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| | SEP: Kant's Theory of Judgment |
 | | In his logical textbook, the Jäsche Logic, he says that it is a representation of the unity of consciousness linking together several other representations, or a representation of their relation in a single concept (9: 101). |
 | | Thus a proposition is the logically well-formed and semantically well-composed, truth-valued, unified objective representational content of a judgment, and more generally it is “what is judged” in the act of putting forward any sort of rational claim about the world (9: 109) (14: 659-660) (24: 934). |
 | | Still, Kant's pure general logic is irreducible to all contingent facts and especially to all empirical psychological facts; hence his logic is thoroughly anti-psychologistic, which exploits the flip-side of unconditional obligation, whether logical or moral: happily, is does not entail ought. |
| plato.stanford.edu /entries/kant-judgment (5998 words) |
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