his influential work on equality for these purposes) that have led to this state of affairs, i.e., that his views should be so relatively moribund among legal philosophers.
		Bear in mind some context: Dworkin and Raz were colleagues at Oxford for three decades, and Raz's authority argument, which received its canonical articulation in a 1985 paper, has been perhaps the single most influential and discussed post-Hart contribution to legal positivism.
		One reason, then, Dworkin's jurisprudential views are moribund is the exasperation so many of us feel at his inability to engage honestly with his opponents.
	webapp.utexas.edu /blogs/archives/bleiter/000484.html (763 words)

	Amazon.ca: Taking Rights Seriously: Books: Ronald Dworkin (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-09)
		Dworkin's thesis is that a tyranny of a minority is better than a tyranny of the majority.
		Dworkin provides a compelling theory for why we should take rights seriously even if we find fallacy in 'natural rights,' which may do.
		Dworkin clears out the old cobwebs and provides insights and new perspectives for the 21st century.
	www.amazon.ca /Taking-Rights-Seriously-Ronald-Dworkin/dp/0674867114 (991 words)

	The Chronicle: 6/9/2006: The Last Judicial Idealist?
		Dworkin argued that judges in sophisticated legal systems can find right answers even in hard cases by extracting moral principles discoverable in them.
		He now thinks any proper theory of law must be divided into "semantic, jurisprudential, doctrinal, and adjudicative stages." He remains committed to the belief that "propositions of law" possess "truth conditions," and that part of the job of judges and legal philosophers is to determine whether "moral criteria" are among them.
		As before, Dworkin sounds utterly Wittgensteinian in his loose approach to definitional, sociological questions about law ("We normally think it unnecessary to ask for a more precise definition of 'legal system' than our rough working ideas provide."), while notably essentialist in that insistence that propositions of law possess truth conditions.
	chronicle.com /temp/reprint.php?id=fszrkmqbp4gzsvbry8yyr0rlzdctycrc (1236 words)

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