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| | Relative Identity (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-11-06) |
 | | The most common objections -- that on the temporal parts account, objects are not "wholly present" at any given time, and that on the relations-to-times account, seemingly simply properties of objects, such as Oscar having a gray muzzle, are complicated relations -- do little more than affirm what their targets deny. |
 | | There is a similar conflict of criteria in the case of personal identity: Brain duplication scenarios (Wiggins, 1967, Parfit, 1984) suggest that it is logically possible for one person to split into two competitors, each with equal claim to be the original person. |
 | | Secondly, the interesting cases of RI do not involve a shift from an impoverished point of view to an improved one -- whether this is seen in epistemic terms (which Geach disputes -- Geach, (1973)) or in purely logical terms. |
| www.science.uva.nl /~seop/entries/identity-relative (15279 words) |
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