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| | Chapter IX: Tripartite Agreements |
 | | More important than the WSC list were the concepts developed at higher levels-in the State Department and in the JCS that the surrender document ought to be brief, attesting mainly to the fact of unconditional military surrender, and that specific provisions to be imposed on Germany should be relegated to orders, proclamations, and ordinances. |
 | | As a matter of fact, British and American intelligence opinions were in considerable agreement on the effect of the unconditional surrender policy, and the JCS would before long appeal to the President-unsuccessfully-to modify it, by doing at least what the British were attempting in their draft surrender, namely, stating their meaning specifically. |
 | | Secondly, in December, War Department planning had assumed that outright military government would probably have to be maintained in Germany for a time after the surrender; therefore, the EAC ought not to devise a permanent control system, particularly not since its mandate was limited to the immediate postsurrender period. |
| www.army.mil /CMH/books/wwii/Occ-GY/ch09.htm (9651 words) |
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