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Topic: Strategyproof

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	Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Costs: budget balance versus efficiency - Moulin, Shenker (ResearchIndex)
		The service is binary, each agent either receives service or not, and the total cost of service is a submodular function of the set receiving service.
		We investigate strategyproof mechanisms that elicit individual willingness to pay, decide who is served, and then share the cost among them.
		Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Costs: Budget Balance Versus E#ciency, to appear in Economic Theory.
	citeseer.ist.psu.edu /moulin99strategyproof.html (355 words)

	Strategyproof - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		In game theory, an asymmetric game where players have private information is said to be strategyproof (or truthful) if there is no incentive for any of the players to lie about or hide their private information from the other players.
		Although the strategyproof concept has applications in several areas of game theory and economics, it is most natural to the theory of payment schemes for network routing.
		A naive approach would be to ask the owner of each link the cost, use these declared costs to find the least cost path, and pay all links on the path their declared costs.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Strategyproof (365 words)

	Strategyproof Cost-sharing Mechanisms for Set Cover and Facility Location Games - Devanur, Mihail, Vazirani ...
		Abstract: this paper, we obtain strategyproof cost allocations for two fundamental games whose underlying optimization problems are NP-hard, the set cover game and the facility location game.
		For the latter game, this is made possible by new approximation algorithms for the underlying optimization problem using the technique of dual fitting [7].
		Strategyproof cost-sharing Mechanisms for Set Cover and Facility Location Games.
	citeseer.ist.psu.edu /565942.html (550 words)

	[No title]
		Give an infinite family of examples that demonstrates that it is not group-strategyproof.
		Problem 2 (30 Points) Recall that there is no strategyproof mechanism for multicast cost sharing that satisfies the NPT, VP and CS assumptions explained in the Feigenbaum-Papadimitriou-Shenker paper and is both efficient and budget-balanced.
		Show that there is no strategyproof mechanism that satisfies the NPT, VP, and CS assumptions, is efficient, and is approximately budget-balanced.
	zoo.cs.yale.edu /classes/cs455/2002/hw3.doc (312 words)

	Vickrey-Clarke-Groves - the free encyclopedia (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		The basic idea of a VCG mechanism is to pay the owner of each link or node (depending on the network model) it declared cost plus its added value.
		In many routing problems, this mechanism is not only strategyproof, but minimum among all strategyproof mechanisms.
		This routing problem is one of the cases for which VCG is strategyproof and minimum.
	www.world-knowledge-encyclopedia.com /?t=VCG (171 words)

	[No title]
		In this paper, we take for granted that the properties of strategyproofness and efficiency are desirable features of an allocation mechanism. But we are interested as much in equitable mechanisms such as the uniform rule discussed in the previous paragraph, as in inequitable ones such as the priority mechanisms.
		The role of the peak only property in the analysis of strategyproof mechanisms is discussed first in Barbera and Peleg [1980] for the voting problem and further developed in Barbera and Jackson [1994], [1995] for the allocation of public or private goods.
		Remark 1 The fixed path allocation mechanisms are coalitionally strategyproof: it is easy to check that no coalition of agents can jointly misrepresent their preferences and make some agent in the coalition strictly better off while no agent in the coalition is worse off.
	www.econ.duke.edu /pub/moulin/ration.w7.doc (8042 words)

	Untitled (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		Given te Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type impossibility results for more general settings, we investigate strategyproofness for the assignment problem, where individuals are assigned at most one indivisible object, without making side payments.
		Since their choice will depend only on their top-ranked object at certain stages, in the decentralized version individuals not only will not have to report their ranking of the objects but they also will not have to determine, typically, their entire ranking.
		We show that the set of hierarchical exchange functions can be characterized as the only strategyproof, Pareto-optimal, and interpersonally independent social choice functions for the assignment problem, where interpersonal independency ensures a certain concervativeness or lack of arbitrariness of the social choice function.
	www.hss.caltech.edu /Events/Archives/ES/Abstracts/314.html (517 words)

	RePEc (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		The service is binary, each agent either receives service or not, and the total cost of service is a submodular function of the set receiving service.
		We investigate strategyproof mechanisms that elicit individual willingness to pay, decide who is served, and then share the cost among them.
		We characterize the rich family of budget balanced and group strategyproof mechanisms and find that the mechanism associated with the Shapley value cost sharing formula is characterized by the property that its worst welfare loss is minimal.
	www.inomics.com /cgi/repec?handle=RePEc:spr:joecth:v:18:y:2001:i:3:p:511-533 (238 words)

	ISMP 2000 - Meeting Topics (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		Besides the well-studied class of non-decreasing, submodular costfunctions, the only other class known to admit a budget balanced and group strategyproof cost sharing mechanism is the class of supermodular functions.
		In this paper, we give a budget balanced and group strategyproof cost sharing method for a cost function that is not in either of these classes.
		So, the existential questions concerning such good allocations lead to a new perspective on many fundamental problems in resource allocation, and on the structure of their feasible solutions.
	www.isye.gatech.edu /ismp2000/schedule/session_pages/THB-03-IC115.html (397 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		We give a group-strategyproof mechanism that exhibits a tradeoff between the other properties of SH: It can be computed by an algorithm that is more communication-efficient than SH, but it might fail to achieve exact budget balance or exact minimum welfare loss (albeit by a bounded amount).
		We also show that no strategyproof mechanism for multicast cost sharing can be both approximately efficient and approximately budget-balanced.
		For an important class of restricted valuations, next-hop preferences, a welfare-maximizing set of routes can be computed with a strategyproof mechanism in polynomial time (in a centralized computational model).
	theory.lcs.mit.edu /~sami/papers/thesis.html (349 words)

	Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		We develop a general method for turning a primal-dual algorithm into a group strategyproof cost-sharing mechanism.
		Both mechanisms are competitive, group strategyproof and recover a constant fraction of the cost.
		For the facility location game our cost-sharing method recovers a 1/3rd of the total cost, while in the network design game the cost shares pay for a 1/15 fraction of the cost of the solution.
	csdl.computer.org /comp/proceedings/focs/2003/2040/00/20400584abs.htm (155 words)

	SSRN-Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Access Costs: Budget Balance versus Efficiency by Hervé Moulin, Scott Shenker
		A given set of users share the submodular cost of access to a network (or, more generally, the submodular cost of any idiosyncratic binary good).
		We compare strategyproof mechanisms that serve the efficient set of users (but do not necessarily balance the budget) with those that exactly cover costs (but are not necessarily efficient).
		Within the second class, the mechanism associated with the Shapley value cost sharing formula is characterized by the property that its worst welfare loss is minimal.
	papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=42940 (281 words)

	[No title]
		Put more formally, in a straight fight SMR is strategyproof ; no voter can ever improve the outcome with respect to his or her true preferences by misreporting those preferences on the ballot.
		In addition, all voting procedures are vulnerable to spoiler effects when the field of candidates expands or contracts â” that, whether candidate A or B is elected may depend on whether some third candidate (the potential âspoilerâ) enters the field or not.
		This is especially unfortunate because, in so far as Condorcet voting does select winners, it is (unlike the others) both strategyproof and not subject to spoiler effects.
	userpages.umbc.edu /~nmiller/POLI325/WINNERS.htm (4505 words)

	Rahul Sami/Ph.D. Dissertation Defense (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		We give a group-strategyproof mechanism that exhibits a tradeoff between the other properties of the Shapley-value mechanism: It can be computed by an algorithm that is more communication-efficient than the Shapley-value mechanism, but it might fail to achieve exact budget balance or exact minimum welfare loss (albeit by a bounded amount).
		In our first formulation, lowest-cost routing, we show that there is a unique strategyproof mechanism.
		We then show that for an important class of restricted valuations, next-hop preferences, a welfare-maximizing set of routes can be computed with a strategyproof mechanism in polynomial time (in a centralized computational model).
	www.cs.yale.edu /calendars/sami.html (366 words)

	Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof
		This paper gives a concrete example of a nondictatorial, coalitionally strategyproof social choice function for countably infinite societies.
		The function is defined for those profiles such that for each alternative, the coalition that prefers it the most is gdescribable.h The gdescribableh coalitions are assumed to form a countable Boolean algebra.
		"Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol.
	ideas.repec.org /p/wpa/wuwppe/9604002.html (519 words)

	EconPapers: Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof
		Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof
		Abstract: This paper gives a concrete example of a nondictatorial, coalitionally strategyproof social choice function for countably infinite societies.
		The function is defined for those profiles such that for each alternative, the coalition that prefers it the most is "describable." The "describable" coalitions are assumed to form a countable Boolean algebra.
	econpapers.repec.org /article/sprsochwe/v_3A18_3Ay_3A2001_3Ai_3A3_3Ap_3A543-553.htm (251 words)

	Nikhil's Home Page (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		In this paper we show how to use elementary ideas from randomization to solve various variants of this problem in time o(mn).
		Achieving truth-revealing, also called strategyproofness or incentive compatibility, is fundamental to game theory.
		In this paper, we obtain strategyproof cost allocations for two fundamental cost sharing games whose underlying optimization problems are NP-hard, the set cover game and the facility location game.
	www.cc.gatech.edu /~nikhil/pubs.html (326 words)

	DIMACS Workshop on Computational Issues in Game Theory and Mechanism Design
		In this context, it is often desirable to have truthful (or strategyproof) mechanisms with an objective function that is suited for the application.
		Recent work in economics [Moulin and Shenker,1997] leads naturally to the consideration of two mechanisms: Marginal Cost (MC), which is efficient and strategyproof, and Shapley value (SH), which is budget-balanced and group-strategyproof and, among all mechanisms with these two properties, minimizes the worst-case efficiency loss.
		Kamal Jain, Microsoft Research Equitable, Group Strategyproof Cost Allocations via Primal-Dual-Type Algorithms We build on the well-studied egalitarian cost-sharing method of Dutta and Ray [1987] as follows.
	dimacs.rutgers.edu /Workshops/gametheory/abstracts1.html (4831 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		Archive users may download papers and produce them for their own personal use, but downloading of papers for any other activity, including reposting to other electronic bulletin boards or archives, may not be done without the written consent of the authors.
		i) a unique strategyproof and efficient mechanism (a variant of the familiar pivotal mechanism) dubbed the marginal contribution mechanism (MC)
		ii) a whole class of strategyproof and budget-balanced mechanisms, each one corresponding to a certain cost sharing formula; these mechanisms, unlike MC, are immune to manipulations by coalitions.
	www.econ.duke.edu /Papers/Abstracts96/abstract.96.31.html (259 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		Interdomain routing between ASes is a multi-agent game in which selfish ASes are capable of manipulating the interdomain routing protocol, BGP to gain revenue unfairly.
		This paper presents a design and analysis of a strategyproof BGP-based routing mechanism that provides a direction in distributed algorithmic mechanism design.
		In this talk, I will present the motivation behind studying such problems, with intuitive description about strategyproof pricing scheme for Vickrey-Clarke-Groove family.
	www.cs.bu.edu /groups/nrg/abstracts/f02/dhiman-1008.txt (110 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		Recent work in economics leads naturally to the consideration of two mechanisms: marginal cost (MC), which is efficient and strategyproof, and Shapley value (SH), which is budget-balanced and group-strategyproof and, among all mechanisms with these two properties, minimizes the worst-case welfare loss.
		We also extend a classical impossibility result in game theory to show that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approximately efficient and approximately budget-balanced.
		Our results show that one important and natural case of multicast cost sharing is an example of a canonical hard problem in distributed, algorithmic mechanism design; in this sense, they represent progress toward the development of a complexity theory of Internet computation.
	lambda.cs.yale.edu /~arvind/mechdes.htm (219 words)

	2001-02 AFLB Calendar
		We build on the well-studied egalitarian cost-sharing method of Dutta and Ray [1987] as follows.
		Submodular functions capture the notion of economies of scale and such cost functions arise naturally in practice, e.g., in multicast routing.
		All methods in our class are cross-monotone and therefore lead to group strategyproof mechanisms (i.e., the dominant strategy for each user is to report her true utility, even in the presence of collusions).
	theory.stanford.edu /~aflb/2001-02.html (1873 words)

	Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms - Pal, Tardos (ResearchIndex)
		Abstract: We develop a general method for cost-sharing that is approximately budget balanced and group strategyproof.
		We use our method to design cost sharing mechanisms for two NP-complete problems: metric facility location, and single source rent-or-buy network design.
		For the facility location game our costsharing method recovers a 1/3rd of the total cost, while in the network design game the cost shares...
	citeseer.ist.psu.edu /559338.html (630 words)

	Repeated Game Analysis of Internet Routing (extended abstract) (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-05)
		The mechanism is strategyproof, meaning that all nodes are incented to advertise their costs truthfully.
		However, we see that the FPSS mechanism is not strategyproof in the repeated setting.
		The observation that the strategyproof nature of the FPSS model does not hold in a repeated environment, a significant problem for a routing protocol.
	www.mit.edu /~afergan/papers/rrouting_podc04.html (224 words)

	Citations: Group strategyproof mechanisms via primal-dual algorithms - Pal, Tardos (ResearchIndex)
		Citations: Group strategyproof mechanisms via primal-dual algorithms - Pal, Tardos (ResearchIndex)
		Pal, E. Tardos "Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms," FOCS 2003, pp.
		Pal and E. Tardos, Group strategyproof mechanisms via primal-dual algorithms, Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 584-593, 2003.
	citeseer.ist.psu.edu /context/2238264/699214 (216 words)

	Notre Dame Mendoza College Of Business: Faculty List
		"Strategyproof Exchange of Indivisible Goods", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 39: 931-959, 2003.
		"Strategyproofness and Population-Monotonicity in House Allocation Problems", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38:329-339, with Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus, 2002.
		"Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments", Journal of Public Economic Theory, 3: 257-271, 2001.
	www.business.nd.edu /Faculty/faculty_bio_page.cfm?who=spapai (143 words)

	[EM] The challenge: reasoning from Berlin solving 2 candidate elections
		> >Therefore, I interpret May's theorem in connection with Hylland's >theorem as follows: > > When there are only two candidates then the unique anonymous, > neutral, decisive, and strategyproof single-winner election > method is FPP.
		(3) Mr Schulze copied in the word "strategyproof"..
		The rest of my e-mail is over the idea that to copy from most Soc Choice economists is not sufficiently serious.
	www.mail-archive.com /election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com/msg04449.html (604 words)

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