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| | Finance & Development, December 1999 - Financial Markets - Managing Global Finance and Risk |
 | | Private risk management and prudential oversight of financial institutions can be improved, and incentives strengthened for depositors, creditors, counterparties, and investors to exercise greater control over the activities of financial institutions with which they have business relationships. |
 | | Most current defenses against risk are premised on a limited definition of a systemic disturbance as an episode in which problems at one institution might cascade through payment systems, affect interbank relationships, lead to depositor runs, or infect other institutions to the point of posing risks for the financial system itself. |
 | | Although this approach has worked reasonably well in limiting systemic damage from financial excesses, it may lead to conflicts between the objectives of regulators, who, by providing insurance, want to reduce systemic risks, and those of the regulated institutions, which have incentives to take greater risks within internal and regulatory capital constraints. |
| www.imf.org /external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/12/schinasi.htm (2779 words) |
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