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Topic: Subgame perfect nash equilibrium

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Nash equilibrium

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	International Security Arma virumque cano
		It follows that the open-loop Nash solution requires that each country pre-commits itself to a path of investment in arms and that the expectations of each other's paths of investment are correct in equilibrium.
		An equilibrium solution is subgame-perfect if for each subgame over a remainder of the planning period, the relevant part of the solution is also a Nash equilibrium.
		Subgame perfectness rules out threat equilibria, which rely on information patterns with memory, and equilibria which imply future investments that are not rational to carry out if called upon to do so in the future.
	www.cepr.org /pubs/Bulletin/dps/dp206.htm (1659 words)

	EconPort - Handbook - Game Theory - Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
		Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) was invented in order to refine Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a way that is similar to how subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium refines Nash equilibrium.
		To determine which of these Nash equilibria are subgame perfect, we use the extensive form representation to define the game's subgames.
		The crucial new feature of this equilibrium concept is due to Kreps and Wilson (1982): beliefs are elevated to the level of importance of strategies in the definition of equilibrium.
	www.econport.org /econport/request?page=man_gametheory_incompinf (731 words)

	Nash equilibrium subgame perfect equilibrium (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-11)
		EconPapers: Subgame perfect manipulation of children by overlapping generations...
		Nash equilibrium and subgame perfection: The case of observable queues...
		IngentaConnect Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfection in Observable Queues...
	www.scienceoxygen.com /math/567.html (150 words)

	Answers for Chapters 15
		A Nash equilibrium is a situation in which each player makes his or her best response, that is, plays the strategy that maximizes his payoff, given the strategies of other players.
		The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game is for Carolyn to choose to go to the party followed by Mark's decision to go to the party.
		The Nash equilibrium is for both countries to have lots of nuclear weapons, with each getting 0 units of happiness.
	www.econ.rochester.edu /eco108/ch17/ans17.htm (2251 words)

	[No title]
		A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which every player's strategy is credible (no player makes incredible threats).
		Equilibrium savings rises (because the equilibrium quantity of loans is the same as equilibrium savings) and equilibrium consumption falls.
		One Nash equilibrium is for the monopoly to play the strategy, "high price regardless of whether the new firm enters," and the new firm enters.
	www.econ.rochester.edu /eco108/Oldies/m2s94a.html (2708 words)

	Coalition-Stable Equilibria in Repeated Games
		It is well-known that subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium does not eliminate incentives for joint-deviations or renegotiations.
		This paper presents a systematic framework for studying non-cooperative games with group incentives, and offers a notion of equilibrium that refines the Nash theory in a natural way and answers to most questions raised in the renegotiation-proof and coalition-proof literature.
		Intuitively, I require that an equilibrium should not prescribe in any subgame a course of action that some coalition of players would jointly wish to deviate, given the restriction that every deviation must itself be self-enforcing and hence invulnerable to further self-enforcing deviations.
	ideas.repec.org /p/ecm/nasm04/581.html (575 words)

	Incomplete Stable Structures (SMEALSearch) - Pal,Rangaswamy,Giles,Debnath (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-11)
		We show that with at most ve players the full cooperation structure results according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
		Moreover, if the game is strictly convex then every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium results in a structure that is payo equivalent to the full cooperation structure.
		We show that there exists a subgame Nash equilibrium that results in an incomplete structure in which two players are worse o than in the full cooperation structure, whereas four players are better o....
	smealsearch2.psu.edu /6074.html (252 words)

	AMCA: Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games by Marco Slikker (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-11)
		Aumann and Myerson (1988) already note that for a superadditive game this process may lead to partial cooperation according to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept.
		Additionally, we analyze a 6-person symmetric (strictly) convex game, which illustrates that the arguments that suffice to show that the full cooperation structure can result in symmetric convex games with at most 5 players, cannot be extended to games with 6 (or more) players.
		In fact, we show that in this 6-person symmetric convex game, according to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept, structures can result in which two players receive strictly less than they would according to the full cooperation structure and four players receive strictly more than they would according to the full cooperation structure.
	at.yorku.ca /c/a/f/i/84.htm (421 words)

	University of Trento - Italy - UNITN-Eprints - On the Behavior of Proposers in Ultimatum Games
		We demonstrate that one should not expect convergence of the proposals to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer in standard ultimatum games.
		Second, considering a range of learning theories (from optimal to boundedly rational), we explain that this is an inherent feature of the learning task faced by the proposers, and we provide some insights into the actual learning behavior of the experimental subjects.
		This explanation for the lack of convergence to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in ultimatum games complements most alternative explanations.
	eprints.biblio.unitn.it /archive/00000544 (225 words)

	[No title]
		If the first stage outcome is (y, z), where y does not equal Q1 and z does not equal Q2, play Pi in the second stage.
		The result of the first stage is observed before the second stage begins.
		Problem 5 Consider the model of infinitely repeated Bertrand competition with stochastic but verifiable demand that we did in class.
	www.ssc.upenn.edu /~weber2/pset3_econ35.doc (309 words)

	S-WoPEc: Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior
		By taking the social network connecting agents as given, we study the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game in which individuals decide first to work or to become a criminal and then the crime effort provided if criminals.
		We also show that multiple equilibria with different number of active criminals and levels of involvement in rime activities may coexist and are only driven by the geometry of the pattern of links connecting criminals.
		Using the equilibrium concept of pairwise-stable networks, we then show that the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes holds even when we allow for endogenous network formation.
	swopec.hhs.se /iuiwop/abs/iuiwop0601.htm (284 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-11)
		It is easier to get a collusive agreement that is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium if we consider that the firms play the same game N periods instead of 1.
		Is there any Nash equilibrium that is not SPNE?
		Is it possible an equilibrium with collusion in all periods?
	home.uchicago.edu /~jsantalo/springp2.doc (594 words)

	Table of contents for Incentives
		EQUILIBRIUM 5.1 Dominant strategy equilibrium 5.2 Nash equilibrium 5.3 The invisible hand 5.4 The incentive to harbor terrorists 5.5 Dissolving a partnership 5.6 The centipede game 5.7 Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium 6.
		REPETITION AND EQUILIBRIUM 7.1 Repeated prisoner's dilemma with terminal date 7.2 Infinitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma 7.3 Equilibrium theorem for infinitely repeated games 7.4 Terminal date and unknown type CHAPTER 2: BASIC MODELS AND TOOLS 1.
		THE ARROW--DEBREU ECONOMY 2.1 The model 2.2 Welfare theorem for an exchange economy 2.3 The welfare theorem in the general model 2.4 Externalities 3.
	www.loc.gov /catdir/toc/ecip066/2006000774.html (736 words)

	AMCA: Subgame perfect implementation, a full characterization by Hannu Vartiainen (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-11)
		Moore and Repullo (1988, Econometrica), and Abreu and Sen (1990, JET) show that more social choice correspondences (SCCs) can be implemented in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) than in Nash equilibrium.
		They characterize a complex condition (called " alpha") which is necessary for SPE implementation, and which, if the number of players is at least three, together with no-veto power (NVP) is also sufficient.
		The author(s) of this document and the organizers of the conference have granted their consent to include this abstract in Atlas Mathematical Conference Abstracts.
	at.yorku.ca /c/a/f/i/13.htm (214 words)

	Analyzing Sequential Game Equilibrium: (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-11)
		The Wheel is a sequential game of perfect information played twice during each taping of the television game show The Price is Right.
		We derive the Unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (USPNE) for The Wheel and test its predictive ability using data from a sample of actual plays from the show.
		Using the concept of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) we find contestants are less likely to use their subgame perfect strategies when the cost of deviating is relatively low.
	fac.comtech.depaul.edu /rtenorio/prabst.html (117 words)

	[No title]
		It specifies a feasible action for the player in every contingency in which the player might be called on to act.
		ª>(d2ódW¨8Find subgame perfect Nash equilibria: backward induction¡99&ª, óeX¨8Find subgame perfect Nash equilibria: backward induction¡99&ª, ó¨Summary¨öDynamic game of complete and imperfect information Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium Backward induction Next time Bank runs (2.2.B of Gibbons) Tariffs and imperfect international competition (2.2.C of Gibbons) Reading lists Sec 2.2 A-C of Gibbons¡Tr`r`ª>3ª/ðTó>óRóTêø_ ï `ð ÌÌÌ3ÿÿÿWo+ff3Ì`ð 3ÌÌÌ3ÿÿÿf3ÿÿ3Ì3`ð !
		% ð{¨-K, -K¡X0 2DD@DÿþDÿþðã¢ ð3 ð0DÞ¿¿Àÿð,9S ð{¨-K, -K¡X0 2DD@DÿþDÿþðl ð5 “ð6¿ÀÎ×ÿ"ñ¿`ð.·wRðl ð6 “ð6¿ÀÎ×ÿ"ñ¿`ðªjÄðÛ¢ ð7 ð0¼å¿¿Àÿ"ñ¿`ð£¦ ðm¨ a subgame¡& 0 2 ªðRB ð8@ sðD¿ÀÑÿð’R%%ðÛ¢ ð9 ð0$ë¿¿Àÿ"ñ¿`ð1á[ ðm¨ a subgame¡&* 0 2 ªðRB ð:@ sð*D¿ÀÑÿð `³ðl ð; “ð6¿ÀÎ×ÿ"ñ¿`ð ;;ðß¢ ð
	www.andrew.cmu.edu /user/xinming/gametheory/lecture16.ppt (271 words)

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