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 | | Representationalism is probably the dominant approach to belief in contemporary philosophy of mind, advocated by Jerry Fodor (1975, 1981, 1987, 1990), Ruth Millikan (1984, 1993), Fred Dretske (1988), and Robert Cummins (1996), among many others. |
 | | Since the defense of physicalism has been one of the driving forces in philosophy of mind since the late twentieth century, and one of the principal reasons philosophers have been interested in accounts of propositional attitudes such as belief, this failure to advance the physicalist thesis may be seen as a substantial drawback. |
 | | Despite the intuitive appeal of this view, some widely accepted "Russellian" views in the philosophy of language appear committed to attributing to Lois exactly the same beliefs about Clark Kent as she has about Superman. |
| www.faculty.ucr.edu /~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/BeliefEntry030927.html (7581 words) |
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