| | [No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-08) |
 | | The properties to which computing mechanisms are sensitive are often characterized as “formal” or “syntactic.” Some have pitched the semantic view of computation against the non-semantic view of computational causation. |
 | | By analogy, it is tempting to conclude that in some sense, computers respond to the semantic properties of the instructions they execute, and hence the instructions and the corresponding computational states of the mechanism are individuated by their content. |
 | | Egan appears to reject the semantic view of computation, because she rejects the view, championed by many philosophers, that computational states postulated by psychological theories are individuated by the cognitive contents of those states (e.g., visual contents for the states of visual mechanisms, auditory contents for the states of auditory mechanisms, etc.). |
| philsci-archive.pitt.edu /archive/00002014/01/Computation_Without_Representation_7.doc (8124 words) |