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	Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind - dualism
		In philosophy of mind, the belief that the mental and physical are deeply different in kind: thus the mental is at least not identical with the physical.
		Often, the term 'Cartesian dualism' is used to refer to the general class of substance dualist theories.
		Substance dualists hold that mind and matter are different kinds of substances.
	philosophy.uwaterloo.ca /MindDict/dualism.html (979 words)

	Dualism (philosophy of mind) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Substance dualism is contrasted with all forms of materialism, but property dualism may be considered a form of emergent materialism and thus would only be contrasted with non-emergent materialism.
		Substance dualism is a philosophical position compatible with most theologies which claim that immortal souls occupy an independent "realm" of existence which is distinct from that of the physical world.
		Predicate dualists believe that so-called "folk psychology", with all of its propositional attitude ascriptions, is an ineliminable part of the enterprise of describing, explaining and understanding human mental states and behavior.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind) (5360 words)

	Dualism and Mind [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
		Substance dualists typically argue that the mind and the body are composed of different substances and that the mind is a thinking thing that lacks the usual attributes of physical objects: size, shape, location, solidity, motion, adherence to the laws of physics, and so on.
		According to the dualist, mind (or soul) is comprised of a non-physical substance, while body is constituted of the physical substance known as matter.
		Property dualists agree with the materialists that mental phenomena are dependent upon physical phenomena, since the fomer are (non-physical) attributes of the latter.
	www.utm.edu /research/iep/d/dualism.htm (10531 words)

	20th WCP: Anne Conway’s Critique of Cartesian Dualism
		The two substances of which a dualist speaks are defined on the basis of the exclusion of characteristics.
		For example, even dualists speak of spirit as locatable somewhere, perhaps in the sense that a person's spirit is seen as residing in the same location as his body because such a location allows a spirit to experience that which is happening inside and in the area around the body).
		This response, she argues, is inconsistent, because a dualist believes that the body itself does not have life or feeling in it.
	web.bu.edu /wcp/Papers/Onto/OntoDerk.htm (3011 words)

	[No title] (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Substance is “that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it has to be formed” (Ethics, Part 1, Def.
		He says that there is one substance and that all that we perceive are attributes of substance.
		Apart from God no substance can be or be conceived, that is, something which is in itself and is conceived through itself.
	www.users.drew.edu /wkruzek/philo38paper2.doc (1543 words)

	FOLDOP search
		pluralism and is opposed by monism, practically speaking dualists often put their emphasis on the "higher", more spiritual reality that their theoretical separations construct, so that they are often construed as adherents of idealism or transcendentalism, even though this is not strictly the case.
		Often, the term "Cartesian dualism" is used to refer to the general class of substance dualist theories.
		Substance dualists hold that mind and matter are different kinds of substances.
	www.swif.it /foldop/dizionario.php?find=dualism (1162 words)

	Reasons To Believe: Facts For Faith Issue 7, 2001
		Substance dualists assert that as a human, Mom consists of an immaterial substantial soul with a physical body that is not identical to the soul.
		In contrast with mere property dualism, substance dualists believe that the brain is a physical thing with physical properties and the mind or soul is a mental substance that has mental properties.
		The property dualist would add a description of the properties possessed by that body, such as the body is feeling pain, thinking about lunch, or can remember being on vacation with her children in Grandview, Missouri, in 1965.
	www.reasons.org /resources/fff/2001issue07/index.shtml#creedal (17082 words)

	Dualism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Both the three-millennia old Zoroastrian religion and the lesser-known Christian gnostic religion (and its variations such as, Manichaeism, Bogomils, Catharism, etc.) are dualistic, as is Mandaeanism.
		In this sense, it is dualistic when one perceives a tree as a thing separate from everything surrounding it, or when one perceives a "self" that is distinct from the rest of the world.
		Mind-body dualism can exist as substance dualism which claims that the mind and the body are composed of a distinct substance, and as property dualism which claims that there may not be a distinction in substance, but that mental and physical properties are still categorically distinct, and not reducible to each other.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Dualist (1351 words)

	What is the source of our mental experience (Site not responding. Last check: )
		Substance dualism proports to explain the mind by suggesting it is a nonphysical object, separate and distinct from the body, though linked to it, mysteriously.
		I intend to argue that substance dualism is preferable to these theories because of its capacity to explain qualia, a certain sort of mental state that these alternative theories cannot account for.
		And, since qualia is one sort of mental state, it must be the case that at least some mental states are nonphysical, as the substance dualist argues.
	s94176570.onlinehome.us /Philosophy/substance_dualism_and_qualia.htm (1839 words)

	PA143
		It is involved in this statement, a substance distinct from the body...The Scriptural doctrine of the nature of man as a created spirit in vital union with an organized body, consisting, therefore, of two, and only two, distinct elements or substances, matter and mind, is...properly designated as realistic dualism.
		Besides the incongruity of a "dualist" speaking of the true self as one component of the anthropological combination, we must note that his argument is invalid since the indiscernability of identicals does not hold in intestinal contexts (i.e.
		[13] At times the dualist has argued that the irreducibility of "mind" and "body" proves that there are minds and bodies in which, respectively, mental and physical events take place; despite the problem involved in arguing from grammar to ontology, this argument is (like others) overstated.
	www.cmfnow.com /articles/PA143.htm (6330 words)

	Reasons To Believe: Facts For Faith Issue 8, 2002
		In a dualist construal, the mental states of other persons are always underdetermined by knowledge of the relevant physical facts about those persons (e.g., brain states and body movements) and, thus, knowledge of the physical facts does not yield knowledge of other people's mental states.
		Second, dualists see the physicalists' skepticism as going too far: physicalists presuppose that if it is logically possible for some knowledge claim to be mistaken, then one cannot have knowledge (or justified belief) regarding the claim, at least not until the skeptic is refuted.
		The dualist argues that an individual can have knowledge or justified belief even if it is logically possible that she is mistaken, or that she offers a defeasible account of knowledge of other minds.
	www.reasons.org /resources/fff/2002issue08 (16496 words)

	Spinoza on Substance (Anna Swartz)
		Richie equates substance with God and then examines the implications of their synonymity.
		Woolhouse attempts to rectify this problem by conceiving of substance as an abstraction which allows for the extended existence of the modes.
		Perhaps the strongest objection leveled against Spinoza is that, while proves that there can be no more than one substance, he does not prove that there must be any such thing as substance at all.
	www.trinity.edu /cbrown/modern/litrev/Spinoza-substance.html (2404 words)

	dangerous idea: Reply to Arnold Guminski, with some clarifications
		Accordingly, William Hasker’s emergent self is a kind of substance dualism which a naturalist could plausibly embrace were it purged of its theistic aspects, i.e., the doctrine that the emergent self survives the death of its parent organism due to miraculous intervention.
		The interactionist property dualist is simply referring to non-physical states of appropriately configured physical substances—it being understood that the physical substances in question are causal agents.
		However, the substance dualist must engage in “explaining exactly” how it is that what happens to the John’s human body (a physical substance) when he touches the flame causes John’s human soul (a spiritual substance) to have the particular mental state of experiencing pain.
	dangerousidea.blogspot.com /2007/08/reply-to-arnold-guminski-with-some.html (1479 words)

	Human Persons as a Test Case for Integrative Methodologies: Complementarity vs. Theistic Realism
		Second, a substance is a deep unity at a point in time of parts, properties, and capacities, and it maintains absolute sameness through (accidental) change.
		Substances are wholes that are ontologically prior to their parts in that those parts are what they are in virtue of what the substance is, taken as a whole.
		Though Locke was somewhat inconsistent, the standard way to understand him is note that he distinguished the identity of being a man (human) which consists in the "continuity" of a living organized body, from the identity of a person which consists in the "continuity" of consciousness and psychological traits, especially memory.
	www.leaderu.com /aip/docs/moreland1b.html (7028 words)

	Disembodied Survival and the Mind/Body Problem
		Substance dualism provides a basis for the persistence of a self through time without change and hence is essential to a robust account of personal identity.
		By contrast, the dualistic interactionist maintains that in addition to physical states causing mental states, mental states also cause physical states.
		Dualistic interactionists may be substance or property dualists, but some property dualists are epiphenomenalists.
	www.homestead.com /mscourses/files/DisembodiedSurvivalandtheMind.htm (799 words)

	Afterlife (Site not responding. Last check: )
		An argument used by dualists against monism is that the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead presupposes dualism, as it is impossible in a monistic framework.
		When the dualist appeals to the survival of the soul as a basis for continuity of personal identity, it is clear that it does so because it is deemed necessary for some essential part to survive.
		Substance dualism can thus be divided into those on the one hand who say that the soul is inherently immortal and cannot be destroyed by anyone, and those on the other hand who say that the soul possesses derived immortality.
	www.afterlife.co.nz /articles/anthropology/identity.html (9637 words)

	Wikinfo \| Mechanism (philosophy) (Site not responding. Last check: )
		What is less frequently appreciated is that René Descartes, who is today remembered mainly as a paradigmatic enemy of materialism and mechanism (and in that respect quite the opposite of Hobbes), also did much to advance the mechanistic understanding of nature, in both his scientific works on mechanics and in his philosophical works on metaphysics.
		Descartes was a substance dualist, and argued that reality was composed of two radically different types of substance: corporeal substance, on the one hand, and mental substance, on the other hand.
		Nevertheless, his understanding of corporeal substance was thoroughly mechanistic; his scientific work was based on the understanding of all natural objects, including not only billiard balls and rocks, but also non-human animals and even human bodies, as completely mechanistic automata.
	www.wikinfo.org /wiki.php?title=Mechanism_(philosophy) (1264 words)

	A Case for Qualified Dualism by Peter McCarthy (Site not responding. Last check: )
		If dualists are not prepared to adopt some form of 'occasionalism' then they have to believe that there are causal relations between the mental and the physical.
		Dualists agree with Dennett that the mind is not a stream of subatomic particles or sound waves (they are aware that such things do not characterise the mental, which is the whole point).
		The dualist can never really satisfy Dennett because they cannot speak on the same terms, one party insisting that the mind is physical, the other insisting that it is not.
	www.damaris.org /dcscs/readingroom/2001/dualism1.htm (2723 words)

	Amazon.ca: Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics: Books (Site not responding. Last check: )
		The aims of this book are: (1) to establish and defend Thomistic substance dualism as a viable view of what we are most fundamentally; and (2) to show that Thomistic substance dualism entails various (conservative) conclusions about medical technologies such as abortion, cloning, and euthanasia.
		Put another way, from the (alleged) fact that foetuses are "persons" in the sense of being individual substances with a rational nature, it simply does not follow that foetuses are "persons" in the sense of having a right to life.
		Moreland and Rae present a very strong case for the soul (their particular version of this: Thomistic substance dualism), they refute or significantly weaken most of the commonly offered critiques of their view and refute or critique the views that compete against theirs.
	www.amazon.ca /exec/obidos/ASIN/0830815775 (2573 words)

	Parallelism essay
		In formulating the substance dualist account of mind in which the mind and body are different substances, Descartes had not accounted for how the two substances might interact.
		This was a significant problem for the dualist account of mind and parallelism can be seen as an attempt to circumnavigate this issue (as in parallelism the two do not interact).
		As this was the other major problem facing dualist accounts of mind it could be argued that Liebniz's theory was incomplete, or at least fails to answer all of the questions.
	www.arrod.co.uk /essays/parallelism.php (1353 words)

	Ratiocination: A Repository of Thoughts
		Take a sort of folk substance dualism according to which there are ghosts and their ilk in this material world: immaterial substances which nonetheless occupy regions of spacetime and exert causal influence on the material world.
		What the substance dualist needs to exonerate soul-body interaction is not a principle according to which the co-location of souls is impossible; she only needs that such co-locations are not frequent at the actual world.
		After all, substance dualists think they have reason to think that humans are (at least partly) immaterial souls; Kim does not address any of these arguments in his book.
	www.andrewmbailey.com /BlogArchive/2006_10_01_archive.html (1897 words)

	Descartes vs
		Although Descartes believed that there was only one infinite substance (God), he believed that there were lots and lots of finite thinking substances, and lots and lots of extended substances.
		Spinoza rejects both of Descartes's divisions of substances, and rejects Descartes's plurality of finite substances.
		Substance, then, can be conceived of as thinking, or conceived of as extended.
	home.wlu.edu /~mahonj/Spinoza.Descartes.htm (639 words)

	AskPhilosophers.org (Site not responding. Last check: )
		The early Kant was a substance dualist who believed that there were spiritual substances that possessed a repulsive force and occupied space in just this way.
		Later in his life, Kant remained a substance dualist who believed that there existed a non-physical soul, but he jettisoned the idea that the soul had to possess impenetrability to be present in the world.
		So, the early Kant would answer your question that all substances in our world, both material and immaterial ones, possess attractive and repulsive forces and are located in space in virtue of a "region of impenetrability" created by the exertion of those forces on other substances.
	www.amherst.edu /askphilosophers/question/713 (563 words)

	PropDvsCD
		As before, the canny dualist should reject the blithe Churchlandian assumption that the main purpose of mental ascriptions is third-person explanatory.
		Churchland says that that argument doesn't threaten PD at all, because PD "reckons the brain as the seat of all mental activity." But as we saw, the substance dualist can do nearly as well, by granting that finely tuned brain processing is constantly and absolutely necessary for mental activity.
		Since the property dualist regards the immaterial properties as properties either of the brain or more broadly of the human animal who has them, s/he need not worry about what identifies or unifies or individuates Cartesian egos, or about the vexed relation between an ego and a human body.
	www.unc.edu /~ujanel/PropDvsCD.html (591 words)

	Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind - monism (Site not responding. Last check: )
		In philosophy of mind, monism is usually contrasted with the dualist position that mind and matter are deeply different.
		For example, Hobbes felt that the mental is merely and epiphenomena of the physical, thus the physical is the one real substance (Contemporary materialism is also a form of physicalistic monism (see Churchland, 1996).
		Spinoza's position is similar to that of Russell's neutral monism, however the latter is not committed to the belief that a supreme being is the more basic substance.
	www.artsci.wustl.edu /~philos/MindDict/monism.html (206 words)

	Plato’s Beard » One Reason I Am a Substance Dualist
		The view that persons are immaterial substances is not popular these days, at least not among philosophers and certainly not among cognitive scientists.
		The upshot is this: Alternatives to substance dualism conflict with what seems obvious to me, namely that my awareness of pain could not be possessed by a thing that is built out of things which themselves are not aware of pain.
		There’s a decent case to be made that the trouble with substance dualism is that talk of mind as substance, whether in materialist terms or along more Cartesian lines, is just a category mistake because really talk of mind commits us to nothing but talk of powers and capacities.
	www.platosbeard.com /philosophy-of-mind/one-reason-i-am-a-substance-dualist (4263 words)

	Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
		In the classical and mediaeval periods, it was the intellect that was thought to be most obviously resistant to a materialistic account: from Descartes on, the main stumbling block to materialist monism was supposed to be ‘consciousness’, of which phenomenal consciousness or sensation came to be considered as the paradigm instance.
		They emphasize that he was not a ‘Cartesian’ dualist, because the intellect is an aspect of the soul and the soul is the form of the body, not a separate substance.
		He believed that there were two kinds of substance: matter, of which the essential property is that it is spatially extended; and mind, of which the essential property is that it thinks.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/dualism (12972 words)

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