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Topic: Subgame perfection

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	Subgame perfect equilibrium - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		A common method for determining subgame perfect equilibria is backward induction.
		A common example of the use of nodes and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is in the estimate of optimal American option exercise through a decision lattice such as a binomial tree.
		The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is normally deduced by "backward induction" from the various ultimate outcomes of the game, eliminating branches which would involve any player making a move that is not credible (optimal) from that node.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Subgame-perfect_Nash_equilibrium (692 words)

	Solution concept - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		A generalisation of backward induction is subgame perfection.
		In subgame perfect equilibria, play in every subgame is rational (specifically a Nash equilibrium).
		For example, since subgames cannot cut through information sets, a game of imperfect information may have only one subgame – itself – and hence subgame perfection cannot be used to eliminate any Nash equilibria.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Solution_concept (1373 words)

	Subgame Perfection In A "Divided Government" Model - Iannantuoni (ResearchIndex)
		Subgame Perfection In A "Divided Government" Model - Iannantuoni (ResearchIndex)
		Subgame Perfection In A "Divided Government" Model (1999)
		Iannantuoni, G. (1999), "Subgame perfection in a divided government model", CORE DP.
	citeseer.ist.psu.edu /iannantuoni99subgame.html (247 words)

	Mahalanobis
		A Nash equilibrium for an extensive form game (an extensive form with perfect* information is basically a rooted tree with a partition of the set of moves) is subgame perfect if it induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
		One of you decribed this nice experiment where he actually played (almost) subgame perfect if the strategy space of player 1 were finite.
		Of course there is a subgame perfect equilibrium, and it is indeed (offer 0, accept all offers).
	mahalanobis.twoday.net /stories/1073551#1074566 (2089 words)

	The Prize in Economics 1994 - Press Release
		In addition, however, it fulfills Selten's requirement of subgame perfection, which thus implies systematic formalization of the requirement that only credible threats should be taken into account.
		Selten's subgame perfection has direct significance in discussions of credibility in economic policy, the analysis of oligopoly, the economics of information, etc. It is the most fundamental refinement of Nash equilibrium.
		Nevertheless, there are situations where not even the requirement of subgame perfection is sufficient.
	nobelprize.org /nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1994/press.html (2238 words)

	EconPapers: Racing for the Water: Laboratory Evidence on Subgame Perfection
		Solving the model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laboratory experiments.
		Baseline experiments, which portray a "rule of capture" for establishing ownership with group size equal to 10, achieve an average efficiency of 30%.
		The stock quota come closet to producing data consistent with subgame perfection.
	econpapers.repec.org /paper/bonbonsfb/278.htm (252 words)

	Game Theory (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
		However, the demonstration of this fact applies only in conditions of ‘perfect competition,’ that is, when firms face no costs of entry or exit into markets, when there are no economies of scale, and when no agents' actions have unintended side-effects on other agents' well-being.
		The simplest games (from the perspective of logical structure) are those in which agents have perfect information, meaning that at every point where each agent's strategy tells her to take an action, she knows everything that has happened in the game up to that point.
		If the subgame descending from node 3 is played, then Player II will face a choice between a payoff of 4 and a payoff of 3.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/game-theory (20519 words)

	Amazon.com: "subgame perfect equilibrium path": Key Phrase page (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-12)
		Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria by Eric van Damme
		The subgame perfect equilibrium path has Telex entering and IBM accommodating.
		This is the only subgame perfect equilibrium of Telex versus IBM with perfect information,...
	www.amazon.com /phrase/subgame-perfect-equilibrium-path (498 words)

	6.3: Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-12)
		We were sometimes able to refine away such undesirable equilibria by strengthening our solution concept--demanding subgame perfection, which requires that the restriction of a strategy profile to any subgame be a Nash equilibrium of that subgame.
		The concept of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium for extensive-form games is defined by four Bayes Requirements.
		These requirements eliminate the bad subgame-perfect equilibria by requiring players to have beliefs, at each information set, about which node of the information set she has reached, conditional on being informed she is in that information set.
	virtualperfection.com /gametheory/Section6.3.html (194 words)

	Subgame Perfection (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-12)
		A set of strategies is subgame perfect if, for every proper subgame, the restriction of those strategies to the subgame forms a Nash equilibrium for that subgame.
		SPE must be in the players’ best interest at each information set.
		SPE must be a NEQ for all proper subgames.
	www.courses.rochester.edu /stone/PSC272/theory3/sld025.htm (48 words)

	4.3: Solution Concepts in Extensive-Form Games
		Then we learn how to restrict extensive-form game strategies to the subgame and to the difference game, as well as the reverse: how to compose a new extensive-form game strategy from a subgame strategy and a difference-game strategy.
		A subgame-perfect equilibrium of an extensive-form game is a behavior-strategy profile whose restriction to each subgame is a Nash equilibrium of that subgame.
		We use Zermelo's backward-induction algorithm to prove that all such games of perfect information have a pure-strategy subgame-perfection equilibrium.
	www.virtualperfection.com /gametheory/Section4.3.html (381 words)

	George and Gina
		There is another subgame at the node labeled P and S.
		In the normal form of the entire game there is only one subgame perfect equilibrium.
		Explain why one of the subgame Nash equilibria is not a subgame perfect equilibrium.
	isc.temple.edu /economics/Econ_92/Game_Lectures/9th-SubGPerfEq/george_and_gina.htm (413 words)

	Game theory - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		This need not be perfect knowledge about every action of earlier players; it might be very little information.
		Perfect information is often confused with complete information, which is a similar concept.
		In 1965, Reinhard Selten introduced his solution concept of subgame perfect equilibria, which further refined the Nash equilibrium (later he would introduce trembling hand perfection as well).
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Game_theory (4285 words)

	[No title]
		¨Structure of a EF Game¨The structure of a simple game of complete and perfect information.
		In more complicated games, they also require assumptions about the evolution of beliefs.
		Player 2 observes a1 and then chooses a2 from the feasible set A2.
	www.poli.duke.edu /eitm/files/institutions2/Extensive_Form_Games.ppt (425 words)

	Chris Yiu - Game Theory Lounge - Solving Dynamic Games (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-12)
		A subgame is any subset of the game tree starting from a singleton node (this means a subgame cannot start from an information set containing more than one node).
		We then look for Nash equilibrium strategies in the main game that also constitute a Nash equilibrium in every proper subgame.
		This leaves (In,A) as the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game.
	www.yiu.co.uk /gametheory/?page=dynamic (595 words)

	Racing for the Water: Laboratory Evidence on Subgame Perfection
		This paper examines strategic behaviour in the context of a dynamic common-pool resource game with a unique symmetric subgame equilibrium.
		To our knowledge, this item is not available for download.
		Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using
	ideas.repec.org /p/bon/bonsfb/278.html (268 words)

	On The Equivalence Between Subgame Perfection And Sequentiality
		On The Equivalence Between Subgame Perfection And Sequentiality
		We identify the maximal set of finite extensive forms for which the sets of subgame perfect and sequential equilibrium strategies coincide for any possible assignment of the payoff function.
		We also identify the maximal set of finite extensive forms for which the outcomes induced by the two solution concepts coincide.
	ideas.repec.org /p/cte/werepe/we052616.html (364 words)

	EconPapers: A note on the equivalence of time consistency and subgame perfection in stochastic games (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-12)
		EconPapers: A note on the equivalence of time consistency and subgame perfection in stochastic games
		A note on the equivalence of time consistency and subgame perfection in stochastic games
		This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
	netec.wustl.edu /WoPEc/data/Articles/eeeeecrevv:39:y:1995:i:2:p:245-251.html (94 words)

	GW Bulletin (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-12)
		Expected utility theory, general equilibrium in a pure exchange economy and economy with production, welfare theorems and the core theory of the competitive firm in the short run and long run, monopoly and price discrimination, models of oligopoly.
		Theory of games, including Nash equilibrium and its refinements and comparative statics, evolutionary game theory, multistage games and subgame perfection, repeated games and oligopolistic supergames, static and dynamic Bayesian games, auction theory, and bargaining theory.
		Alternative theories of income, employment, and the price level; impact of monetary and fiscal policy; role of expectations in the economy; and microfoundations of macroeconomic models and dynamic analysis.
	www.gwu.edu /~bulletin/grad/econ.html (2249 words)

	LabSi - Contents
		In the first stage we are interested in the emergence of backward or forward induction equilibria in games in which the change of one of the outcomes varies the equilibrium selection criterion.
		Drift does not plays any role in this game, the experiment would provide comparative statics on these subgame perfection concepts as outcomes varies between the games.
		Direct tests of the drift would be as follows.
	www.econ-pol.unisi.it /labsi/labsi.html?activities (1478 words)

	Amazon.com: "sequential equilibrium concept": Key Phrase page (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-12)
		See all pages with references to sequential equilibrium concept.
		It is probably a weakness of many refinement concepts that they restrict themselves to games with...
		Key Phrases in this book: strict equilibrium points, equilibrium selection theory, irreducible game, loudest resistance, unperturbed game, agent normal form, proper subcells, proper subformation, undominated candidates, perfect equilibrium point, market entry games, residual game (See more)
	www.amazon.com /phrase/sequential-equilibrium-concept (546 words)

	Georgetown University (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-12)
		"Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games."
		"Industrialization under Perfect Foresight: a Dynamic World General Equilibrium with a Continuum of Countries."
		"On the Equivalence of Time Consistency and Subgame Perfection in Stochastic Games."
	econ.georgetown.edu /workingpapers.html (3087 words)

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