
	Where results make sense

Topic: Signaling games

	Signaling games - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Signaling games are dynamic games with two players, the sender (S) and the receiver (R).
		I have now described the character of a case of signaling without mentioning the meaning of the signals: that two lanterns meant that the redcoats were coming by sea, or whatever.
		The antlers of stags, the elaborate plumage of peacocks and birds of paradise, and the song of the nightingale are all such signals.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Signaling_games (1298 words)

	Transfer in Signaling Games (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-03)
		Signaling game refinements are a notable example of this phenomenon.
		In this paper we present a series of experiments in which subjects gain experience in one signaling game and are then switched to a second related signaling game.
		As such, we are able to generate violations of all major equilibrium refinements for signaling games with experienced subjects.
	www.nyu.edu /econ/dept/esa/cooper.htm (479 words)

	Too Cool for School? Signaling and Countersignaling
		Signaling and Countersignaling by Nick Feltovich, Rick Harbaugh, and Ted To, RAND Journal of Economics, Winter 2002.
		signaling formalized this argument by showing that wasteful actions can separate higher "quality" types from lower quality types if the action is less burdensome to the higher quality types.
		Since medium types are signaling to differentiate themselves from low types, high types may choose to not signal, or countersignal, to differentiate themselves from medium types.
	zhongwe2.serverpros.com /cs (1031 words)

	Matthias Scheutz and Paul Schermerhorn: The Role of Signaling Action Tendencies in Conflict Resolution
		In a poker game, for example, this price is the cost of bidding in each round, while in the hiring of employees it is the company's investment during the selection and interviewing process (the reviewing of resumes, the on-site interview, etc.).
		Consequently, in such games players generally do not have the possibility to take the propensities of other players into account and, hence, have to develop a strategy that is entirely based on their own propensities.
		The stopping game with signaling that we examine here is one in which agents engage in conflicts over resources and continue to fight until one participant (or both) chooses to break off the conflict (i.e., retreats) or runs out of resources and is removed from the simulation (i.e., dies).
	jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk /7/1/4.html (6844 words)

	Games for Handicapped Disabled Boy Scouts, Cub Children Blind Deaf Boys Disabilities Activities Kids Kid
		This collection of games has been compiled in the hope that it will prove of help to those taking up work with handicapped or disabled children, and also those who have been doing such work over a period of years and have grown tired of racking their brains for new games.
		It is not desirable, however, that it should be the main source of supply as individuals should be able to adapt ordinary games for the use of their own particular group of children.
		These games have been sent in by Scouters working with Boy Scout and Cub Scout Groups all over Great Britain, and each one has been actually played by handicapped or disabled Cub Scouts or Boy Scouts and has proved to be popular with them.
	www.inquiry.net /outdoor/games/disabled (703 words)

	Y2K Bibliography of Experimental Economics and Social Science: Signaling
		Abstract: Signaling games with "reverse type dependence" lead to behavior in the laboratory that violates all of the standard refinements of the Nash equilibrium (intuitive criterion, divinity, strategic stability, etc.) The history of the adjustment path seems to determine out-of-equilibrium beliefs that are ruled out by these refinements.
		Abstract: Subjects are randomly matched in 2x2 coordination games, and the subject designated as a "sender" sends a message about intended play, which is read by the "receiver" prior to the point at which both make their decisions.
		Abstract: The "treasures" are ten static and dynamic games where behavior matches the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement, and the contradictions are variations of the same game that produces anomalous behavior patterns.
	www.people.virginia.edu /~cah2k/sigy2k.htm (1504 words)

	SSRN-Repeated Signaling Games by Ayca Kaya
		Although many signaling situations are best interpreted as repeated games, prior research often models them as one-shot games.
		We analyze a class of repeated signaling games in which the informed player's type is persistent and the history of actions is perfectly observable.
		In this context a large class of possibly complex sequences of signals can be supported as the separating equilibrium actions of the strong type of the informed player.
	papers.ssrn.com /soL3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=765905 (209 words)

	RePEc
		Abstract: This paper shows the existence of sequential and weak-best-response equilibria for cheap-talk extensions of signaling games for a class of signaling games called communication-impervious.
		An example shows there are well-behaved infinite signaling games with no sequential equilibria.
		The assumption that talk is cheap seems reasonable in many economic contexts and yields a very straightforward solution to the existence problem in infinite signaling games.
	www.inomics.com /cgi/repec?handle=RePEc:nwu:cmsems:915 (113 words)

	EconPapers: Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications
		Abstract: Focusing on signaling games, I illustrate the relevance of the rationalizability approach for the analysis multistage games with incomplete information.
		I define a class of iterative solution procedures, featuring a notion of “forward induction”: the Receiver tries to explain the Sender’s message in a way which is consistent with the Sender’s strategic sophistication and certain given restrictions on beliefs.
		In a model of job market signaling the best separating equilibrium emerges as the unique rationalizable outcome only when the high and low types are sufficiently different.
	econpapers.repec.org /paper/igiigierp/275.htm (234 words)

	Peter Eso's page of research abstracts
		It is a menu consisting of pairs of transfers specifying payments between the two parties (from the client to the consultant or vice versa) in case the project is undertaken by the client and in case it is not.
		The main result of the paper is that in the optimal mechanism, the consultant obtains the same profit as if she could evaluate the impact of the signals (whose release she controls) on the client’s profit estimate.
		Our main result is that in the expected revenue maximizing mechanism, the seller makes available all the information that she can, and her expected revenue is the same as it would be if she could observe the part of the information that is “new” to the buyers.
	www.kellogg.northwestern.edu /faculty/eso/htm/abstracts.htm (1790 words)

	TBO - TBO.COM
		Games and Economic tbo.comj Behavior, Forthcoming Meghana Bhatt and Colin Camerer California Institute tubo.com of Technology tibo.com - Division of tbo.fom the Humanities and Social tkbo.com Science
		Camerer, C. (1997), "Progress in behavioral game theory", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, 167-188.
		attributions tbovcom in games (Durell, tboycom 1999; otbo.com Weber, Rottenstreich, Camerer, and Knez, forth.).
	www.repentantnadervoter.com /T/tbo-com.html (3182 words)

	Signaling Games Term Papers, Essay Research Paper Help, Essays on Signaling Games
		If you would like to read detailed information about our Signaling Games papers BEFORE submitting payment—such as a summary, the number of pages, year written, and number of sources—you may try our deluxe Signaling Games Search Engine.
		We write Signaling Games papers for research—24 hours a day, 7 days a week—on topics at every level of education.
		Equipped with proper research tools and sources, we write essays on Signaling Games that are accurate and up-to-date.
	www.essaytown.com /topics/signaling_games_essays_papers.html (928 words)

	SSRN-Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning In Sender-Receiver Signaling Games by Christopher Anderson, Colin Camerer
		Since these games often have many equilibria, logical 'refinements' have been used to predict which equilibrium will occur.
		Our adaptation of EWA to signaling games includes a formalization of the Brandts-Holt belief formation idea as a special case.
		Extensions of EWA which update unchosen signals by different functions of the set of unobserved foregone payoffs further improve predictive accuracy.
	papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=239397 (270 words)

	Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications
		Focusing on signaling games, I illustrate the relevance of the rationalizability approach for the analysis multistage games with incomplete information.
		"Fixed-Equilibrium Rationalizability in Signaling Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 90-13, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
		"Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol.
	ideas.repec.org /p/igi/igierp/275.html (743 words)

	Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games
		This paper shows the existence of sequential and weak-best-response equilibria for cheap-talk extensions of signaling games for a class of signaling games called communication-impervious.
		"Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Working Papers 565, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
		"Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol.
	ideas.repec.org /p/nwu/cmsems/915.html (404 words)

	Testing Learning Rules in Experimental Signaling Games (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-03)
		WC17.2 Testing Learning Rules in Experimental Signaling Games David W. Harless, Colin F. Camerer --- VA Comm.
		We formulate how subjects select from strategies over multiple-round signaling experiments.
		Subjects select among strategies, including an experimentation strategy, based on the weight attached to each strategy; the weights are adjusted for each round as specified by a learning rule.
	www.informs.org /conf/NO95/TALKS/WC17.2.html (111 words)

	Games for Deaf Boy Scouts, Boys Cub Cubs Children
		Games for Deaf Boy Scouts, Boys Cub Cubs Children
		(See Also: Indian Sign Language for signing games and pastimes that appeal to both deaf and hearing Scouts)
		S.C. A Test Match in the Ward 13
	www.inquiry.net /outdoor/games/disabled/games_for_deaf_scouts.htm (378 words)

	EconPapers: Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games
		EconPapers: Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games
		Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games
		This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
	econpapers.repec.org /paper/nwucmsems/915.htm (254 words)

Try your search on: Qwika (all wikis)