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| | Prisoner's Dilemma |
 | | We assume here that the game is symmetric, i.e., that the reward, punishment, temptation or sucker payoff is the same for each player, and payoffs have only ordinal significance, i.e., they indicate whether one payoff is better than another, but tell us nothing about how much better. |
| | The most obvious generalization from the two-player to the many-player game would pay each player R if all cooperate, P if all defect, and, if some cooperate and some defect, it would pay the cooperators S and the defectors T. But it is unlikely that we face many situations of this structure. |
| | No human agents can actually play an infinitely repeated game, of course, but the infinite IPD has been considered an appropriate way to model a series of interactions in which the participants never have reason to think the current interaction is their last. |
| plato.stanford.edu /entries/prisoner-dilemma (14078 words) |
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