| | 20th WCP: In Spite of Davidson's Arguments for "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth," Truth Can Be Defined |
 | | Moreover, according to pragmaticist epistemological theory of truth the terms "languages" and "sentences" in the above definition are replaced by the conceptions of the cognitive languages of mind and cognitions respectively. |
 | | If Davidson abandoned the coherent theory of truth, as he concedes, and still retains the function of truth conditions in determining the truth and the meaning of our propositional beliefs, then the question is whether these truth conditions are themselves beliefs or not (Davidson, 1996:273, 1990:320). |
 | | Truth conditions cannot be elements of external reality to which we do not have direct access, but they cannot be just any cognitive states because then we would be in a vicious circle of holism. |
| www.bu.edu /wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoNesh.htm (4008 words) |